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There has been an exponential growth in International Investment Agreements (IIAs), signed 
by countries to protect foreign investments, in last two decades. These agreements provide 
broad standards of treatment and give private investors the right to challenge allegedly treaty-
inconsistent regulatory actions of sovereign countries at international arbitration. Over the 
last decade or so, such investor-state disputes have increased manifold where all sorts of 
regulatory actions, like urban policy; health policy; monetary measures; taxation, property 
rules, environmental policy, have been challenged by private investors. These developments 
have not only brought the investor-state dispute settlement system under the scanner but have 
also made it imperative to critically review the substantive law the investor-state tribunals 
apply i.e. the IIAs. In this light, this thesis will critically analyse Indian IIAs, which have not 
been subjected to detailed research yet, despite India’s gigantic IIA programme and India’s 
increasing integration with the global economy. This thesis will analyse the provisions on fair 
and equitable treatment; expropriation; monetary transfer; and non precluded measures 
(NPM) in 73 Indian IIAs from the perspective of India’s regulatory power as a host nation.  
The thesis hypothesises that the present formulations of these four provisions, in Indian IIAs, 
are capable of being interpreted in a manner that gives precedence to investment protection 
over India’s regulatory power to adopt policies and measures directed at achieving legitimate 
policy objectives. Hence, the thesis concludes that these provisions in Indian IIAs should be 























CHAPTER 1  
 
IIAS AND REGULATORY POWER: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a steady increase in the number of International Investment Agreements 
(IIAs). The number of IIAs has increased from 500 in 1990 to 31161 by the end of 2010.2 In 
2010 alone, 54 IIAs were signed, with 20 IIAs being signed between developing countries.3 
This increase in the number of IIAs has been followed by an increase in the number of 
disputes between foreign investors and host states. The number of known investor-state treaty 
disputes has increased from little more than 50 in 1996 to 450 by the end of 2011.4 This has 
led to a global debate on the interests of foreign investors protected by the IIA, on the one 
hand, and regulatory power of the host state, on the other. This introductory chapter is an 
attempt to introduce this global debate as the backdrop against which the research on Indian 
IIAs has been carried out. The chapter introduces IIAs (Section 1.1) and provides a brief 
discussion on the meaning of regulatory power (Section 1.2). This is followed by a discussion 
on the emerging global debate on IIAs and host country’s regulatory power (Section 1.3). 
After this, the chapter introduces the debate on Indian IIAs and India’s regulatory power in 
light of the emerging global debate and provides the outline of the thesis (Section 1.4). 
Section 1.5 provides the methodology.    
 
1.1 PROLOUGE  
 
IIAs5 are treaties signed at the bilateral, regional or multilateral level by two or more 
countries to protect investments made by investors of both the countries.6 IIAs protect 
investments by imposing conditions on the regulatory behaviour of the host state and thus, 
                                                
1 The figure of 3116 IIAs includes 2807 Bilateral Investment Treaties and 309 other IIAs. This figure does not 
include Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA).  
2 World Investment Report (2011)  
3 Id.  
4 UNCTAD (2012).   
5 IIAs, used as a generic term in this thesis, includes Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Regional Investment 
Treaties (RITs) and investment chapters in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and in Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreements (CECAs). In India, IIAs are typically referred to as ‘Bilateral Investment Promotion 
Agreements’ (BIPA).     




prevent undue interference with the rights of the foreign investor.7 These conditions include 
restricting the host state from expropriating investments, barring for public interest with 
adequate compensation; imposing restrictions on host states to discriminate against foreign 
investment, barring certain circumstances given in the IIA; allowing for repatriation of profits 
subject to conditions agreed to between the two countries; and most importantly allowing 
individual investors to bring cases against host states if the latter’s sovereign regulatory 
measures are not consistent with the IIA8 to be monetarily compensated.9 This is known as 
the investor-state dispute settlement system. In this thesis, the dispute settlement system 
along with the network of IIAs is referred as investment treaty arbitration (ITA).  
 
There are several explanations given for the increase in number of IIAs, which can be broadly 
divided into perspectives of capital importing and capital exporting countries.10 From the 
perspective of capital importing countries, it is argued that countries enter into IIAs to attract 
foreign investment.11 One of the powerful voices in this regard is that of Andrew Guzman. 
He has argued that least developed countries (LDCs) entered into IIAs to overcome a 
‘dynamic inconsistency problem’12 for self economic interests such as attracting foreign 
investment.13 Other scholars have also argued that capital importing countries look at IIAs as 
                                                
7 In this regard it has been said that IIAs essentially focus on the ‘rights of the investor and the obligations of the 
host state, rather than the obligations of the capital-exporting state, or indeed the obligations of the investor’ – 
Qureshi and Ziegler (2011), 499.   
8 For a general discussion on IIAs see Dolzer and Stevens, (1995); Sornarajah (2004), 204–314; McLachlan, 
Shore and Weiniger, (2007); Lowenfeld (2008), 467–591; Dolzer and Schreuer (2008); Muchlinski, Ortino and 
Schreuer (eds) (2008); Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 1-73; Muchlinski (2007); Subedi (2008); Salacuse 
(2010); Vandevelde (2010).   
9 Sykes (2005), which emphasises on the significance of private right of action for money damages in 
international investment law.  It has been argued that investor-state dispute resolution became necessary because 
of the disadvantages that the investor faced in domestic courts of the host country and due to the weaknesses of 
the diplomatic system of protection – Choi (2007), 734-736.     
10 The distinction between capital exporting and capital importing countries is increasingly getting blurred due 
to the emergence of many countries that are both capital importers and exporters. 
11 This is clearly recognized as one of the key objectives of the Indian IIA programme, discussed later. 
Countries endeavour to attract foreign investment so as to fill the gap between resources mobilised and the 
resources needed to achieve growth and development targets - Todaro and Smith (2000), 711, Perkins et al, 526-
533. Foreign investment plays an important role in complementing developmental processes at the national level 
by enhancing export competitiveness - WIR (1999), 234-244; creating employment opportunities and providing 
opportunities to local labour to develop new skills - UNCTAD (1999), Rajan, (2004), 12. It has also been argued 
that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the form of green field investment (which is a net-addition to the capital 
stock of the host country) is beneficial to the host country in comparison to FDI in the form of acquisition 
(where there is no addition to the host country’s capital stock) - Singh (2005). On the other hand, it is also 
argued that in certain situations foreign investment may adversely affect the country’s economy by lowering 
domestic savings and investment by reducing competition and crowding out domestic investment - WIR (1999), 
171-172; Ghose (2011).   
12 This means a situation ‘when a preferred course of action, once undertaken, cannot be adhered to without the 
establishment of some commitment mechanism’ – See Guzman (2009), 78.   




admission tickets to foreign investments14 and limit their regulatory power by entering into an 
IIA to reduce investor insecurity in exchange for increased foreign investment inflows.15 
Some scholars are critical of Guzman’s mono-causal view arguing that LDCs enter into IIAs 
not just to overcome the ‘dynamic inconsistency problem’ but for a host of other economic 
and political reasons.16 However, a recent empirical study shows that it is largely correct that 
developing countries have entered into IIAs hoping to attract more foreign investment.17  
 
This leads to the question - do IIAs result in more investment flows? The empirical evidence 
and the academic debate on the effect of IIAs on foreign investment are divided and thus 
inconclusive.18 There are studies that argue for a positive relationship between IIAs and 
investment inflows. For instance, Neumayer and Spees have analysed the data of 119 
countries from 1970 to 2001 to argue for a positive relationship between IIAs and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI).19 Another study argues that stricter IIAs increase FDI whereas less 
strict IIAs have no effect.20 It has also been argued that although there is some positive effect 
of IIAs on foreign investment flows, these treaties are at best complements and not 
substitutes for good institutional quality and local property rights in the host state – factors 
which have a more direct influence on foreign investment.21  
 
On the one hand, IIAs could be an important tool to attract foreign investment because by 
signing an IIA the host country signals congenial investment environment and offers treaty 
based protection and thus enhanced security for investment.22 This enhanced security does 
play a role in boosting investor confidence to make investments.23 However, on the other 
hand, arguably, signing IIAs alone do not ensure greater foreign investment inflows because 
                                                
14 Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), 9.  
15 Id. Also see Salacuse and Sullivan (2005), 71; Dolzer and Schreuer, (2008), 9; Subedi (2008), 161; Dolzer 
(2005), 953; Dugan et al (2008), 6-7; Akinsanya (1987), 58. 
16 Alvarez (2011), 620-621. Also see Yackee (2008), 815 challenging Guzman’s findings.   
17 Poulsen (2011), 114-151.   
18 See Sauvant and Sachs (2009), which documents studies showing the effect of investment treaties on FDI 
flows. The prominent studies on this relationship are - Neumayer and Spees (2005); Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 
(2006); Salacuse and Sullivan (2005); Driemeyer (2003).  
19 Neumayer and Spees (2005), 1567.  
20 Salacuse and Sullivan (2005), 67.  
21 See Aisbett (2009), 395; Yackee (2010), 397; Poulsen (2010); Driemeyer (2003). Also see Vandevelde 
(2005), 184.  
22 Vandevelde, (1998), 522-525; Robin (1984), 942-43; UNCTAD (1998); Kotera (2008), 624.        




foreign investment is more related to macro economic factors such as host country’s overall 
economic stability, advantages as a location, level of infrastructure and other related factors.24  
 
From the perspective of capital exporting countries, greater liberalisation and cross border 
investment flows has meant more and more investors are investing abroad and, as a result, 
subjecting themselves to the sovereign powers of the host state. This, in turn, has increased 
the demand for international investment law to regulate the relationship between investors 
and host states.25 The weakness and vagueness of customary international law (CIL) and also 
of contractual guarantees given by countries to investors has strengthened the need to develop 
an international investment law regime.26 This international investment law regime has been 
developing in the form of IIAs.27 It has been argued that the ascend in the number of IIAs can 
be seen as an endeavor to develop international investment law as a new regulating structure 
where foreign investment has the benefit of treaty based protection and where investor-state 
arbitration is used to police state’s regulatory conduct.28 Furthermore, since there is no 
multilateral treaty for investment protection, capital exporting countries are relying more and 
more on IIAs to develop higher treaty protection standards for their investment.29      
 
1.2 REGULATORY POWER OF THE HOST STATE     
 
A comprehensive discussion on ‘regulation’ is beyond the scope of this work. However, a 
brief discussion of the concept of ‘regulation’ is important to understand the meaning of 
                                                
24 Salacuse (1990), 673; Also see Vandevelde, (1998), 524. Data on FDI flows on the basis of country of origin 
into India shows that US has been the second largest investor in India after Mauritius (10% of total FDI flows in 
India from 2000-07 originated from the US) -  Gopalan and Rajan (2009). Another example is of Brazil that has 
no IIAs, but is still one of the leading recipients of FDI in Latin America – see Whitsitt and Vis-Dunbar (2008).   
25 Chill (2009), 3.   
26 Guzman (1998), 679; Tobin and Ackerman (2005), 7; Dugan et al (2008), 51-53; Dolzer and Stevens (1995), 
2; UNCTAD (1998), 7; Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 40-41. Also see Sornarajah (2008), 199-223, who has 
argued that growth in the number of IIAs was a result of the extension and expansion of the neo liberal agenda. 
This view has been critiqued by Jose Alvarez. See Alvarez (2011), 607. Also see Vandevelde (1998), 502; 
Lowenfeld (2003), 127.     
27 See Salacuse (2010), 5-6 who has conceptualized the mass of investment treaties as constituting a regime.  
28 See Chill (2009), 1-10. Also see Vandevelde (2009), 30-64 that describes the first and the second wave of the 
US IIA programme where IIAs developed for legal, economic and political objectives in mind. Also the German 
IIA programme focused on creating a favourable treaty protection regime for foreign investments – see Poulsen 
(2011), 102-107 for more details.      
29 Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 42. Also see Chalamish (2009), 305 – for the argument that lack of a 
multilateral agreement on investment has also played a role in more and more IIAs coming into existence. In 
this regard, it is also interesting to note the argument that the MFN provision in the present IIAs is converting 
the present regime of bilateral investment treaty protection into a multilateral framework – see Chalamish 




‘regulatory power’, a term, used in the entire thesis. Developing a working definition of 
‘regulatory power’ will be useful in understanding the analysis in the forthcoming chapters.  
 
It is difficult to define regulation. The definitions of regulation have hovered around the 
conceptualisations of centred regulation and decentred regulation. Centred regulation means 
that regulation involves only the state; whereas decentred regulation means that regulation, as 
an activity, also involves non-state actors such as Inter Governmental Organisations (IGOs) 
and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs); and that ‘regulation’ is a broader social 
phenomenon than ‘law’ in the sense ‘regulation’ does not need to emanate from the state, and 
‘law’ can thus be seen as one form of regulation.30 Since this work is about the regulatory 
power of host states, it will focus on the centred regulatory concept. This is, of course, not to 
say that decentred regulatory conceptualisation has no role to play in the debate on IIAs and 
regulatory power. However, the regulatory role of non state actors in the host state, in case of 
IIAs, is outside the scope of this work.31   
 
Centred regulation can be understood in two different ways. First, regulation is the 
promulgation of rules by government accompanied by mechanisms for monitoring and 
enforcement, usually assumed to be performed through a specialist public agency.32 This is a 
narrow understanding of regulation because here regulation is carried out only by specialist 
public regulatory bodies mainly aimed at correcting market failures and it generally excludes 
redistributive policies of the state from the ambit of regulation.33 Thus, according to this 
understanding of regulation, state providing subsidies to industries set up in economically 
backward region is not regulation.  
 
Second, regulation is any form of state intervention in the economy, whatever form that 
intervention might take.34 This is a broader understanding of regulation under which the state 
may intervene not just through specialist regulatory bodies like the regulatory body for the 
telecom sector, but also through direct state intervention. Thus, according to this 
                                                
30 For more on this see Black (2002), 1; Black, (2001), 54; Smith, (2002), ?; Baldwin, Scott and Hood, (1998); 
Morgan and Yeung (2007). It is interesting to note the argument that there exists a web of regulatory 
mechanisms and law is just one strand, albeit a particularly significant one, in the complex web of regulatory 
mechanisms. For more on this see – Braithwate and Parker (2004), 270-271; Black (2004), 34.   
31 For a discussion on the role of non-state actors in this debate see Muchlinski (2008), 8-9; Kawahru (2010).  
32 Majone (1996).   
33 Krajewski (2003).  




understanding, regulation is state’s intervention through various policies and measures to 
control, order or influence the behavior of others.35 In this thesis, regulation is understood in 
this broader sense. On this basis, one can define regulatory power as ‘the ability of the host 
state to adopt policies and laws to achieve a variety of policy objectives’.36  
 
1.3 GLOBAL DEBATE ON IIAs AND REGULATORY POWER  
 
Right to regulate is the sovereign prerogative of a country arising from the control over its 
own territory;37 however, IIAs require countries to exercise this sovereign right in accordance 
with their obligations for the protection of foreign investors. This brings IIAs and host 
country’s regulatory power face to face. One can conceptualise the relationship between IIAs 
and host country’s regulatory power in different ways such as it can be argued that IIAs result 
in ‘regulatory chill’ in the host state.38 As per this argument, host country does not exercise 
its regulatory power because it perceives that its regulations may violate the IIA for which it 
can be sued by the investor, resulting in a ‘chilling effect’.39 Testing this hypothesis will 
require an investigation and documentation of cases where the host country was constrained 
from exercising its regulatory power because it thought the concerned regulation would 
violate the IIA. This hypothesis has been challenged on the ground that regulators in host 
states are often not aware of IIAs and of disputes that can be brought under them.40 It has also 
been argued that it is difficult to find such cases ‘because they require counter-factual 
evidence about the regulations that would have existed in the absence of the purported 
chilling’.41 In similar vein, it has been argued that even if regulators in the host state adopt a 
regulatory measure under the belief that such measures are compatible with the IIA, they 
however abandon them when threatened to be sued by foreign investors under the IIA.42  
 
                                                
35 Black (2002), 25. Also see Reagan (1987), 15.   
36 In this regard, it has also been argued that under this type of regulation countries regulate not just in public 
interest but also in private interest. See Ogus (1994); Krajewski (2003), 11-21. Also see Morgan and Yeung 
(2007), 8-9 for the argument that theories on regulation can be divided in three categories – ‘public interest’ 
‘private interest’ and ‘institutionalist’ approach.   
37 WIR (2003), 145.  
38 See Tienhaara (2009), 262; High Commissioner for Human Rights (2003), 21; Schill (2007), 470.  
39 See Bonnitcha (2011), 133-137.  
40 Coe Jr and Rubins (2005), 599.  
41 Bonnitcha (2011), 134; Neumayer (2001), 78.    




Tienhaara supports the regulatory chill hypothesis by giving examples of such cases from 
NAFTA and Costa Rica.43 The inherent assumption in the ‘regulatory chill’ hypothesis is that 
regulators in host states have full knowledge about IIAs and of the disputes that can be 
brought against them under such international treaties. However, this assumption is 
challengeable especially in context of developing countries where officials have inadequate 
knowledge about IIAs.44 This is more so in case of countries that have inadequate or 
negligible experience in defending their regulatory measures in ITA. In other words, it is 
possible that regulators in a country might start internalising IIAs in their exercise of 
regulatory power, if previously foreign investors have challenged their regulations under 
IIAs. However, even this depends on various factors such as whether regulators in developing 
countries have the internal technical capacity to do so.       
 
 Another conceptualisation of the relationship between IIAs and regulatory power can be in 
terms of ‘IIA disputes’. As per this conceptualisation, the host country, unaware of the 
implications of IIAs, exercises its regulatory power, which the foreign investor challenges 
under ITA. Hence, the ITA tribunal gets to decide whether the regulatory measure of the host 
country is legal or not by interpreting the concerned IIA. In other words, the legality of the 
host country’s regulatory measure will depend on the interpretation of different provisions of 
the IIA. This, in turn, will shift the focus on how different provisions of the IIA are worded 
and whether these provisions balance investment protection with regulatory power. If an ITA 
tribunal comes to the conclusion that the regulatory measure of the host state is illegal, it will 
require the host state to pay damages to the foreign investor. Paying damages to the foreign 
investor will increase the cost of regulation, which may deter the host country from adopting 
such regulations in future. Although the ITA tribunal will not require the host state to remove 
the regulatory measure, the host country will not like to be seen as pursuing a regulatory 
measure that has been found illegal under international law since this may affect the 
reputation of the host country as an attractive destination for foreign investment. Further, 
continuance of such regulatory measure may encourage other foreign investors to challenge 
the measure.  
 
                                                
43 Tienhaara (2011), 617-626. Also see Bonnitcha (2011), 137-139.   
44 See Poulsen (2011). Also, as the thesis will show in chapter 2, in India there is very low level of awareness 




In other words, as per this conceptualisation, the relationship between IIAs and host country’s 
regulatory power is to be understood in terms of the potential disputes that can be brought 
against the host country for violating IIAs. Hence, the focus here is on understanding the 
nature of IIAs signed by that country. This conceptualisation is best suited to understand the 
relationship between IIAs and regulatory power in case of countries where there is poor 
knowledge about the implications of IIAs and hence IIAs have not been internalised in the 
exercise of regulatory power.45    
 
1.3.1 Recognition of Conflict between IIAs and Regulatory Power   
 
IIA disputes between foreign investors and host states have covered a very wide array of 
regulatory measures such as environmental policy;46 sovereign decisions regarding 
privatisation;47 regulatory issues related to supply of drinking water;48 urban policy;49 
monetary policy;50 laws and policies related to taxation;51 policy related to re-organisation of 
public telephone services;52 industrial policy related to sectors like media;53 financial 
services;54 banking;55 energy;56 public postal services;57 electricity services;58 motorway 
construction;59 tourism;60 and many others.61 In a number of cases against Argentina,62 the 
                                                
45 See Chapter 2 for this issue in context of India.  
46 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States 5 ICSID 236; Methanex Corporation v United States of 
America (2005) 44 ILM 1345.  
47 Eureka BV v Republic of Poland, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11, 19 August 2005 
48 Biwater Gauff Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 24 July 2008.   
49 MTD Equity v Republic of Chile (2005) 44 ILM 91. 
50 CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentina, ICISD Case No ARB/01/8; CMS Gas Transmission Company v 
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8 (Annulment Proceedings);  Enron Corporation v Argentina, ICSID Case 
No ARB/01/3; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/01/3 (Annulment 
Proceeding); Sempra Energy International v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16; Sempra Energy 
International v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 (Annulment Proceedings); LG&E Energy Corporation v 
Argentina, ICISD Case No ARB/02/1; Continental Casualty Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9. 
51 Occidental Exploration and Production Co v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No UN 3467; EnCana 
Corporation v Ecuador, London Court of International Arbitration, 3 February 2006; Feldman v Mexico, ICSID 
Case No ARB(AF)/99/1.  
52 Telenor Mobile Communications v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/04/15.  
53 CME v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, September 3, 2011; R S Lauder v The Czech 
Republic, 9 ICSID Reps 66, 3 Septemebr 2001.   
54 Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/01, 17 July 2006.  
55 Saluka Investments v The Czech Republic (Partial Award), UNCITRAL, 17 March 2006.   
56 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, 18 August 2008.  
57 United Parcel Service of America v Canada, Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 24 May 2007.  
58 Nykomb Synergetics v Republic of Latvia, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 16 December 2003.  
59 Bayindir Insaat Ticaret VeSanayi AS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No ARB/03/29 
60 Waguih Elie George v Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, 1 June 2009.     




core issue has been whether Argentina’s regulatory measures to safeguard its economy from 
a complete collapse violated the obligations that Argentina undertook in its IIAs. As it will be 
discussed in the thesis, many ITA tribunals have concluded that Argentina could not suspend 
its treaty obligations even in response to an extremely severe financial, economic, social and 
political crisis.63 There have also been cases where ITA tribunals have adjudicated over the 
actions of the judiciary.64 One key example that best illustrates the conflict between 
investment protection and host state’s regulatory power is the challenge posed by foreign 
investors to the South African legislation (Minerals and Petroleum Resources Act) aimed at 
empowering the participation of Blacks in the South African mining industry.65 Another 
example demonstrating the wide net of IIAs capable of catching many sovereign regulatory 
functions as potential violations of the IIA is Philip Morris, a tobacco company, challenging 
Uruguay’s public health measure aimed at regulating cigarette packaging as a violation of the 
Switzerland-Uruguay IIA.66 Philip Morris (Asia) Limited has also given a notice to the 
Australian government on the cigarette plain packaging requirements under Australia’s IIA 
with Hong Kong.67      
 
In other words, many sovereign decisions of host countries68 have been adjudicated by 
arbitral tribunals as violations of the IIA.69 Furthermore, there are examples in ITA where 
similar set of facts70 or even the same provision of an IIA71 has been interpreted differently 
                                                                                                                                                  
62 CMS v Argentina; CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina, (Annulment Proceedings); Enron 
Corporation v Argentina; Sempra Energy International v Argentina; LG&E Energy Corporation v Argentina; 
Continental Casualty Company v Argentina.  
63 See CMS v Argentina; Sempra v Argentina; Enron v Argentina   
64 Saipem SpA v Bangladesh, ICSID Case No ARB/05/7, 30 June 2009.  
65 Piero Foresti et al v South Africa, Case No ARB(AF)/07/1, 4 August 2010.  
66 See Porterfield and Byrnes (2011), 3.  
67 For more on this issue see Voon and Mitchell (2011), 515.  
68 Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), 7-8; Kaushal (2009), 511-512.  
69 This is not to suggest that in each of these disputes, the host state’s regulatory measure was found illegal. In 
fact, limited empirical work done in this area (based on 52 decided cases), shows that in 20 cases foreign 
investors were awarded damages whereas in 30 cases host countries paid nothing to foreign investors – see 
Franck (2007). Sornarajah has critiqued this by arguing that one should not look merely at the results of 
investment disputes but also at the nature of pro-investor doctrines created by arbitrators on the basis of treaty 
interpretation – Sornarajah (2010), 235. Also see Gallagher and Shrestha (2011), which challenges Franck’s 
study.  It has been rightly argued that though ITA uses a private law adjudication model based on arbitration 
followed in international commercial arbitration (ICA), it addresses public law questions and hence the nature 
and character of ITA is very different from ICA – see Van Harten (2007); Schill (2010). Also see Salacuse 
(2010), 354-355; Van Harten and Loughlin (2006), 121; Montt (2009). Also see Mills (2011), 469  
70 The most commonly stated example of this is the ‘Lauders case’ where two arbitration tribunals gave different 
decisions to essentially the same set of facts for disputes brought under two different IIAs. The cases are – CME 
Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic, 13 September 2001, 14 (3) World Trade and Arbitration Material 109 and 
Lauder (Ronald) v Czech Republic, 3 September 2001, 4 World Trade and Arbitration Materials 35.   
71 The Argentine cases on Article XI of the US-Argentina IIA are a good example of such inconsistency. C H 




by tribunals. The ITA rulings have also resulted in award of substantive damages to foreign 
investors,72 and thus have resulted in diversion of taxpayer’s money to foreign investors. For 
these reasons, many question the entire ITA system and use terms like ‘legitimacy crisis’ to 
describe it.73   
 
There may be disagreements regarding whether the term ‘legitimacy crisis’ is appropriate to 
describe the current state of affairs in the ITA system or some alternative term should be 
used.74 However what cannot be ignored is that adjudication of such large gamut of sovereign 
regulatory powers of host states by ITA tribunals as breaches of IIAs, which have the 
potential of affecting a large part of the population of the host state, certainly raises questions 
about the relationship between IIAs and host country’s regulatory power.75  
 
State practice of different countries such as Latin American countries and other developing 
and developed countries like the US and Canada76 reveal the acceptance of a problem 
between IIAs and host country’s regulatory power. This state practice, mentioned below, is in 
response to the experiences of these countries with ITA.77 Some countries have taken the 
extreme step of denunciating the system; whereas some are critically reviewing their existing 
                                                                                                                                                  
towards a common set of interpretative principles or that there is no possibility of uniform jurisprudence 
emerging through adjudication that balances investment protection with host state’s regulatory power, in the 
future. Such convergence might happen in future with more and more investment treaty disputes coming up for 
resolution – see Cheng (2006), 1014. However, the formidable challenge of reconciling different tribunals 
interpreting different IIAs remains. For a different view point on the issue of divergent interpretation see – 
Alexandrov (2011), 60.      
72 For example in CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Czech Republic paid US $ 355 million to CME 
as damages for violating the IIA on account of adopting a regulatory measure. As per one study on NAFTA – to 
date, Canada has paid damages to the tune of $ CAD 157 million to NAFTA claimants; Mexico has paid 
damages more than $187 million; interestingly US has not paid any damage as it has never lost a NAFTA case. 
Also all three NAFTA countries have incurred significant costs in defending their claims – Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives (2010), NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes available at 
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2010/11/NAFTA%
20Dispute%20Table.pdf.   
73 See Van Harten (2007), 63; Franck (2005), 1521; Schneidermann (2000), 757; Kaushal (2009) 491; Waibel, 
et al (2010), xxxvii – li; Brower and Steven, (2001), 193; Laird (2001), 223; Howse, (2008), 72-73; 
Schneidermann (2008), 69; Newcombe (2007) 394; Bottini (2008), 145; Karl (2008) 231-38; Choudhary (2008), 
775-831; Muchlinski (2009), 1; Ruggie (2009); Subedi (2006), 121; Joubin-Bret (2009), 145; Spears (2010). In 
this regard also see Moloo and Jacinto (2011), 1. One scholar has argued that investment rules regime imposes 
constitution-like limits on state regulatory capacity - Schneidermann (2008), 77-78. 
74 Bjorklund (2011). The Rapporteur’s Report admits that while there are differences in terms of the gravity of 
the crisis in ITA system, there is recognition that ITA system has problems that require attention.  
75 Wells (2011). Also see Schill (2011), 69 who states ‘the extent to which investment treaties limit a state’s 
regulatory powers and subject the exercise of such powers to liability claims by foreign investors may become 
the litmus test for the future viability of the system’.  
76 See the separate and concurring opinion of B Schwartz on SD Myers v Canada, 12 November 2000 available 
at http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/Canada/SDMyers/SDMyersMeritsAwardOpinion.pdf; Herman (1998), 
121; Mann (2000), 405. Brower II (2001), 43. 




IIAs.78 Bolivia and Ecuador gave up their membership of the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).79 In 2008, Ecuador terminated nine IIAs.80 
Recently, on 24 January 2012, Venezuela sent a notice to the World Bank denouncing the 
ICSID convention.81 In July 2009, Russian Federation terminated the provisional application 
of the Energy Charter Treaty.82 Venezuela also announced its intention to renegotiate 25 
IIAs.83 Previously, Venezuela had sent a notice terminating its IIA with Netherlands because 
it felt that the particular IIA came in the way of implementing policy changes in its energy 
sector.84 Many Latin American countries are developing new model IIAs keeping in mind the 
concerns such IIAs can have on their regulatory powers.85 
 
In 2009, South Africa began a review of its entire IIA programme partly necessitated by 
various arbitral claims made against it.86 The South African government admits that in its 
endeavour to make the country an attractive destination for foreign investment, it entered into 
IIAs without critically evaluating their impact on policy-making in critical areas.87 This, 
according to the South African government, happened because of the inexperience of their 
negotiators and lack of knowledge about investment law.88  
 
                                                
78 Also see Spears (2011), 272-275.  
79 List of Contracting States and other Signatories to the ICSID convention (as on 7 January 2010) online pdf 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&langu
age=English. For detailed discussion on the legal effect of these denunciations see Tzanakopoulos (2011), 75; 
UNCTAD (2010). Bolivia has faced three ITA disputes so far - Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, 21 October 2005; Guaracachi America, INC.(USA) and Rurelec PLC (UK) v. The 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No.AA406, Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. 
and Allan Fosk Kaplún v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2. Ecuador has faced 14 ITA 
disputes - http://italaw.com/alphabetical_list_respondant.htm  
80 Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs, IIA Issues Note No 2 (December 2010) online 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf.   
81 Venezuela Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Anno
uncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement100. Venezuela has faced 10 ITA 
disputes so far - http://italaw.com/alphabetical_list_respondant.htm  
82 Salacuse (2010), 470; Salacuse (2010), 427.  
83 Venezuela follows Bolivia and Ecuador with Plans to Denounce ICSID Convention available at 
http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/CFE8282C-A5F0-40CA-805E-
915A7864D2A7/0/VenezuelafollowsBoliviaandEcuadorwithplanstodenounceICSIDConvention.html  
84 Peterson (2008).  
85 Analysis: Latin America’s New model Bilateral Investment Treaties, Investment Treaty News, 17 July 2008 
available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2008/07/17/in-depth-latin-america-s-new-model-bilateral-investment-
treaties/   
86 Department of Trade and Industry, Republic of South Africa, Notice 961 of 2009, online 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=103768.    
87 Id.  
88 Id. See Poulsen (2011), 300-322, which undertakes a detailed historical analysis of the South African IIA 




Other notable developments on state practice include recognition by developed countries like 
Australia, United States, Canada and Norway of conflicts between investment protection and 
host country’s regulatory power. Australia has recently decided not to have investor-state 
dispute resolution mechanism in its trade agreements,89 and has made it clear that it is against 
all provisions that come in way of making laws for social, environmental and economic 
purposes. This is in clear response to the notice given by Philip Morris (Asia) Limited 
challenging Australia’s tobacco regulations.90 Similarly, in 2001, NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission (FTC) – a body composed of the representatives of all the three NAFTA states 
issued a note of interpretation aimed at limiting and rejecting the expansive interpretation 
given by arbitral tribunals on the meaning of fair and equitable treatment (FET).91 
Furthermore, Canada, in response to the concerns expressed by the civil society on the effect 
of investment treaties on Canada’s regulatory power, adopted a new model IIA in 2004.92 
Even Norway developed a new model IIA in 2008, in response to concerns related to IIAs 
and host state’s regulatory power.93 Although, Norway is yet to adopt this model since 
concerns arose that it doesn’t balance investment protection with regulation.94  
 
In 2004, US adopted new model IIA in an effort to address the apprehensions that the 1994 
model IIA didn’t balance investment protection with regulatory power.95 The change in the 
approach of the US towards IIAs came about when foreign investors started suing the US 
government for IIA violation.96 During the initial years of its IIA programme, US had not 
critically mulled over the possibility of being a respondent state in ITA and hence its 
approach was clearly biased in favour of foreign investment.97 For example, during its early 
wave of the IIA programme, US wanted to establish a body of state practice in support of its 
                                                
89 US-Australia FTA does not contain investor-state dispute resolution. See – Gillard Government Trade Policy 
Statement (2011), ‘Trading Our Way to more Jobs and Prosperity’ available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.pdf  
90 Philip Morris sues Australian Government over Tobacco Laws (2011), The Guardian available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/21/philip-morris-australia-tobacco-laws  
91 Salacuse (2010), 225.  
92 Newcombe (2004).  
93 ‘Norway Proposes Significant Reforms to its Investment Treaty Practices’, Investment Treaty News, 27 March 
2008 available at  http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_mar27_2008.pdf  
94 ‘Norway Shelves its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty’, Investment Treaty News, 8 June 2009 available 
at http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/06/08/norway-shelves-its-proposed-model-bilateral-investment-treaty/  
95 See Vandevelde (2009), 64-82 for a detailed description of the third wave of the US IIA programme focusing 
on the conditions that made the US change its approach towards IIAs. Also see Alvarez and Park (2003), 383-
386; Vandevelde (2009); Spears (2010), 1038.  
96 Vandevelde (2009), 64-65; Sornarajah (2009), 291. Jose Alvarez has argued that the change in the US 
approach to IIAs was due to the realisation within US that it could be at the receiving end of foreign investment 
flows – See Alvarez (2011), 625-26.  




view on prompt, adequate and effective compensation for expropriation without emphasising 
on the necessity of opino juris.98 However, this approach changed, when foreign investors 
started suing US, as is evident by the defence made by US in the Loewen99 and ADF group100 
cases.101     
 
Even after the adoption of the 2004 model IIA, the Obama administration announced that it 
will ‘review the implementation of our FTAs and BITs to ensure that they advance the public 
interest’.102 Elucidating further on this, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Trade of the 
Committee on Ways and Means, while holding a hearing on investment obligations in US 
IIAs, said – ‘concerns have been expressed regarding these investment provisions. These 
concerns include: whether our FTAs and BITs give foreign investors in the United States 
greater rights than U.S. investors have under U.S. law; whether the FTAs and BITs give 
governments the regulatory and policy space needed to protect the environment and the 
public welfare.’103 Surely, it is not coincidental that all countries who are reviewing their IIAs 
are those who had foreign investors bringing cases against them under IIAs.    
 
1.3.2 Reasons for Conflict  
 
A wide variety of views have been expressed on the problems affecting the ITA system. 
Many scholars argue that a wide range of sovereign decisions of host states are capable of 
being caught in the broad net of investor-state dispute settlement due to the vague and broad 
language of IIAs.104 The provision on fair and equitable treatment, occurring in almost all 
IIAs, is an appropriate example of such a term whose meaning is unclear.105 Such imprecise 
and broad provisions like FET become suitable candidates for broad and inconsistent treaty 
interpretations as chapter 4 of the thesis on FET discusses.106 Similarly, all IIAs contain a 
                                                
98 Id.  
99 The Loewen Group Inc v United States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/98/3.  
100 ADF Group Inc v USA, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/1, 9 January 2003.  
101 Vandevelde (2009), 65.  
102 See the Advisory from the Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade of the United States 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg53473/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg53473.pdf Id.  
103 Id. See the new US Model IIA 2012 available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf   
104 See Schill (2011), 67-68; Wells (2010), 342; Spears (2010), 1040; Alavarez and Khamsi (2008), 472-478; 
Clodfelter (2009), 921. In this regard Brower and Schill (2009), 471 - have argued that IIA provisions are not as 
abroad as some contend.   
105 See chapter 4 on FET for an elaborate discussion on this.  




provision on expropriation without defining when it can be said that the host state has 
expropriated investor’s investment.107 The textual indeterminacy of the IIAs has resulted in 
divergent and inconsistent legal conclusions108 and has also led to unexpected and undesired 
results.109 Such indeterminacy has given a fair degree of discretion to ITA tribunals to 
interpret the terms occurring in IIAs and hence indulge in ‘law-making’ activity.110 Problems 
related to such activity by ad hoc ITA tribunals are discussed in the thesis.111   
 
Some scholars hold arbitral interpretation responsible for emerging problems in the ITA 
system, arguing that arbitrators have failed to interpret IIAs in a manner that balances 
interests of competing stakeholders by adopting pro-investor interpretation of IIAs to enhance 
investment protection.112 A public statement on international investment regime supported by 
many leading academics says ‘awards issued by international arbitrators against states have 
in numerous cases incorporated overly expansive interpretations of language in investment 
treaties. These interpretations have prioritized the protection of the property and economic 
interests of transnational corporations over the right to regulate of states and the right to 
self-determination of peoples’.113 It has also been argued that IIAs are aimed at pursuing neo-
liberal policies at the cost of the regulatory power of developing countries.114 Some scholars 
argue that arbitrators have adopted interpretations of IIAs different from what the countries 
had in mind at the time of drafting these treaties.115  
 
                                                
107 See the chapter on expropriation for full discussion on this.  
108 For a detailed discussion on such inconsistent decisions see Franck (2005), 1558-1582. Also see Reinisch 
(2009), 905-908; McLachlan et al (2007), 88.  
109 Salacuse 2010, 342. See for example Occidental Exploration v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No 
UN3467, 1 July 2004  – where ‘like circumstances’ in the national treatment provision was interpreted in an 
unexpected manner to compare treatment given to foreign oil company (involved in exporting oil) not with 
domestic oil company but with all exporters, like flower exporters. Also see cases involving Argentina where 
Argentina’s response to an extremely severe financial crisis has been held by many arbitral tribunals as violating 
IIA provisions – see – Burke-White (2010), 407. These cases are discussed at different places in the thesis.    
110 Schill (2011), 1092-1093.  
111 See the substantive chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 on expropriation, FET, capital transfer provision and Non 
Precluded Measures respectively.   
112 Sornarajah (2008), 205 and 207-208 and Karl (2008), 234-236. Also see Subedi (2008), 139-140; Subedi 
(2006), 128-130. Also see the argument on adopting contextual standards for developing countries for IIA 
interpretation owing to the low level of development of developing countries – Alexander (2008) 817-843.    
113 Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, 31 August 2010 available at 
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement/documents/Public%20Statement%20%28June%202011%29.pdf  
114 Sornarajah 2009; Miles (2010), 1. For a general hegemonic critique of international law making based on 
Marxist analysis see Chimni (2004). On this point also see Mills (2011), 501-502.   




Others hold the institutional design used to settle disputes between foreign investors and host 
states responsible for the problems in ITA.116 The argument is that the ITA system is 
evidently biased against host states and in favour of foreign investors because it is not based 
on an impartial and independent adjudicative process.117 Arbitrators are appointed on a case 
to case basis and many a times may act as counsel in similar sort of disputes thus raising 
issues related to conflict of interest.118 Hence, it has been proposed to create a world 
investment court to act as an impartial and independent adjudicator to settle investor-state 
disputes.119 Arguably, the absence of an appellate system in ITA that could correct the 
divergent interpretations of different arbitral tribunals and hence enhance certainty and 
predictability in the system is also responsible for the problems affecting the ITA system.120 
Thus, it has been proposed to build an appellate mechanism for investment treaty 
arbitration.121  
 
On the other hand, some authors argue that IIAs are only going through ‘growing pains’, 
which will disappear as the system grows older;122 and while some argue that the ITA system 
does not adversely affect the host state’s right to regulate.123 The argument often is that under 
general international law host countries have the regulatory power to adopt ‘non 
discriminatory’, ‘good faith’ regulatory measure for public policy without attracting any 
international liability,124 which has been recognised by many tribunals.125 For example, in the 
context of disputes on expropriation, it is argued that regulatory measures adopted by a state 
as part of its ‘police power’ is not expropriation.126 These arbitral rulings are discussed 
throughout the thesis in subsequent chapters; it is important to state here that the precise 
                                                
116 Van Harten (2007).  
117 Id. Van Harten (2010), 433.    
118 Lowe (2002), 464-465. Also see Sands (2011), 19.   
119 Van Harten (2007). Also see Meyers (2008), 47; and Alvarez (2008), 909, – which offer a critique of Van 
Harten’s work.  
120 Franck (2005). Also see Brower II (2003), 37. 
121 Franck (2005). Also see Wälde (2005). Further proposals to improve the institutional design and its 
functioning are establishing a ‘roaster’ for the composition of the ‘tribunal’ - Karl (2008), 242; allowing for 
amicus curiae submissions; allowing non-parties to have access to arbitral proceedings - See generally 
Chaudhary (2008), 818-821.  
122 Stern (2011).   
123 See Paulson (2006); Brower & Schill, (2009), 483-489; Moloo and Jacinto (2011), 1; Krishan (2011).      
124 Paulsson (2006); Brower and Schill (2009), 471; Alvarez (2009), 17. Also see Newcombe (2008), 145.  
125 Methanex Corporation v Mexico, NAFTA Award (of August 3, 2005); Tecmed v Mexico, ICSID Case No 
ARB/AF (00)/2; Feldman v Mexico, Award, 16 December 2002, 18 ICSID Review-FILJ (2003) 488; Saluka v 
Czech Republic, para 255; Parkerings-Campignet AS v Lithuania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/8, 11 September 
2007, para 332.  Also see Santa Elena v Costa Rica (Award), 5 ICSID Reports 153, 17 February 2000, and ADC 
Affiliate Ltd v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/03/16, 2 October 2006 who do not support this 
position. This discussed in different chapters of the thesis. Also see Martinez (2010), 331-336.   




boundaries of justified ‘public policy’ are unclear.127 The moot issue is whether an exercise 
of ‘police power’ by a state resulting in substantial deprivation of foreign investment can be 
held a regulation or an expropriatory act? Also, there is no consensus on how broad or narrow 
the ‘police powers’ are.128 Will adopting a regulatory measure that gives incentives to 
domestic industry to boost indigenous industrialisation in a backward region of a country be 
allowed under the IIA as part of the ‘police power’ argument? Or, will a regulatory measure 
adopted for furthering public interest, which withdraws the assurances given to foreign 
investors or which changes the regulatory framework relied by the foreign investor before 
making the investment, be allowed under the ‘police power’ argument? There are no clear 
answers to these questions.129  
 
1.4 DISCUSSION ON INDIAN IIAs IN BACKGROUND OF THIS GLOBAL DEBATE   
 
Given this emerging global background on IIAs and regulatory power, this thesis will discuss 
Indian IIAs from the perspective of India’s regulatory power, which is significant to pursue 
various non-investment related policy objectives. This thesis is the first-ever effort to 
comprehensively understand the nature and character of all Indian IIAs from the perspective 
of India’s regulatory power. 
 
The right to regulate assumes even more significance for an extremely diverse, multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious and multi-cultural country like India where both the central and state 
governments have to deal with and resolve all kinds of complex problems and multitude 
competing interests between different stakeholders and groups.  India has followed broader 
regulation, since its independence in 1947, where the state has adopted measures to achieve a 
number of public policy objectives. These include equitable distribution of wealth; balanced 
industrial development of all regions; protection of small scale industries; protection of 
environment; providing public health to all; providing primary, secondary and higher 
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education; providing tax holidays and incentives to certain industries130; pursuing 
independent monetary policies and pursuing other macroeconomic objectives.131 Similarly, 
regulatory measures may also include developing and adopting policies aimed at keeping 
foreign investment out of certain strategic sectors or imposing certain performance 
requirements on foreign investment.132 These generalised regulatory measures are in addition 
to specialised regulations, which are fairly recent in India, and are prepared by specialised 
regulatory bodies for specific sectors such as telecom and insurance.  
 
As the global debate demonstrates, the exercise of many such regulatory powers by India, if 
they affect foreign investment, may be challenged as violation of India’s IIAs. Two factors 
have increased India’s vulnerability to challenges of regulatory measures under IIAs. First, 
India has signed 86 IIAs so far out which 73 IIAs are in force.133 Thus, India has bound itself 
to international legal regimes to protect foreign investment with many countries. 
Notwithstanding the significance of Indian IIAs, not much work has been done to analyse and 
understand them, barring few articles.134  
 
Second, foreign investment flows to India have increased manifold from US $ 393 million in 
1992-93 to US $ 26192 million in the financial year 2011-12 (up to January 2012).135 This 
has increased the interaction between different layers of governments, at the centre and state 
levels, with foreign corporations belonging to one of the IIA partner countries of India and 
hence the possibility of a conflict due to the exercise of India’s regulatory power. India has 
already faced two IIA disputes - Dabhol power project case136 and the White Industries 
case.137 Further, in recent times many examples of regulatory conflicts between Indian 
                                                
130 This sort of regulation may be given to both domestic industries and also foreign industries to boost 
investment flows – See Vandevelde (2000), 477-478 who has argued that the interventionist approach of giving 
tax incentives to boost investment has its own limitations.  
131 For a discussion on why countries regulate see - Ogus (1994).  
132 Vandevelde (2000), 484-485. Vandevelde has argued that if IIAs do not allow for such regulatory 
interventions to be made, countries might be deterred from entering into IIAs and thus might exclude foreign 
investment altogether. Also see Vandevelde (1998), 621-8.   
133 Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements 
available at http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp  
134 Rao (2000), 623; Krishan (2008), 277; Ranjan (2008), 209; Ranjan (2010). 
135 Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, India “FDI in India 
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government and foreign investors at the national level have cropped up and some of them are 
on the verge of snowballing into IIA disputes (see chapter 2).  
 
In India’s case, the ‘regulatory-chill’ conceptualisation is not useful to understand the debate 
on IIAs and regulatory power because there is a very low, even negligible, level of awareness 
within the Indian government about IIAs entered by India (see chapter 2). Thus, the thesis 
will not investigate whether there have been cases where India was deterred from adopting 
regulatory measures due to the knowledge, on the part of the regulators, that these regulatory 
measures are prohibited under IIAs.138 It will also not look at the regulatory measures 
adopted by India but later withdrawn when foreign investors threatened legal action. The 
thesis will use the ‘IIA-dispute’ conceptualisation (discussed above) to understand the debate 
on Indian IIAs and India’s regulatory power; hence the focus will be on the substantive law 
i.e. the IIAs themselves. The thesis will find plausible interpretations of Indian IIAs and 
assess whether these interpretations give precedence to investment protection over India’s 
regulatory measures.  
 
1.4.1 Outline  
 
Chapter 2 of the thesis discusses the evolution of India’s approach to foreign investment and 
the advent of the Indian IIA programme providing an overview of the substantive investment 
protection provisions in Indian IIAs. The thesis then focuses on finding the plausible 
interpretations of four provisions in Indian IIAs that have the closest relationship with India’s 
regulatory power. These provisions are expropriation; FET; monetary transfer provision; and 
non precluded measures (NPM). The thesis hypothesises that the present formulations of 
these four provisions in Indian IIAs are worded broadly, and depending on the exercise of 
arbitral discretion can be interpreted in manners giving precedence to investment protection 
over India’s exercise of regulatory power.  
 
The provisions on expropriation, FET and NPM have the potential of affecting a broad range 
of regulatory measures whereas the provision on monetary transfer will specifically affect the 
                                                                                                                                                  
against the UK under the India-UK IIA (Sancheti v United Kingdom, UNCTIRAL). However, very little is 
known about this particular dispute. Some details are available from an English Court judgment – The Mayor 
and Commonalty & Citizens of the City of London v Ashok Sancheti Case No: B2/2008/0489, Date: 21/11/2008. 




regulatory power related to imposing capital controls on flow of funds across borders. The 
provision on expropriation will play a crucial role in determining whether a regulatory 
measure adopted by India to achieve a non-investment related policy objective is regulation 
or expropriation (chapter 3). The FET provision has become ‘the most frequently invoked 
standard in investment disputes’;139 and ‘a majority of successful claims pursued in 
international arbitration are based on a violation of the FET standard’.140 Thus, the FET 
provision has a very close link with India’s regulatory power because changing an existing 
law or regulatory framework or adopting new laws to achieve certain policy objectives may 
be challenged as a violation of the FET provision141 (chapter 4). The provision on monetary 
transfer is very important for the investor because it lays down the conditions related to 
transfer of funds across borders. Unrestrained transfer of funds across borders can have 
certain macroeconomic consequences such as appreciation or depreciation of currency. The 
thesis will understand whether the formulation of the monetary transfer provisions in Indian 
IIAs allows India to impose capital controls to achieve monetary policy objectives (chapter 
5). Finally, the NPM provision is crucial as it allows the host state to deviate from investment 
protection in certain circumstances to achieve non-investment regulatory goals. The thesis 
will understand whether the current formulation of the NPM provision allows India to deviate 
from its IIA obligations to pursue non-investment policy objectives (chapter 6). Chapter 7 
concludes by emphasising on reformulating these provisions in a manner that balances 
investment protection with India’s regulatory power142 and identifies the key elements of the 






                                                
139 Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), 119.  
140 Id.  
141 See the FET chapter for more details which discusses such cases.  
142 Generally on balancing rights of investors with host states see – McLachlan et al (2007), 21-23; Muchlinski 
(2006), 527; Charles H Brower II (2008), UNCTAD (2000); WIR (2003); Zarsky (2005), 1-12; Shan (2008), 
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143 See also the work of Gallagher and Shan (2009) on Chinese Investment Treaties which follows same outline 
discussing the features of Chinese IIAs and then putting together the elements of new formulation in the 




1.5 METHODOLOGY   
 
Since the framework adopted by the thesis focuses on Indian IIAs, it will primarily aim at 
finding out what is the substantive law of investment protection - contained in 73 Indian IIAs 
- the primary source of this research.144 This will be done by studying how each of the 
selected provision is defined in each of the 73 Indian IIAs by undertaking a treaty by treaty 
examination. A preliminary question regarding methodology may be that since the thesis is 
concerned with India’s regulatory power as a host nation, instead of focusing on all 73 Indian 
IIAs, the thesis should select and study only those IIAs where India is a net capital 
importer.145 However, the thesis has selected and studied all 73 Indian IIAs for the following 
reasons:  
 
First, India is still a net capital importing country. India’s net FDI flows by the end of 2010-
11 stood at US $ 9.4 billion.146 India is also a net capital importing country vis-à-vis many 
developed countries. For all these foreign investment inflows, India will act as a host state 
needing regulatory power to pursue different policy objectives in light of the vastness of India 
and its diverse needs.    
      
Second, India receives capital not just from developed countries such as the US, UK, 
Germany, and Italy but also from developing countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, 
Philippines, Indonesia, South Africa, Iran, Sri Lanka, Kenya and others.147 Even if, India is a 
net capital exporting country vis-à-vis some of these developing countries; nothing stops a Sri 
Lankan or a Kenyan investor from bringing a case against India challenging a regulatory act 
                                                
144 The number of 73 IIAs includes the Indian model IIA. These IIAs are available at Ministry of Finance, 
Government of India -  http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp. Further, all the Indian IIAs studied in this thesis 
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published by Ministry of Finance, Government of India, September 2011.  
145 See Krishan (2008), 308 who argues that India should have two model IIAs depending on capital exporting 
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interpreting’ nature of the clause for the protection of essential security in the 2004 US Model IIA. While the 
US policy makers knew that adoption of a ‘self interpreting’ measure will give more leeway to treaty partners of 
US in treating investments made by US nationals, they were happy to pay this price in return for ensuring that 
their own regulatory power to take measures in certain exigencies is not jeopardised - for more on this see 
Vandevelde (1993), 170; Gagne and Morin (2006), 357.   
146 Economic Survey (2012), 136.  




allegedly violating the IIA.148 In other words, disputes can arise with investors, irrespective of 
the fact whether India is a net capital exporter or importer vis-à-vis a particular country. 
Moreover, capital exporting or importing country status is not a static one. This is 
corroborated by India’s own experience. When India started its IIA programme in 1994, India 
was not a major exporter of capital. In fact, till 2000-01, India’s outward investments were 
close to only US$ 2000 million. This increased, by more than seven times, to being more than 
US$ 15000 million by the end of 2010-11.  
 
Third, having different IIAs based on capital exporting or importing interest will result in 
inconsistent treaty practice adding unnecessary confusion amongst India’s IIA partner 
countries and foreign investors, regarding India’s foreign investment protection policy.  
 
Fourth, the Indian investment treaty practice is itself contrary to this argument. India has 
started inserting provisions that boost India’s regulatory power in some of the IIAs only in 
recent years, i.e., during the time when India is emerging as an exporter of capital and that 
too with countries with whom India has an offensive interest such as countries in Africa. For 
example, few recent Indian IIAs state that the purpose behind regulatory measure should be 
taken into account in determining expropriation (see chapter 3).  
 
Fifth, the presence of the MFN provision could be used to borrow beneficial provisions from 
other treaties in case the primary treaty is not investor friendly.149 
 
These 73 Indian IIAs will be examined to find out how many of them include a particular 
provision being studied (in a particular chapter); and out of the IIAs that cover this provision 
– what are the differences in text or language for each of these provisions. This information 
will then be organised in a tabular form in each of the chapters.150  
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Once this information is collated, the thesis will interpret these provisions using the treaty 
interpretation tools given in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.151 Although India is not party to 
VCLT;152 it can still be used to interpret Indian IIAs in light of the fact that treaty 
interpretation rules are widely recognised as part of CIL.153 A treaty has to be interpreted 
using the treaty interpretation rules and not on the basis of some per se normative value 
without carefully studying the text of the treaty. ITA tribunals have endorsed the importance 
of treaty interpretation rules to interpret IIAs.154  
 
Treaty interpretation rules require that a treaty be interpreted in good faith155 by giving 
ordinary meaning to the words used in their context and in light of the object and purpose156 
(Article 31(1)). The context will have to be determined by examining the text, preamble, 
annexes and other factors like - any subsequent agreement between the parties on the 
interpretation of the treaty (Article 31(2)). Here, it is important to note treaty interpretation 
rules given in Article 31(2) of the VCLT are of limited value in case of Indian IIAs because 
rarely has India and its IIA partner countries entered into agreements related to the treaty in 
connection with conclusion of the treaty (barring in some IIAs on the provision on 
expropriation – discussed in chapter 3 on expropriation chapter). Other important factors 
include any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty that establishes the agreement 
of the parties on its interpretation (Article 31(3)(b)). The role of Article 31(3) (c) of the 
                                                
151 In this regard, Professor Jackson and Professor Qureshi (for different reasons) have argued for a re-
evaluation of the principles of treaty interpretation applicable to the WTO treaty. See Jackson (2006), 184 and 
Qureshi (2006), 4-7.   
152 United Nations Treaty Collection (1 July 2011) available at 
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in the VCLT. Also see AES Corp. (US) v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/17, para 30 (Decision on 
Jurisdiction), 26 April 2005. In this regard, also see the Mox Plant case: it was stated that application of 
international law rules on interpretation of treaties to identical and similar provisions of different treaties may 
not yield the same results - Ireland v United Kingdom, 2001 ITLOS No 10, para 51 (3 December).  
155 In this regard it is important to note that ‘good faith’ in Article 31(1), in the context of WTO agreements has 
been interpreted to mean two things – first, ‘effective treaty interpretation’, and second, ‘interpretation should 
not lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable – see Qureshi (2006), 12-15.   
156 Finding the object and purpose — the aims of the treaty — is extremely important to shed light on the 
ordinary meaning of the terms, especially when the terms used in the treaty are capable of different 
interpretations - see Gardiner (2008: 190). USA, Federal Reserve Bank v Iran, Bank Markazi, Case A28, (2000-




VCLT, which states that any relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties shall also be taken into account, is also important in this regard.157  
 
Article 32 of the VCLT provides for the supplementary means of treaty interpretation which 
include the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion in order to 
confirm the meaning derived from application of Article 31 or to determine the meaning 
when the interpretation according to the particular leaves the meaning ambiguous or leads to 
a result which is manifestly absurd or obscure.158 It is difficult to find the negotiating history 
of IIAs that can assist in interpretation.159 In case of Indian IIAs, this treaty interpretation rule 
is of very limited value because the negotiating history of none of the IIAs is available. 
Arguably, model IIAs constitute ‘preparatory work’ within Article 32 of the VCLT.160 The 
thesis discusses India’s model IIA;161 however, many of the provisions in such an IIA are as 
vague and indeterminate as the provisions in the treaty itself and hence model IIA is of 
limited value in this regard.  The Indian model IIA, adopted in 1994,162 is heavily inspired by 
the first IIA that India entered with the UK in 1994.163  
 
This treaty interpretation will adequately reflect upon the differences in treaty language 
occurring in the text of these provisions. These differences are important as they will have 
different implications on regulatory power. The process of treaty interpretation will focus at 
finding plausible interpretations and then assessing the effect of these interpretations on 
‘regulatory power’ of India to find out whether the provision balances investment protection 
with regulatory power or not. This process of treaty interpretation using the rules of treaty 
interpretation will be aided by taking into account the case law developments in ITA. Like 
international law, there is no doctrine of binding precedent in ITA. However, referring to past 
arbitral tribunal awards becomes necessary in interpreting IIA provisions because of their 
vague and indeterminate nature.164 Such IIA provisions imply that application of rules of 
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treaty interpretation may not be sufficient, on its own, to find the meaning of the treaty 
provisions.165 Hence, it becomes imperative to use other tools such as past arbitral decisions 
to understand how similarly worded provisions in other IIAs have been interpreted by arbitral 
tribunals to understand the meaning of these terms in Indian IIAs. All arbitral tribunals 
extensively refer to past arbitral decisions.166 Further, reference to past arbitral decisions is 
also important to show the consistency or lack of it in interpreting similar provisions and to 
demonstrate arbitral discretion, which play a major role in determining what impact is caused 
on host country’s regulatory power. The existence of this arbitral discretion can also be used 
to argue for carefully reviewing the existing substantive law, i.e., the IIAs. Furthermore, since 
the thesis conceptualises IIAs and India’s regulatory power in terms of investor-state 
disputes, a careful and critical assessment of the ITA jurisprudence becomes an integral part 
of the methodology to study Indian IIAs and their impact on the exercise of India’s regulatory 
power.   
 
In order to ascertain the meaning of different provisions of Indian IIAs and to understand the 
rationale behind India’s IIA programme, the researcher conducted interviews with Indian 
investment treaty negotiators, which is used to inform the research conducted.  
 
Background to the Interviews conducted  
 
The researcher contacted more than 20 Indian government officials, past and present, of 
Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Commerce and Industry; and Ministry of External Affairs of 
Government of India. Officials from these Ministries were contacted because these ministries 
play major role in negotiating IIAs with Ministry of Finance being the nodal ministry that 
deals with IIAs (see the discussion in chapter 2 on this along with the role of other two 
ministries in affairs related to IIAs). Some officials didn’t respond to request for an interview.  
 
In the end, researcher interviewed 15 Indian government officials from three ministries - six 
from Ministry of Finance (some officials of Ministry of Finance were interviewed more than 
once); five from Ministry of External Affairs; and four from the Ministry of Commerce and 
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Industry. Only senior officials, past and present (officials holding the post of Director167 and 
Joint Secretary168 in the Indian bureaucratic order),169 of these ministries were selected. This 
was done for coupe of reasons. First, for logistic reasons as barring these officials no one else 
has the relevant information related to IIAs. For instance, the researcher contacted the office 
of the Additional Secretary (an official higher than Joint Secretary) 170 for an interview; 
however was told to contact either the office of the Joint Secretary or the Director thus 
showing their importance on matters related to IIAs. Second, since these officials hold senior 
and key positions in the Indian government, information shared by them could be 
authentically relied upon for its representativeness for the project at hand. All officials agreed 
to interview requests on the condition that they are quoted only anonymously. Most 
interviews were held in New Delhi from July 2010 to September 2010 (after obtaining 
approval of the ethics committee), in October-November 2010 and in November 2011. Some 
interviews were held over phone. After the India-White Industries171 ruling, couple of 
interviews were conducted in February 2012, over the phone, with the same officials who 
were interviewed earlier. These interviews were done in order to understand what effect the 
ruling will have on the Indian IIA programme.      
 
All these interviews were semi-structured. The theme of all the interviews with the six 
officials of Ministry of Finance was whether India fully understood the implications of IIAs 
on India’s regulatory power at the time of negotiating and signing these treaties. The 
researcher asked these six interviewees as to why India is entering into IIAs; what it expects 
to gain out of it; and has India’s approach to IIAs changed in light of emerging disputes 
between investors and other developing countries like Argentina.  
 
The theme of all the interviews with the four officials of the ministry of commerce was the 
rationale behind India having a separate investment chapter in its CECAs and why these 
chapters differ from India’s standalone IIAs. The theme of all the interviews with the five 
officials of Ministry of External Affairs was regarding their contribution in the process of 
negotiating IIAs.   
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169 Also see the discussions in chapter 2  
170 An official of the rank of Additional Secretary is the second senior most official in the Indian bureaucratic 
order.  




Most individual bureaucrats especially of Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry seemed not to have an adequate understanding of IIAs. This was confirmed by the 
researcher asking questions related to basic features of IIAs, jurisprudence of IIAs, and the 
reasons why a specific provision in a particular Indian IIA differed from another IIA though 
both IIAs were signed by India at the same time.     
 
In addition to the 15 officials, the researcher also interviewed two key officials each of 
Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Health. These ministries do not play any direct role 
in IIA negotiations or in international investment law policy making. The theme of the 
interviews with these officials was whether these ministries were aware of the existence of 
IIAs and whether IIAs figured in their exercise of regulatory power.   




























INDIA’S APPROACH TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE INDIAN IIA 
PROGRAMME  
 
After having understood the relationship between IIAs and regulatory power and the 
emerging issues thereto, this chapter outlines India’s evolving approach to foreign investment 
since its independence (Section 2.1 and 2.2). It also introduces the Indian IIA programme 
providing its salient features and an overview of the substantive protection contained in 
Indian IIAs (Section 2.3). This is followed by discussing where India stands on the global 
debate on IIAs and host country’s regulatory power highlighting the lack of India’s internal 
capacity to fully understand the ramifications of IIAs (Section 2.4).    
 
 
2.1 THE INDIA STORY - 1947 to 1990  
 
India’s policy on foreign investment has evolved over the years since its independence in 
1947. In the initial years after independence, India’s attitude towards FDI was receptive172 
although India’s policy was characterised by import substitution and focused on developing 
indigenous industries.173 India’s first Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, while speaking in 
the Parliament on 6 April 1949 recognised the importance of foreign investment in 
supplementing domestic savings and helping in economic and technological progress.174 FDI 
was sought in 1950s in mutually advantageous way with conditions like joint ventures with 
local industries, local content clauses and export obligation.175 However, FDI during this 
period was also subject to careful scrutiny due to India’s fragile Balance of Payment (BoP) 
position.176 The BoP crisis of 1957-58 resulted in the Indian government encouraging foreign 
investments to bring in more foreign exchange to improve the BoP situation.177  
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This receptive attitude to foreign investment started to change in 1970s when there was a 
more conscious shift towards adopting protectionist and inward looking economic policies to 
protect India’s infant industries that had developed in the 1950s and 1960s.178 A number of 
laws were enacted such as the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA),179 which required a 
foreign company to convert foreign equities into minority holdings. Only if a foreign 
company diluted its equity to a minority holding of 40 percent would it get national 
treatment.180 The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1977 provided a list of industries where no 
foreign collaboration either financial or technical was considered necessary.181 Also, fully 
owned foreign companies were permitted in only highly export oriented and sophisticated 
technology areas.182 This led to many transnational corporations like IBM and Coca Cola 
exiting India.183 The GDP growth rate of India came down to 2.9 percent in 1965-1979184 as 
against a respectable 4.06 percent from 1950-1964.185  
 
Low economic growth, lower international competitiveness of Indian goods and low export 
potential of Indian manufactured goods in 1970s resulted in India adopting limited 
liberalisation and de-regulation in 1980s.186 The post 1980s period saw a shift from import 
substitution strategy to an export neutral promotion strategy and witnessed a higher rate of 
GDP growth from about 3.5 percent annually during 1960s and 70s to 5.7 percent annually in 
1980s.187 This period saw a receptive attitude towards FDI signalled in some key changes 
such as limited flexibility was introduced in foreign ownership and exceptions introduced to 
the 40 percent ceiling rule.188 There was an increase in inflows between 1985 to 1991, 
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although the annual average for all foreign investment from 1970 to 1991 was only about 
US$ 99 million.189 
 
Thus, one can say that India’s attitude towards foreign investment was receptive in initial 
years (1950 to end of 1960s). However, even this attitude was cautious and never meant 
embracing foreign investment wholly but only as per need such as helping in bringing in 
foreign exchange or plugging the domestic savings gap.190 This cautious receptive attitude 
changed in 1970s with a tremendous and open shift towards indigenous industries, to the 
extent of discriminating against foreign companies. The 1980s saw the re-emergence of this 
cautious receptive attitude towards foreign investment best embodied in the example of 
setting up of Maruti – a central government joint venture small car project with Suzuki 
motors of Japan in 1982.191 On the whole, foreign investment didn’t figure very prominently 
in India’s economic policy till about mid 1980s. The Indian economic model was based on 
indigenisation, economic nationalism and self-reliance, developing heavy capital industries 
and followed by inward looking economic policies. Although this has been critiqued,192 it is 
important to understand that given India’s colonial past, India’s not-so-enthusiastic attitude 
towards foreign investment wasn’t surprising.193   
 
India’s overall domestic economic policy on foreign investment from 1947 till 1990 provides 
a useful background to understand India’s stand on international investment law during that 
period. Not just the domestic economic policy based on indigenisation and self-reliance but 
also India’s overall stand on international affairs in the post colonized world contributed to 
India’s position. Internationally, India was keen to build a new international legal order based 
on equality and sovereignty of nations founded on the spirit of nationalism and economic 
self-reliance followed domestically. This was reflected in Nehru’s speech in the Asian 
Relations Conference held in March 1947, even before India was formally independent. 
Nehru said:  
 
“For too long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. The 
story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to co-operate 
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with all others who are prepared to co-operate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings 
of the others…The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others; they are 
bound to have their own policies in world affairs.”194 
 
In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 3 November 1948, Pandit Nehru 
said:  
 
“May I say, as a representative from Asia, that we honour Europe for its culture and for the 
great advance in human civilization which it represents? May I say that we are equally 
interested in the solution of European problems; but may I also say that the world is 
something bigger than Europe, and you will not solve your problems by thinking that the 
problems of world are mainly European problems. There are vast tracts of the world, which 
may not in the past, for a few generations, have taken much part in world affairs. But they 
are awake, their people are moving and they have no intention whatever of being ignored or 
being passed by.”195 
 
India and many other newly independent countries accepted many international law rules, 
notwithstanding the fact that they had played no role in developing many of these 
international law standards.196 However, they objected and challenged certain standards 
espoused by developed countries such as minimum standard of treatment of aliens and issues 
pertaining to quantum of compensation in the event of expropriation of foreign investment, in 
which they had no role to play.197 India rejected concepts such as ‘state responsibility for 
injuries to aliens’ and ‘direct individual rights of investors to bring disputes against states 
under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Individuals of Other States of 1965198 (ICSID Convention) and supported United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions like ‘Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty over natural 
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resources’.199 This challenge and rejection was part of a larger effort by India and other newly 
independent countries to assert themselves in international affairs and play an active role in 
the making of international law.200 In 1960s the adoption of the UN General Assembly 
Resolution declaring permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources201 also 
indicates the rejection of the law relating to responsibility of states espoused by developed 
countries.202    
 
Nehru’s spirit guided India’s quest for an international legal order that respected equality and 
sovereignty of all nations. An integral part of this quest was to build a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO).203 India was one of the active supporters of this initiative.204 The 
enthusiasm and the active support for the NIEO in India in 1960s and 70s can be gauged from 
the articles written by Indian government officials and Indian international law academics in 
India’s leading international law journal – The Indian Journal of International Law.205 India 
and other developing countries made an effort to evolve a NIEO in 1970s, in the words of an 
Indian diplomat, as ‘a response to a position of political and economic dominance exercised 
by the metropolitan powers and their nationals over the natural resources, raw materials and 
labour in developing countries during the colonial era’.206 The vision of this NIEO was 
formulated in the UNCTAD resolution passed in 1972, which ‘stressed the urgency to 
establish generally accepted norms to govern international economic relations systematically 
and recognised that it is not feasible to establish a joint order and a stable order as long as a 
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charter to protect the rights of all countries, and in particular the developing States, is not 
formulated’.207 This period also witnessed a perpetual effort made by developing countries to 
influence norms in international law in many fields such as pertaining to monetary law;208 
environment;209 and multinational corporations.210    
 
This effort to build a NIEO was further bolstered by the adoption of the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) by the United Nations General Assembly, on 12 
December 1974, with 120 countries voting in favour with 6 against211 and 10 abstentions.212 
India supported CERDS and took active part at every stage in its drafting.213 The aim of this 
Charter was to formulate norms related to economic matters having international dimensions 
benefitting developing countries.214 The Charter contained provisions recognising the right of 
countries to regulate foreign investment as per national laws, regulate and supervise the 
activities of MNCs as per national laws, and decide the question of compensation for 
expropriation as per national laws.215. Chimni, a prominent Indian international law scholar, 
and Anghie describe the developing country scholarship on NIEO in 1970s and 80s as an 
important formulation of the position taken by the Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL) I scholars.216   
 
2.2 1990s ONWARDS – STORY OF INDIAN ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION    
 
The Indian economic growth of 1980s (5.7% of annual GDP growth rate as mentioned above)  
was fuelled by built-up of an external debt that culminated into a severe Balance of Payment 
(BoP) crisis in 1990-91 with foreign exchange reserves worth only two weeks of imports.217 
In order to overcome this BoP crisis India unleashed major structural adjustments and macro-
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economic reforms such as gradually dismantling quantitative restrictions on imports, bringing 
down tariff rates from a peak of 300 percent to a peak of 35 percent; liberalising FDI and 
Foreign Institutional Investment (FII) inflows to overcome the problem of over-dependence 
on debt; and comprehensive reform of the exchange control regime.218 Many measures aimed 
at liberalising FDI inflows were adopted in early 1990s marking a change from the cautious 
receptive attitude to foreign investment of 1980s. These measures included automatic 
approval of FDI up to 51 percent in high priority industries; 100 percent foreign equity in the 
energy sector; setting up of a Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) to act as a single 
window clearance for foreign investment proposals; opening up new sectors such as mining 
and telecommunications for private investment including foreign investment; amendment of 
the foreign exchange regulation act to treat foreign companies with more than 40 percent 
ownership at par with fully owned Indian companies.219 These reforms of the external sector 
signalled a change in India’s perception towards foreign investment and a paradigm shift in 
India’s economic thinking. India, slowly but surely, started to move from a close, inward-
looking economic model to a liberalised and outward-looking economic model. A major 
indictor of this paradigm shift was India’s acceptance of Article VIII of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) articles on 20 August 1994.220 Article VIII of IMF Articles provides 
general obligations of member countries of the IMF including the obligation on avoidance of 
restrictions on current payments.221 As a result, India accepted the international obligation not 
to impose restrictions on current account transactions subject to IMF Articles.   
 
The new industrial policy that India adopted in 1991 recognised that ‘foreign investment 
would bring attendant advantages of technology transfer, marketing expertise, introduction 
of modern managerial techniques and new possibilities for promotion of exports’.222 In the 
period from 1992-93 to 1996-97, after the major reforms were introduced, India’s GDP grew 
at an impressive 6.7 percent average.223 The industrial policy of 1991 allowed investment 
through two routes – the automatic route (where no permission is needed from the 
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government) and the approved route (where prior permission of the government is needed). 
The automatic route has been liberalised over the years as mentioned in the FDI policy of the 
Indian government released in 2011.224 The latest industrial policy of the Indian government 
clearly recognises the central role of foreign investment in India’s economic policies.225 The 
policy recognises the role of FDI in ‘accelerating economic growth’ ‘by way of infusion of 
capital, technology and modern management practices’.226 According to the 2011 FDI 
policy, the intent and objective of India is to attract and promote FDI in order to supplement 
domestic capital and technology for faster economic growth.227  
 
Chart 1 – FDI Equity Flows to India (in US$ million) from 1991-92 to 2009-10 (31st March 




Source – Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, India  
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FDI flows to India rose from US $ 393 million in 1992-93 to US $ 5549 million in 2005-
06.228 After 2005-06, FDI inflows to India showed a remarkable jump. The FDI equity 
inflows for the period 2006-07 and 2007-08 stood at US $ 15726 million229  and US $ 24579 
million230 respectively – an increase of almost three and five times respectively from 2005-
06. FDI inflows continued their upward movement in the year 2008-09 and stood at US $ 
27309 million.231 In 2009-10232, these inflows only marginally came down to US $ 25888 
million.233 The FDI equity inflows in the financial year 2011-12 (up to January 2012) stood at 
US $ 26192 million.234  
 
The sectors of the Indian economy that have received maximum FDI since 1991 are the 
service sector, electrical equipment (including hardware and software) and the 
telecommunications sector,235 automobile, power and the petroleum and natural gas sector.236 
India has opened most of its sectors for foreign investment either fully or partially under the 
automatic route or the approved route except some sectors like multi brand retail trading, 
atomic energy, lottery business and gambling and betting.237         
 
2.3 INDIAN IIAs     
 
Before one starts looking at the reasons behind India entering into IIAs, it is pertinent to have 
a discussion on the material used for this purpose. There is paucity of material in India on the 
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Indian IIA programme. The researcher, during his visits to the Ministries of Finance; 
Commerce and Industry; and External Affairs in New Delhi, India couldn’t get access to any 
material that enunciated India’s stand on IIAs including the rationale behind India entering 
into IIAs apart from the various ‘compendiums’ of Indian IIAs published by the Ministry of 
Finance and the different press releases issued by the Indian government. To put things in 
perspective regarding the availability of material on IIAs it is relevant to point out that India’s 
IIAs were not even publicly available on the website of the Ministry of Finance till July-
August 2011.238 It was only towards the later part of 2011 that Ministry of Finance put all the 
Indian IIAs on the website. Before putting these IIAs on the website, the hard copy of the 
IIAs were available only if a request was made. Even here, no information was available as to 
how to make such a request. The researcher learnt about these compendiums in the course of 
his interactions with the officials of the Ministry of Finance and, as a result, made a request 
and obtained them for the project at hand.  
 
The researcher’s efforts to find out if policy documents on IIAs existed, during his visits to 
the three ministries, didn’t yield much results because in response to each such request, the 
officials directed the researcher to the compendiums, the website of the Ministry of Finance, 
and the many press releases issued either by Ministry of Finance or Ministry of Commerce, 
which give reasons for India entering into IIAs. It appeared that there were actually no policy 
documents on IIAs rather than the case of something being hidden. This is because IIAs have 
never been an important issue in Indian policy making for a host of reasons (See section 2.4). 
An official of the Ministry of Finance mentioned to the researcher that how much priority 
IIAs occupy directly depends on how much personal interest and motivation the concerned 
official shows, without there being much institutional mandate to focus on IIAs.239 The 
official also mentioned that IIAs do not even take 10 percent of the total professional time of 
the concerned division of the ministry. 
 
No public documents are available to reveal that studies are or were conducted before 
launching IIA negotiation with a particular country. There is no publicly available document 
that could reveal how an assessment was made regarding whether the proposed IIA will 
benefit India. The only exception to this are the Joint Study Groups (JSG) formed before 
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entering into a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA). India has entered 
into CECAs containing a chapter on investment with Korea,240 Singapore, Japan and 
Malaysia (discussion on CECAs appears later in the thesis). These study groups give reports 
on whether the proposed CECA will increase trade and investment flows between India and 
its proposed CECA partner. Such JSG reports, then, form the basis for negotiations between 
India and the other country.241 The focus of these JSG reports is largely on domestic 
investment policy issues though they provide some information about India’s international 
investment policy (these are discussed below).     
 
 Given the paucity of available material on Indian IIAs, the thesis has used the 
‘compendiums’; the website of the finance ministry; press releases issued by India 
subsequent to signing the IIA; information about India’s international investment policy 
given in the JSG reports and the information collected through the interviews with the Indian 
government officials to find out India’s stand on IIAs.      
 
Indian IIA programme          
 
India started entering into IIAs in early 1990s to attract foreign investments as part of this 
overall strategy of liberalisation. The Ministry of Finance, Government of India – the nodal 
body that deals with IIA policy and negotiations clearly states – ‘As part of the Economic 
Reforms Programme initiated in 1991, the foreign investment policy of the Government of 
India was liberalised and negotiations undertaken with a number of countries to enter into 
Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPAs) in order to promote and 
protect on reciprocal basis investment of the investors’.242 It also states – ‘the objective of 
Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement is to promote and protect the 
interests of investors of either country in the territory of other country. Such Agreements 
increase the comfort level of the investors by assuring a minimum standard of treatment in all 
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matters and provides for justifiability of disputes with the host country’.243 This policy 
objective is also clearly evident in the ‘Forewords’ written by different Indian finance 
ministers from 1994 to 2011 in ‘compendiums’ of Indian IIAs that the Indian finance 
ministry regularly publishes. So far, eight such compendiums have been published.244 In the 
first such volume (published in 1996-97) Finance minister, P Chidambaram, wrote that after 
the adoption of liberal economic policies in 1991, India initiated the process of entering into 
IIAs with a view to provide investor confidence to foreign investors.245 The same view of 
India entering into IIAs to protect foreign investment has been repeated in all the subsequent 
volumes, by different finance ministers belonging to different governments.246 None of these 
‘Forewords’ talk about the relationship of investment flows with other non-investment issues, 
nor do they recognise that investment protection should be balanced with other legitimate 
non-investment objectives. India’s commerce minister while answering a question in the 
Indian Parliament mentioned that India has been entering into IIAs to attract FDI.247  
 
The press releases issued by India after entering into IIAs with different countries also reveal 
that IIAs are primarily about providing protection to foreign investment with the hope that 
they will increase foreign investment. For example, the press release on India-China IIA 
states that ‘the agreement will increase investment between India and China’.248 Similarly, 
the press release on India-Latvia IIA states that treaty aims at enhancing bilateral investment 
flows by creating favourable conditions for investors.249 The same view is echoed in the press 
release issued on the occasion of signing of the India-Brunei IIA. The press release provides 
‘the Agreement, which seeks to promote and protect investments from either country in the 
territory of the other country with the ultimate objective of increasing bilateral investment 
flow’…250 The press release issued on the occasion of the exchange of instruments of 
ratification of India-Iceland IIA state that the treaty ‘seeks to promote and protect investments 
from either country in the territory of the other country with the objective of increasing 
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bilateral investment flows.’251 The Press Release on India-Colombia IIA states that the 
signing of the treaty is likely to increase to increase investment flow between India and 
Colombia.252 
 
The JSG reports, another important document though restricted to CECAs also gives limited 
indication on India’s international investment policy. The indication is limited because JSGs 
largely focus on domestic investment regimes of India and the other country involved and do 
not contain any detailed substantive discussion on any of the international investment law 
issues. For example, the India-Indonesia JSG, while talking about the proposed investment 
framework of CECA, mentions about investment protection. Within investment protection, 
the JSG states that protection should be accorded to all assets of the investor and that there 
should be adequate provisions relating to free transfers or repatriation of funds.253 It does not 
elaborate further on the investment protection features or provisions. Again, the JSG in India-
Malaysia does not elaborate on international investment policy barring referring to the India-
Malaysia IIA unlike the JSG in India-Indonesia, which does not even refer to India-Indonesia 
IIA. The JSG states that since CECA envisages a deeper economic engagement between 
India and Malaysia, a review of IIA would be required ‘in order to further enhance 
investment flows between the two countries’. There are three important observations about the 
reference to the India-Malaysia IIA. First, the JSG recognised the need to revisit the IIA in 
light of CECA negotiations unlike the JSG in India-Indonesia. Second, the JSG recognised 
that the existing IIA should also contain investment liberalisation provisions (Indian IIAs 
usually contain investment protection features and not market access provisions – discussed 
later in the thesis). Third, and most important, the presumption clearly is that IIA between 
India and Malaysia have increased investment flows and that an IIA containing a more liberal 
regime will further increase investment flows between the two countries. Similar suggestion 
to revisit the existing India-Korea IIA is made by the JSG constituted for India-Korea CECA. 
The JSG states that the India-Korea IIA should be updated in the broader context of a 
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Government of India available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=45695. Also see the Press Release 
on the occasion of India-Jordan IIA, January 2009, available at 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=46919, which also provides the same thing. Also see the Press 
Release on the occasion of signing of India-Serbia IIA available at 
http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page1.asp?relid=47891   
252 Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement with the Republic of Colombia, Press Release, 
Ministry of Finance, July 2009 available at http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page1.asp?relid=49619 
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comprehensive approach of CECA. As per the JSG, this comprehensive approach should 
include investment protection measures similar to those found in other IIAs.254  
 
These documents clearly point to the direction that the object and purpose of Indian IIAs is to 
attract and protect foreign investment.  
 
India’s stand at the WTO during the failed negotiations on an investment agreement where 
India opposed a multilateral investment agreement on the ground that it will unduly restrain 
the regulatory power of developing countries255 is different from the stand taken by India in 
its IIAs. India, in its submission to the WTO’s Working Group on the Relationship between 
Trade and Investment in 1999, argued that bilateral investment treaties are a better model for 
developing countries to offer treaty based protection to foreign investment as it allows them 
to pursue other regulatory interests and thus balance investment protection with country 
specific sensitivities.256 The reason for opposing a multilateral agreement on investment in 
the WTO and supporting bilateral IIAs is the belief amongst Indian policy makers that a 
multilateral agreement on investment in the WTO will be more demanding due to provisions 
like pre-entry national treatment protection.257 However, the thesis will show that even 
bilateral IIAs have been subject to broad interpretations, which Indian treaty negotiators 
hadn’t envisaged.    
 
As of December 2011, India has entered into IIAs with 86 countries out of which 73 have 
already come into force.258 India’s latest IIAs that came into force in 2011 are with 
Bangladesh and Lithuania.259 India has entered into IIAs with almost all major European 
countries like UK, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Poland, 
Switzerland, Sweden. In fact, India’s IIAs in its first five years of the IIA programme (1995-
2000) were mainly with European countries in a clear attempt to attract foreign investment. 
From the year 2000 and after, India entered into IIAs with many developing countries like 
                                                
254 Report of the Joint Study Group on the Feasibility of India-Korea Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement available at http://commerce.nic.in/India-Korea%20JSG.pdf 
255 See the Speech of India’s Ambassador to the WTO in 2003, ‘India’s WTO Ambassador Calls for Investment 
Issue to be Dropped after Cancun’, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twninfo16.htm.  
256 India (1999).  
257 This feeling was shared by almost all officials of all ministries interviewed. One official of the Ministry of 
External Affairs told the researcher that the fact India has not accepted ‘pre-entry’ national treatment provision 
has helped India avoid many disputes with foreign investors.   
258 Id. This figure of 73 IIAs includes 69 standalone IIAs and 4 CECAs containing a chapter on investment.  
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Argentina, Mexico, China, Thailand, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia as well as with least developed 
countries (LDCs) like Bangladesh, Sudan, Mozambique.260 All these IIAs that India has 
entered into are for a 10-year period and are deemed to be automatically extended after this 
period unless either State gives notice in writing to terminate the treaty. Further, even if the 
treaty is terminated, the protection for the existing investments made in India will continue to 
apply for the next 15 years. So far, India has not terminated any of its IIAs. All IIAs contain 
investor-state dispute resolution mechanism. Investors can bring disputes against India before 
international arbitral forums without exhausting the local remedies. 
 
Further, in the last few years, India has entered into CECAs containing a chapter on 
investment as mentioned above. India is also negotiating CECAs with Indonesia, Australia, 
Mauritius and New Zealand,261 is negotiating an IIA with Canada262 and the US,263 and a 
FTA with a chapter on investment with the European Union.264 CECAs are comprehensive 
economic agreements (can also be called free trade agreements) covering trade liberalisation 
(goods and services), investment protection and liberalisation, competition policy, trade 
facilitation, rules of origin and intellectual property rights. The investment chapters in these 
CECAs, along with provisions on investment protection; also contain market access 
provisions (such as national treatment to establishment) which do not exist in any of the 
existing standalone Indian IIAs. This was affirmed by India’s minister of state for finance, 
who, while answering a question in the Indian parliament on what are the advantages of 
having investment provisions within the ambit of CECAs, said that investment provisions in 
CECAs ‘aim at providing foreign investors with a level of legal assurance regarding the 
protection of their investments, as also with specific and transparent commitment on the 
levels of market access available to them’.265 The liberalisation or market access feature of 
investment chapters in CECAs are different from the standalone IIAs that only deal with 
                                                
260 Full list of countries with whom India has entered into an IIA is available at Ministry of Finance, Bilateral 
Investment and Promotion Agreement (BIPA) - http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp?pageid=2  
261 Department of Commerce, Government of India online: 
http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international_ta.asp?id=2&trade=i. India already has an IIA with Indonesia and 
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post-establishment phase. There are many other substantial differences between the two types 
of IIAs, as will be discussed throughout the thesis. The provisions of the investment chapters 
in CECAs are much more elaborate and contain more features aimed at protecting the 
exercise of India’s regulatory power. For example – investment chapter in Singapore CECA 
does not contain the FET provision whereas FET is part of almost all Indian IIAs. Thus, 
India’s IIA programme stands on two legs – standalone bilateral IIAs and investment 
chapters in bilateral CECAs - in this thesis collectively called IIAs.    
 
The figures on FDI inflows and number of IIAs entered by India show that the Indian 
economy is fast integrating with the global economy, which in turn is increasing the 
interactions between the Indian state and foreign investors. This is capable of creating 
situations of conflicts between investment protection and regulation. Given below are some 
key examples of these conflicts seen in recent times.    
 
2.3.1 Conflicts between Investment Protection and Regulation  
 
There have been many instances of different organs of the Indian state and foreign 
corporations coming face to face on regulatory issues. Some of these regulatory conflicts 
have taken the shape of ITA arbitration. Very recently, in some cases, notice to commence 
ITA arbitration against India has been served by foreign corporations. These examples are 
important to show that, as India integrates with the global economy, conflicts will arise while 
regulating foreign investment. Hence, these examples further necessitate the need to study 
Indian IIAs in detail from the perspective of India’s regulatory power. Another important 
issue that emerges from these cases is that different organs of the state appear to be oblivious 
to India’s international obligations owed to foreign investors under IIAs.266  
 
Dabhol Power project case 
 
This relates to an FDI project related to building an electrical power plant in India in early 
1990s soon after the adoption of the liberalisation programme by India in 1991. Enron 
Corporation along with General Electric (GE) Corporation and Bechtel Enterprises formed a 
company called Dabhol Power Company (DPC) in Maharashtra (a western Indian state) to 
                                                




generate electrical power. This formed the biggest FDI investment at that time in India. DPC 
entered into an agreement with the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) a public 
sector enterprise as the sole purchaser of the power generated by DPC. Subsequently, due to 
political opposition to the project on grounds of alleged irregularities and the high cost of 
power charged by DPC, MSEB cancelled the contract to purchase power leaving DPC 
without a consumer to sell electrical power and thus having a huge adverse impact on DPC’s 
business.267 Further, the central government of India, which acted as a counter guarantor, 
after making some payments, also declined to pay DPC for different reasons.268 DPC was 
restrained from starting an international arbitration by anti-arbitration injunctions issued by 
Indian courts.269 There is no evidence to show that either the state government of 
Maharashtra or the central government of India or the Judiciary took India’s IIAs into 
account while exercising their regulatory powers.  
 
The Mauritius based subsidiaries of GE and Bechtel, relying on the India-Mauritius IIA, 
challenged India’s regulatory decisions including sovereign functions like issuing anti-
arbitration injunctions by courts as violation of the IIA provisions like expropriation. 
However, before an ITA award could be issued a mutual settlement was reached270 whereby a 
mammoth compensation (according to some - US $ 1 billion)271 was awarded to foreign 
investors by India. The significance of this case is in illustrating how India’s exercise of 
regulatory powers (which includes the Indian judiciary) has the potential to violate the broad 
IIA provisions.         
 
Australian mining company IIA dispute 
 
White Industries, an Australian company, obtained an arbitral award in its favour in a 
contractual dispute with Coal India, an Indian public sector company, and sought 
enforcement of the award before the Delhi High Court in India. Simultaneously, Coal India 
approached the Calcutta High Court to have the award set aside, and the request was granted. 
White Industries appealed to the Supreme Court in 2004 and the final decision is still 
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pending. In 2010, White Industries took the matter to ITA on the grounds that the inordinate 
delay in Indian courts to enforce the arbitration award violates the India-Australia IIA.272 The 
tribunal held that this delay by Indian courts violated India’s obligation to provide White 
industries with an ‘effective means’ of asserting claims and enforcing rights, despite the fact 
that the India-Australia BIT does not mention or include such a duty for host states. The 
tribunal got around that by holding that White Industries could borrow the ‘effective means’ 
provision present in the India-Kuwait IIA273 by relying on the MFN provision of the India-
Australia IIA.274 
 
Cancellation of Telecom Licenses  
 
This case relates to the grant of Unified Access Service License (UAS) with 2 G spectrum to 
telecom companies both Indian and of foreign origin by the Indian government. These 
telecom licenses were granted following the first-come-first-serve policy. However, a writ 
petition was filed in the Supreme Court of India arguing that the grant of these licenses was 
arbitrary and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of India held that indeed the licenses 
granted by the Indian government were ‘arbitrary and unconstitutional’ and hence all the 
licenses were illegal and thus quashed.275 The cancellation of these telecom licenses will 
adversely affect the investment of many foreign companies. Sistema, a Russian firm, whose 
licenses have been cancelled by the Supreme Court of India, has served a notice to India to 
commence ITA proceedings under the India-Russia IIA.276 Similarly, Telenor, another 
company whose telecom licenses have been cancelled is contemplating to invoke India-
Singapore IIA against India.277  Also, important to note that the Supreme Court of India, in its 
verdict, didn’t discuss its legal arguments in view of obligations that India owes to foreign 
investors under IIAs. 
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Vodafone BV tax dispute  
 
This relates to the case involving imposition of capital gains tax on a US $ 11.2 billion 
transaction where Vodafone BV International (Vodafone’s Netherland entity) in December 
2006 entered into an agreement with Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd (HTIL 
– a Cayman Island company) to buy HTIL’s share of 67 percent interest in an Indian 
company Hutchison Essar Ltd (HEL).278 Vodafone BV contended that the transactions did 
not involve a capital asset situated in India and hence no capital gains tax was payable 
whereas the Indian tax authorities contended otherwise. The Bombay High Court decided the 
case against Vodafone BV in 2010.279 However, the Supreme Court of India reversed the 
Bombay High Court ruling and held that Vodafone didn’t owe any tax to the Indian 
government.280 Subsequently, the Indian government has proposed to insert an explanation in 
the Indian Income Tax Act, which will make such transactions taxable with retrospective 
effect.281 Further, the Indian government has also proposed a clause, which provides for 
validation of tax demands including that on capital gains raised on companies registered 
outside India irrespective of any court judgment.282 Both these clauses are clearly directed at 
taxing Vodafone despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in favour of Vodafone. In response to 
this, Vodafone has issued a notice to India to start treaty-arbitration under the India-
Netherlands IIA.283 In fact, the proposal to impose retrospective taxation may adversely affect 
many more foreign corporations operating in India like US-based GE, UK-based SABMiller, 
Mitsui of Japan and French drug-maker Sanofi Aventis.284 Again, the Indian executive has not 
examined the compatibility of these new regulatory measures in light of obligations India 
owes to Vodafone under the India-Netherlands IIA or to other foreign investors under 
different IIAs.  
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Cairn-Vedanta deal  
 
Cairn Energy, a UK company, struck a deal with London based Vedanta resources to sell 
majority stake in its Indian unit (Cairn India) in August 2010. However, this deal required the 
approval of the Indian government as per Cairn’s existing contractual obligations.  After 
prolonged delay, in June 2011, the Indian government gave conditional approval to the 
deal.285 The conditions imposed by the Indian government are - make royalty paid as cost 
recoverable from oil sales and for Cairn to withdraw the cess arbitration it has initiated.286  
 
Posco’s Investment and Environment  
 
South Korean company, Posco, plans to invest US $ 12 billion in India for constructing a 
steel plant. The efforts in this direction were initiated by Posco in 2005-06. After prolonged 
delay, India’s Environment ministry gave an environmental clearance to the project in 2011. 
The environment ministry didn’t take into account the India-Korea IIA while exercising its 
regulatory power to grant environmental clearance to the project.287 However, some 
environmental activists challenged this in the National Green Tribunal (NGT). On 31 March 
2012, the NGT revoked the environmental clearance given to Posco.288 One is unsure 
whether India-Korea IIA figured in the legal analysis of NGT in revoking the environmental 
clearance to Posco. The revocation of the environmental clearance has jeopardised Posco’s 
investments in India. 
 
2.3.2 Overview of the Key Features of Indian IIAs   
 
Before the thesis dwells on the four substantive provisions mentioned above, it is useful to 
provide a brief overview of how the key features in Indian IIAs are formulated.   
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Definition of Investment  
 
Out of the 73 IIAs studied, as many as 72 (except India-Mexico) of them contain a broad 
asset-based definition of investment. In these 72 IIAs, it is stated that investment means every 
kind of asset. This broad definition is then followed by an inclusive or non-exhaustive list of 
assets, which includes direct investment, portfolio investment, intellectual property rights, 
rights to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value, business 
concessions conferred under law or contract. Out of these 72 IIAs that provide a broad asset-
based definition of investment, only three IIAs - India-Korea; India-Malaysia and India-Japan 
- state that in addition to investment being every kind of asset that the investor owns or 
controls, it should have the characteristics of an investment like commitment of capital or 
other resources, the expectation of gains or profits or the assumption of risk.  
 
The definition of investment in all these IIAs is subject to national laws. This gives regulatory 
power to India to refuse treaty protection to those investments that have been made in 
contravention of the Indian law or which are illegal under Indian law.   
 
Promotion and Protection of Investment  
 
All Indian IIAs including the Indian model IIA provide in the text that investment promotion 
is an important objective of the IIA and that India will take steps towards creating suitable 
conditions for fostering investment. The Indian model IIA states that each contracting party 
‘shall encourage and create favourable conditions for investors of the other Contracting 
Party to make investments in its territory’.  
 
Full Protection and Security  
 
‘Full protection and security’ is a feature in 38 Indian IIAs. India-Latvia IIA only states 
‘protection and security’ not qualified by ‘full’.289 None of these IIAs explain what is meant 
by ‘full protection and security’. The only exceptions to this are India-Korea, India-Malaysia 
and India-Japan IIAs, which provide some indication regarding the meaning of ‘full 
protection and security’. These three IIAs link ‘full protection and security’ with customary 
                                                




international law. For example, Article 87.1 of the India-Japan IIA states – The concepts of 
“fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in 
addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens.290 In the rest 35 Indian IIAs it is unclear whether ‘full 
protection and security’ means protecting and securing foreign investment from physical 
injury or does it also involve protection from non-physical injury.291  
 
Fair and Equitable treatment  
 
A study of 73 Indian IIAs reveals that as many as 71 Indian IIAs contain the FET principle. 
Out of these, 66 do not define the normative content of the FET or provide any guidance 
regarding its meaning, thus leaving the determination of FET content to arbitral discretion. 
Only in 5 IIAs a reference is made to the minimum standard of treatment of aliens under 
customary international law.292  
 
Most Favoured Nation and National treatment  
 
Barring two IIAs, all Indian IIAs contain the MFN principle. This principle is worded 
broadly, making it possible for foreign investors to borrow beneficial treaty provisions from 
other treaties.293 The only exception recognised to the MFN principle is for the purposes of 
                                                
290 Similar provision occurs in Article 10.5(2) of the India-Malaysia IIA and Article 10.4(1) of the India-Korea 
IIA. These are same as the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions, 31 July 2011. Compare these provisions with a more specific provision of the kind found in US-
Uruguay IIA – Article 5(2)(B), which states full protection and security requires each country to provide the 
level of police protection required under customary international law.  
291 In earlier investment treaty arbitration cases such as AAPL v Sri Lanka ICSID Case No ARB/87/3 (Final 
Award) 27 June 1990 and AMT v Zaire ICSID Case No ARB/93/1 (Award) 21 February 1997291 the 
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devalued’ - CME tribunal, para 613. Also see Azurix v Argentina, paras 406-408; Siemens v Argentina, para 303. 
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autonomous interpretation of the standard. On the other hand, some recent arbitral awards like AWG v Argentina 
have held that ‘full protection and security’ is limited to protection from physical injury and does not encompass 
the maintenance of stable and legal commercial or business environment - AWG v Argentina, para 179. Also see 
Saluka v Czech Republic, para 484; BG v Argentina, paras 323-326.   
292 See chapter 4 on FET for more details.  
293 Maffezini v. Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7); MTD v. Chile (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7); Bayindir Insaat 




taxation and obligations imposed by free trade agreements or custom areas. Similarly, 
national treatment protection to foreign investment is offered in broad manner. Barring a few 
IIAs like the India-Mexico IIA, the national treatment provisions in the majority of Indian 
IIAs do not contain the ‘like circumstances’ clause, which requires that in order to find out 
whether national treatment has been provided or not, only investments in ‘like circumstances’ 
need to be compared. This arguably broadens the national treatment protection to foreign 
investments. Further, barring IIAs with Japan, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia, none of the 




All the 73 Indian IIAs contain provisions on expropriation very clearly stating that 
investment shall not be nationalised or expropriated (direct expropriation) or subjected to 
measures having ‘effect’ equivalent to expropriation (indirect expropriation) unless or until 
there is a public purpose, and further that in such cases fair and equitable compensation 
should be promptly paid to foreign investors.294  
 
Monetary Transfer Provision (MTP) 
 
All 73 Indian IIAs studied contain a MTP. In majority of IIAs the provision on monetary 
transfer is broadly worded and does not recognize exceptions to transfer of funds across 
borders.295   
 
Treaty Exceptions  
 
Examination of 73 Indian IIAs reveals that in more than 60 IIAs exceptions to treaty 
obligations are very narrowly formulated. Very few IIAs allow deviation from investment 
protection on potentially very significant grounds such as ‘public order’, ‘health’ or 
                                                
294 For full details look at chapter 3 on expropriation.  




‘environment’ or on grounds such as ‘to boost certain domestic industries’ or ‘domestic 
industries in economically backward regions’.296  
 
Title of the IIAs 
 
The study of 73 Indian IIAs shows that, barring four, all IIAs only have the following words 
in their title: ‘promotion and protection’ of investment. The only slight variation is that some 
IIAs like India-Kuwait and India-Saudi Arabia use words like ‘encouragement’ instead of 
‘promotion’, which means the same thing. Thus, according to the title of 69 IIAs, all these 
treaties are ‘An Agreement for the promotion and protection of investments’.297 Only the IIAs 
with Singapore, Korea, Japan and Malaysia have a different title - ‘comprehensive economic 
cooperation/partnership agreement’. ‘Economic cooperation or partnership’ is broader than 
‘investment protection and promotion’.  
 
Preamble    
 
The preamble of an IIA is important to determine its object and purpose.298 The preamble of 
the Indian Model IIA states the following objectives:   
 
a. Desiring to create conditions favourable for fostering greater investment by 
investors of one State in the territory of the other State; 
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b. Recognising that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under 
International agreement of such investment will be conducive to the stimulation of 
individual business initiative and will increase prosperity in both States; 
 
An identical preamble is to be found in as many as 48 Indian IIAs out of the 73 studied. Of 
the remaining 25 IIAs, four of them, barring a difference of a few words in the formulation, 
contain the same preamble as the model IIA discussed above. Further, there are three IIAs 
that apart from the investment promotion objectives also recognise that FET regarding 
investment will help in fostering investment and in intensifying cooperation between the 
enterprises of the two countries. Thus providing FET to investment is clearly identified as 
one of the objectives of the IIA in the preamble.299  
 
The preambles of Indian IIAs focus on creating conditions favourable for encouraging 
investment flows; and recognising that encouragement and protection of investment will 
stimulate business activity and increase prosperity. Thus, ‘stimulating business initiative’ and 
‘increase in prosperity’ in both the countries are not self-standing objectives, but are linked to 
encouragement and protection of investment.300  
 
Very few Indian IIAs contain more values in the Preamble apart from investment promotion 
and protection. For example, India-Singapore, India-Korea, India-Malaysia and India-Japan 
treaties refer to multiple values such as ‘rights to pursue economic philosophies suited to their 
development goals’; ‘rights to realise their national policy objectives’; and ‘optimal use of 
natural resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both 
to protect and preserve the environment’.301 On similar lines, the preamble in the India-
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Australia IIA provides that ‘investment relations should be promoted and economic relations 
strengthened in accordance with the internationally accepted principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty, equality, mutual benefit, non-discrimination and mutual confidence’.  
 
A combined reading of the title of Indian IIAs, their preambles and substantive protections, 
which are worded in broad terms, one can state that the object and purpose of Indian IIAs is 
limited to investment protection, which, in turn, is expected to result in more investment 
flows.302 Due emphasis on object and purpose is an integral part of treaty interpretation 
methodology warranted by Article 31 of the VCLT and thus cannot be ignored.303   
 
2.4 INDIA AND GLOBAL DEBATE   
 
Notwithstanding the global debate on whether IIAs encroach upon the host state’s ability to 
exercise regulatory power, in India, IIAs are still seen primarily as instruments aimed at 
promoting and protecting investment. Their relationship with regulatory power has not yet 
been fully realised and understood. Further, despite a massive IIA programme resulting in 
international obligations, Indian IIAs as such, have hardly been an issue in academic and 
policy debates within India, although foreign investment policies have certainly attracted 
attention.304  
 
There are two reasons for this. First, lack of adequate information and awareness and lack of 
rigorous academic analysis or commentary about the full implications of IIAs on regulatory 
power in India due to general lack of legal expertise in the field of international investment 
law. There have been very few occasions where India’s IIAs have been comprehensively 
discussed in academic conferences and policy circles with one notable exception being the 
fourth forum for developing country investment negotiators organised in New Delhi in 
                                                
302 In this regard, it is also important to mention the cautionary note given in Plama v. Bulgaria, where the 
tribunal (quoting Sir Ian Sinclair) said: risk that the placing of undue emphasis on the ‘object and purpose’ of a 
treaty will encourage teleological methods of interpretation [which], in some of its more extreme forms, will 
even deny the relevance of the intentions of the parties - Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, referring to Sinclair 
(1984: 130). See also Salacuse (2010: 146-148). 
303 Shaw (2008), 933. In this regard also see McLachlan (2008) 371; Kurtz (2010: 351); and Saluka v. Czech 
Republic, para. 300. Also see Gardiner (2008), 197 
304 Similar arguments have also been made in context of China. It has been argued that while China has changed 
many of its laws due to WTO obligations, the Chinese BITs have not received equal attention – G Wang (2009), 
China’s Practice in International Investment Law: From Participation to Leadership in World Economy, 34 Yale 




October 2010. Similarly, there has been only one occasion where a question was asked to the 
government in the Indian Parliament on whether India has entered into IIAs and what is the 
advantage of having investment provisions in CECAs.305 Also, since IIAs have not resulted in 
legislative changes, they are not discussed in the Parliament of India. In India, treaties are 
ratified by the Executive and not by the Parliament of India and hence discussion on a treaty 
takes place only when a legislative change is introduced by the Executive in the Parliament in 
order to meet the obligation imposed by the international treaty. This is not to suggest that the 
Parliament cannot discuss the significance of IIAs if it so desires; however it has not done so 
far mainly because it is oblivious of the significance of IIAs. This is in contrast to the WTO 
agreements, which have been discussed in the Indian parliament especially during the 
legislative changes to be made due to its obligations.306 WTO agreements have also attracted 
considerable discussion in academic and policy conferences. There are a number of policy 
think-tanks as well as civil society organisations in India working on WTO issues whose 
research and advocacy has sensitised and built capacity of many stakeholders including the 
government and the Parliament to understand complex trade issues.307 However, IIAs do not 
figure highly on the research agenda of these think-tanks although work on the economic and 
developmental dimensions of foreign investment do get attention.  
 
Second, barring the White Industries ITA arbitral award, Indian IIAs have not generated 
much arbitral jurisprudence. Hence, import of most of the IIAs signed by India remains 
untested and hence unclear to policy makers. The lack of arbitral jurisprudence on Indian 
IIAs, coupled with lack of detailed commentary on Indian IIAs, has generated the official 
mindset that there is no need to think about IIAs impact on regulatory power till India gets hit 
by claims, despite what has happened to other developing countries.308 In fact, many officials 
                                                
305 Question asked by P K Javedkar, Member of Parliament in Rajya Sabha, on Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs), Unstarred Question No 2615, 20 April 2010 available at 
http://164.100.47.5:8080/members/website/quest.asp?qref=153265.  
306 For example, the provisions of the TRIPS agreement got attention of the Parliament when India was debating 
amendments to its Patent Act of 1970 due to the WTO obligations. Even in the context of these obligations it 
has been argued that there is a need to expand the role of Parliament from not just debating how the treaty 
provisions already accepted and ratified by the Executive should be transformed into domestic laws, but also to 
decide whether India should accept the international treaty obligations in the first place at all – See Saxena 
(2007), 24; National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2002); Krishna Iyer (2003), 10; 
Dhar and Kallummal (2007), 183; Ranjan (2009), 56.  
307 Some of the prominent think-tanks and civil society organisations working on WTO issues in India are 
Centre for WTO Studies http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/; Indian Council for Research in International Economic 
Relations (ICRIER) http://www.icrier.org/; Research and Information System for Developing Countries 
http://www.ris.org.in/; CUTS International http://www.cuts-international.org/.   
308 All six officials of Ministry of Finance were of this view. Only some officials of Ministry of External Affairs 




were surprised on hearing that there could be such a strong link between IIAs and the 
exercise of India’s regulatory power. This belief and mindset are further strengthened by the 
lack of adequate understanding about the actual impact and working of IIAs across different 
central government departments.309 An insight into how India negotiates its IIAs will be 
useful at this stage to substantiate this point.   
 
 2.4.1 How India Negotiates IIAs  
 
The Ministry of Finance of the Government of India is the nodal body for all IIA negotiations 
and also for developing policies related to the IIA, barring those where the investment 
chapter is a part of CECAs. CECAs containing investment chapters are dealt by the Trade 
and Policy division (TPD) of the Ministry of Commerce.310 In other words, Ministry of 
Finance deals with standalone IIAs, whereas, when same investment obligations have to be 
undertaken as part of a free trade agreement, then Ministry of Commerce is in control.  
 
Ministry of Finance is divided into five different departments – namely economic affairs, 
expenditure, revenue, financial services and disinvestment.311 The Department of Economic 
Affairs (DEA) deals with IIAs. This Department is further divided into different divisions.312 
One of the divisions of DEA is ‘Infrastructure and Investment Division’.313 The section on 
‘International Cooperation’ (IC) within this division deals with ‘negotiation and conclusion 
of Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPAs) with other 
countries’.314 ‘The IC section has an official of the rank of Director who looks after all the 
major functions of the section including all issues pertaining to IIAs. This official is not a 
                                                                                                                                                  
that all is well with India’s IIAs. Polusen’s study corroborates this point for many developing countries – See 
Poulsen (2011), 216-256. Also see Poulsen and Aisbett (2011).     
309 The very recent White Industries arbitration case and the recent arbitration notices issued by foreign 
corporation under different IIAs has led to some mulling over Indian IIAs within the Indian government. 
Though its outcome, and whether this would lead to a paradigm change in how India deals with IIAs is yet to be 
ascertained.   
310 Trade Policy Division, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India 
available at http://commerce.nic.in/aboutus/aboutus_rti_divisions_itpd_1.asp  
311 About the Finance Ministry available at http://finmin.nic.in/index.asp.  
312Department of Economic Affairs available at 
http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/dea_mainpage.asp. 
313Infrastructure and Investment Division available at 
http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/infrastructure_div/I&I_index.asp. 





professional lawyer or an economist but belongs to the Indian Civil Services315 and need not 
necessarily be trained in either subject or international affairs. Further, this official joins the 
IC section on a transferable basis and moves to another department, or ministry, on 
promotion.  
 
This official reports to the Joint Secretary of the ‘Infrastructure and Investment Division’ 
who is also not a professional economist or lawyer, but belongs to the generalist Indian Civil 
Services and serves the division on a transferable basis for a limited duration. For example, 
more than three different officials have held the position of the Joint Secretary (Infrastructure 
and Investment Division) in Ministry of Finance in last three years or so. This position is the 
most important position in the Ministry of Finance for work related to IIAs (See section 2.4.1 
on this).316 In fact, it is interesting to note that the IC section has no full-time trained and 
qualified lawyers or economists or experts in international affairs. The entire section is 
staffed by generalists belonging to the larger pool of Indian bureaucracy. This often results in 
a lack of capacity to understand complex issues related to IIAs leading to other attendant 
problems. Further, even if a new official develops the expertise by working in the division, 
this capacity is lost when the official is transferred to another division or department or 
ministry and the new official often has to start from scratch. Officials admit that their 
generalist background devoid of any professional background in law and economics often 
makes it extremely difficult for them to grapple with complex issues related to international  
investment law and policy.317 This lack of technical expertise is also reflected in the actual 
IIA negotiations.318 
                                                
315 To know more about Indian Civil Services visit http://www.upsc.gov.in/ 
316 The researcher has come to this conclusion by tracing the changes in the officials as per the details provided 
on the website of the Ministry of Finance and also through his visits to the Ministry of Finance.  
317 All the six officials of Ministry of Finance, who were interviewed, admitted to this. Even amongst the civil 
servants, those belonging to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS – the topmost civil service of India not 
based on any specific discipline or subject or domain but consisting of generalists) have better promotion 
opportunities over other civil servants. Thus, a civil servant belonging to the IAS has a much better chance to 
hold key positions even if a civil servant from another service such as the Indian Economic Service (IES – a 
service that selects people with minimum qualification being a post-graduate degree in Economics) is better 
qualified and have more technical and domain expertise. The Approach paper of the Second Administrative 
Reforms Commission (ARC) set up by the Government of India while emphasising on civil services reforms 
recognised that intricate issues in modern administration require domain expertise, long experience in a specific 
sector and deep insights. The present system in India does not encourage the development of such domain 
expertise to the fullest. Also, there is negligible encouragement for lateral entry of experts with specific and 
strong domain knowledge working outside the government system to join the government at key policy-making 
levels. Hence, the second ARC has recommended changing this practice  - see Kishore (2011); Government of 





Ministry of Finance also consults other ministries of the Government of India such as the 
Ministry of Commerce in the process of IIA negotiations. However, inter-ministry 
consultations in India are not very smooth with each ministry endeavouring to hold on to its 
forte and not willing to cede ground, though these consultations have certainly improved over 
those in the 1990s.319 For example, the Ministry of Commerce while negotiating CECAs 
often does not involve the officials of Ministry of Finance dealing with IIAs to the desired 
extent. The domestic FDI policy is also made by the Ministry of Commerce whereas it is the 
Finance Ministry that deals with IIA negotiations. The domestic FDI regulations issued by 
the Commerce Ministry do not mention anything about the IIA obligations.    
 
The inadequacy of coordination between the commerce and finance ministries on IIAs was 
evident during the organisation of the fourth annual forum of developing country investment 
negotiators in collaboration with the International Institute of Sustainable Development 
(IISD) and Government of India.320 The aim of the forum was to develop the skills, 
knowledge and negotiating capacity of officials of developing countries who are involved in 
dealing with IIAs. The Ministry of Commerce represented the Government of India in the 
forum with no representation or participation of the Ministry of Finance despite it being the 
nodal body in India that deals with IIAs. Ministry of Finance did not participate because they 
were not invited.321 The lack of in-depth consultation between the commerce and finance 
ministries has resulted in India’s IIA programme standing on two legs – standalone IIAs and 
investment chapters in CECAs – with both having very different provisions, as mentioned 
above and discussed throughout the thesis.   
  
Another player in the IIA negotiating business is the Legal and Treaties (L&T) division of the 
Ministry of External affairs. This division is also consulted by the Finance Ministry in IIA 
negotiations. The L&T division consists of officials with post graduate degrees in law and 
thus has some capacity to understand the complex issues related to international investment 
law and policy. However, this division is understaffed. Further, this division is used to feed in 
all international negotiations on all international law issues in which India is involved and 
hence very often the officials working in this division, though having the knowledge of 
                                                                                                                                                  
318 In this regard, see the arguments of Professor Qureshi who has highlighted, in context of the WTO treaty, 
that one group of negotiations may lack information and negotiating expertise, which should be taken into 
account while interpreting the treaty (circumstances of the conclusion) – See Qureshi (2006), 5.   
319 Interview with Ministry of Finance officials who have participated in such consultative meetings.  
320 Fourth Annual Forum, IISD http://www.iisd.org/investment/dci/dci_forum_2010.asp.  




international law, are not able to develop specialised competence and expertise in specific 
fields like international investment law.322  
 
Most importantly, the final decision is made by the Ministry of Finance. It may not accept the 
submissions made by the L&T division of the Ministry of External Affairs.323 In any case, the 
consultations happen only during IIA negotiations. Furthermore, the Finance Ministry also 
does not organise widespread stakeholder consultations while framing its policy on IIAs or 
while negotiating IIAs. For example, negligible or inadequate stakeholder consultations have 
been held on issues like whether there is a need to review India’s existing IIAs due to the 
increasing pros and cons of ITA or more generally on issues such as whether India has gained 
from its IIA programme. As discussed above, no comprehensive studies are conducted before 
launching IIA negotiation with a particular country regarding how the proposed IIA will 
benefit India. It is assumed that IIAs will increase investment flows to India although there is 
no evidence to show that the increase in FDI inflows into India is due to IIAs or to what 
extent have IIAs contributed in attracting foreign investment. The reason for lack of evidence 
is lack of research on this issue.324 There is only one study that very briefly looks at impact of 
IIAs on FDI inflows to India.325 However, this study looks at FDI inflows into 15 Asian 
countries including India and hence is not India specific. Furthermore, this study is limited in 
offering guidance on the actual impact of IIAs on FDI inflows to India because it looks at 
impact of IIAs on FDI inflows between the period from 1980-81 to 1999-2000 – when India 
had signed only 13 IIAs as against the 73 IIAs that are in force now.326 In the absence of any 
such evidence, the assumption of the Indian government that IIAs result in increased foreign 
investment is challengeable.  
 
                                                
322 Another important point to note is that the officials of the L&T division do not belong to the All India Civil 
Services cadre and hence are often dominated by civil servants belonging to the all India services like the IAS 
and the Indian Foreign Service (IFS- India’s diplomatic service, which occupies predominant place in the 
Ministry of External Affairs above the officials of the L&T division). The scope of promotion in the L&T 
division is also limited in comparison to civil servants belonging to the IAS, IFS and other civil services. These 
factors act as detriment for bright international law lawyers to join the government, which in turn, adversely 
affects India’s overall ability to deal effectively with international affairs and international law issues including 
international investment law. Also see Gottwald (2007), 237.         
323 The officials of the Ministry of External Affairs made this point during the course of their interviews with the 
researcher.  
324 Ranjan (2010), 68.   
325 Banga (2003).  




Furthermore, the issue is not just limited to the central government but also extends to 
different state governments (or sub-national governments) in view of India’s federal polity.327 
Thus, it is not just the actions of the central government but also the actions of state 
governments that can breach an IIA provision.328 Notwithstanding this, there is negligible 
capacity in state governments of India to understand IIA provisions and their relationship 




This chapter has shown that India’s approach to foreign investment has evolved since its 
independence in 1947. Foreign investment figures prominently in India’s economic growth 
strategy. This changed approach to foreign investment led India to initiate its IIA programme 
and enter into IIAs with more than 80 countries. However, India has been entering into IIAs 
without fully understanding the implications of these treaties and on the assumption that these 
treaties will result in increased foreign investment.329 Many Indian investment treaty 
negotiators were surprised when told about the kind of interpretations that have been 
advanced by ITA tribunals and privately confirm that they didn’t understand that IIAs can 
have such far reaching and wide effect. For example, none of the treaty negotiators had 
imagined at the time the India-Australia IIA was concluded that the MFN clause would be 
interpreted with such latitude to oblige India to pay for the ‘inordinate delay’ of Indian 
courts.330 The discussion in the chapter demonstrates that there is lack of capacity in India to 
comprehensively understand the character of IIAs and their relationship with India’s 
regulatory power.  
 
                                                
327 On interaction between FDI and foreign corporations with Indian federalism see – Singh and Srinivasan 
(2006), 301. Also see Jha and Nair (2007).    
328 For example, as mentioned above, actions of the state government of Maharashtra led to the dispute between 
Dabhol Power Company and India under the India-Mauritius IIA. 
329 Also see Paulsson (1995), 257 who has argued that many countries entered into IIAs without understanding 
their full implications; Ewing-Chow and Teck (2008), 28. The assumption that developing countries ‘knew and 
accepted’ the costs of IIAs Also see L Poulsen (2011), Sacrificing Sovereignty by Chance: Investment Treaties, 
Developing Countries and Bounded Rationality (PhD Thesis: London School of Economics) who, in his 
doctoral thesis submitted to LSE, documents an incredible story of how Pakistan’s Attorney General learnt 
about ICSID and BIT by searching the terms on the internet once Pakistan was notified by ICSID of a new 
investor-state arbitration 




In this regard, the assumption made by some that developing countries ‘knew and accepted’ 
costs of IIAs331 does not hold good for India. Many government departments in India, both at 
the centre and at states, performing regulatory functions, have poor and many a times no 
knowledge about IIAs. The researcher interviewed officials from the Environment ministry 
and health ministry and found that none of them had much knowledge about IIAs and their 
implications.332 Even within the finance and commerce ministries that are involved in 
negotiating IIAs, the understanding of the full ramifications of IIAs is poor. This goes on to 
show that whether IIAs affect India’s regulatory power cannot be understood by finding out 
whether India has been dissuaded from exercising regulatory power due to the known effects 
of IIAs on regulation. This can be inquired into by finding out, if foreign investors were to 
challenge India’s regulatory power, can Indian IIAs be interpreted in a manner that balance 
India’s regulatory power with investment protection. The four substantive chapters answer 


















                                                
331 Montt (2009), 128. Also see Poulsen (2011), 216-256 who has challenged this assumption by interviewing 
officials from many developing countries to show that many developing countries didn’t fully understand the 
implications of IIAs.  
332 The theme and background information about these interviews is included in Chapter 1 under 




CHAPTER 3  
 
EXPROPRIATION IN INDIAN IIAS 
 
One of the substantive investment protection provisions that all IIAs contain is the host 
state’s obligation not to expropriate foreign investment — ‘taking’ of privately owned 
property by the government, unless certain conditions like paying due compensation are 
met.333 This substantive provision has attracted considerable attention in ITA.334 
Expropriation, in its classical sense, refers to direct or formal expropriation, which means that 
the host state takes away the legal title of the investment.335 This can be achieved either by 
nationalisation, which is referred to as expropriation of entire industry or sector,336 
confiscation, requisition or acquisition.337  
 
Direct expropriations, which are easily identifiable, have become rare.338 As modern states 
adopt number of regulations to regulate various spheres of life, instances of indirect 
interference with investor’s property rights have become more prominent. However, the 
difficulty is in determining when such indirect interference constitutes expropriation.339 
Indirect expropriation refers to the deprivation of the substantial benefits flowing from the 
investment without any formal ‘taking’ of the property.340 The Iran-US Claims Tribunal in 
                                                
333 Dugan et al (2008), 429.  
334 Christie (1962);  Weston,  (1975),  103;  Newcombe (2005), t 4, ;  Paulsson,  (2005)  Kriebaum (2007), 717;  
McLachlan et al (2007),  290–313   Dolzer and   Schreuer (2008),  92–118;  Ratner (2008),  475   Hoffmann 
(2008), 151;  Newcombe and Paradell (2009),  341–69. 
335 See Salacuse (2010), 294; Sornarajah (2010), 363; Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 323; UNCTAD (2007), 
56. 
336 Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 323;  Domke (1961),  588. In this regard it is important to note that 
Sornarajah has distinguished between nationalisation and expropriation. According to Sornarajah 
‘nationalisation’ implies ‘across the board takings that are designed to end or diminish foreign investment in the 
whole economy or in sectors of the economy’ whereas expropriation is the targeting of specific business – see 
Sornarajah (2010), 364-67.  
337 For more on this see Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 323.  
338 Feldman v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/99/1, 16 December 2002, para 100.   
339 The Feldman tribunal recognised the difficulty by saying that direct expropriation was relatively easy 
whereas ‘it is much less clear when the governmental action that interferes with broadly-defined property rights 
... crosses the line from valid regulation to compensable taking’ para 100. See Brownlie (2008), 532; OECD 
(2004), ‘Indirect Expropriation and Right to Regulate in International Investment Law’, Working Papers on 
International Investment Number 2004/4; Choudhary (2008), 792-97; Van Harten (2007), 90-93;  Been and  
Beauvais (2003), 30;   Ganguly (1999),  113; OECD (2005),  43–71, Spears (2010), 1049-1052; Walde and 
Kolo (2001), 811; Newcombe (2005), 1; Kriebaum (2007), 717. Also see Christie (1962), 338 where the 
argument is that whether such regulatory interferences constitute expropriation or not need to be determined on 
a case to case basis.  
340 Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), 92; Salacuse (2010), 297; Sohn and Baxter (1961), 553. Also see Christie 




Starrett Housing Corporation v Iran and Tippetts said the following for indirect 
expropriation: 
…‘[it] is recognized in international law that measures taken by a state can interfere with 
property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be 
deemed to have been expropriated, even though the state does not purport to have 
expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally remains with the original 
owner’.341  
 
Whether the host country’s regulatory measures result in indirect expropriation is a question 
that has acquired prominence due to a range of sovereign regulatory functions of host states 
being challenged as acts of expropriation by different foreign investors under IIAs in the last 
decade or so. This includes expropriation cases against Argentina for adopting regulatory 
measures to save itself from an extremely severe economic and financial crisis,342 claims of 
expropriation for environment related regulatory measures,343 regulatory measures aimed at 
addressing supply of drinking water,344 regulatory measures involving sovereign functions 
like taxation,345 regulatory measures related to telecom policy,346 and other cases. There have 
also been cases where arbitral rulings have concluded that host state’s regulatory measures 
amount to expropriation without providing cogent reasons for the same347 or have provided 
broad statements that put expropriation over regulation.348  
 
                                                
341 Starrett Housing Corporation v Islamic Republic of Iran (1983) 4 Iran-US CTR 122 at 154. Also see 
Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton and TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran v Islamic Republic of Iran 
(1984) 6 Iran-US CTR 219 at 225.  
342 CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentina, ICISD Case No ARB/01/8; CMS Gas Transmission Company v 
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8 (Annulment Proceedings);  Enron Corporation v Argentina, ICSID Case 
No ARB/01/3; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/01/3 (Annulment 
Proceeding); Sempra Energy International v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16; Sempra Energy 
International v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 (Annulment Proceedings); LG&E Energy Corporation v 
Argentina, ICISD Case No ARB/02/1; Continental Casualty Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9. 
343 See Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 30 August 2000;  Methanex 
Corporation v United States, Chapter 11 NAFTA Arbitration, 9 August 2005.  
344 Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, 24 July 2008 
345 Occidental v Ecuador LCIA, 2004; Encana Corporation v Ecuador 45 ILM 655 (2006). 
346 Telenor Mobile v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/04/15 
347 For example, Dugan et al argue that in Antoine Goetz v Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3 - Award - 10 
February 1999, the tribunal came to the conclusion that the regulatory measure adopted by Burundi (revocation 
of a ‘free enterprise’ licence) was a measure having effect similar to expropriation in ‘somewhat summary 
fashion’ – see Dugan et al (2008), 449.  
348 For example, see Metalclad v Mexico, which gave an expansive definition of expropriation stating that a 
governmental measure depriving an investor of a significant part of anticipated profits or significantly affecting 





Another important factor that has also played its role in intensifying the debate on 
expropriation in international investment law and the host state’s regulatory power is the 
assertion that expropriation provisions in IIAs provide better protection to foreign 
investments in comparison to domestic investments, which, in turn, implies that host state has 
lesser regulatory space available when it comes to dealing with foreign investments in 
comparison to domestic investments.349  
 
In light of this overall debate on regulation and expropriation, this chapter will study the 
expropriation provision in 73 Indian IIAs in order to answer the central question of the thesis 
— will the present formulation of the expropriation provisions in Indian IIAs lead to 
interpretations giving precedence to investment protection over India’s regulatory power? It 
will suggest plausible interpretations of the expropriation provisions in these 73 Indian IIAs, 
carefully noting the textual difference in the expropriation provision in different Indian IIAs. 
It will understand their implications for India’s regulatory power. Also, as it will be shown, 
the majority of Indian IIAs do not provide for how indirect expropriation is to be determined. 
Thus, in the event of an expropriation dispute arising between the foreign investor and India, 
the arbitral tribunal will have the discretion to find out whether India’s regulatory measure is, 
in fact, expropriation.350   
 
Section 3.1 of the chapter studies the anatomy of the expropriation provision in 73 different 
Indian IIAs. The opening paragraph in all these IIAs prohibits expropriation unless or until 
certain conditions are met. These conditions are given in the second paragraph and the 
fulfillment or non fulfillment of these conditions will decide whether the expropriation is 
lawful or unlawful. Thus, the structure of the expropriation provision in all these 73 IIAs 
requires a three-step analysis to determine whether lawful expropriation has taken place.351 
                                                
349 For example, see such debates in context of the US - Been and Beauvais (2003), 26; Stumberg (2009), 
Porterfield (2004),  15-18. For a different view see  Parvanov and  Kantor (2011),     
350 For example, in BG Group Plc v The Republic of Argentina, Final Award, 24 December 2007, UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, the tribunal held that since UK-Argentina IIA does not define expropriation the tribunal will 
have to define it – para 258.  
351 This step based analysis to determine expropriation has been adopted in NAFTA – see Fireman’s Fund 
Insurance v Mexico para 174; Corn Products v Mexico, Decision on Responsibility, 18 January 2008, paras 89 
and 90. Also see Parkerings Compaginet AS v Lithuania, ICSID Arbitration Case No. ARB/05/8 (11 September 
2007) which mentioned the two tier test – first determine whether an indirect expropriation has occurred; if the 
answer is positive, it will next determine whether this indirect expropriation is legitimate – para 442. In this 
regard see Paulsson and Douglas (2004), 145-158 who advocate a two step analysis to determine expropriation – 
1) the nature and extent of interference with the investor’s property rights in such a manner as to constitute 
taking; 2) determining whether this taking amounts to expropriation. One author has given a three stage analysis 




First, determining whether the investor has an investment that has been interfered with by 
India in exercise of its sovereign power;352 second, determining whether this interference 
with investment amounts to expropriation; third, if indeed this interference amounts to 
expropriation, then determining whether this expropriation is pursuant to public policy, has 
been carried out in accordance with law, is non-discriminatory and whether due 
compensation has been paid to the foreign investor.353 
 
For this thesis, the second step is the crux of the matter because it helps in finding out 
whether a regulatory measure is regulation or expropriation.354 Hence, section 3.2 of the 
chapter will focus on this step. This section will discuss whether the existing formulation of 
the expropriation provisions in 73 Indian IIAs support an interpretation that balances 
investment protection with India’s regulatory power. This section will also juxtapose 
expropriation provision in these 73 Indian IIAs with how expropriation is understood in 
Indian law to demonstrate that India’s international obligations on expropriation is broader 
than India’s understanding on it in domestic law. Section 3.3 discusses the issue of 
compensation for expropriation.   
  
3.1 ANATOMY OF EXPROPRIATION PROVISION IN INDIAN IIAs   
 
All the 73 IIAs cover both direct and indirect expropriation. The formulation of the 
expropriation provision in these 73 Indian IIAs can be divided into two types. First, the 
‘limited-content’ type expropriation formulation, which gives limited indication on 
determining indirect expropriation. In these IIAs the focus is only on effect of the regulatory 
measure to determine indirect expropriation. Since these IIAs provide only one indicator to 
determine indirect expropriation, they are referred as ‘limited-content’. Expropriation 
provision in 57 IIAs belongs to this category. Second, the ‘content-indicative’ type 
expropriation provision, which contains certain factors that need to be taken into account to 
determine indirect expropriation. These IIAs focus on effect but also provide many other 
factors that should be used in determining indirect expropriation and hence are referred as 
                                                                                                                                                  
the total deprivation, is able to successfully defend based on domestic law or pre-eminent public interests; 3) 
counter exceptions – claims by investors that step-two exceptions were improperly and arbitrarily applied – 
Montt (2009), 236.  
352 Also see Chemtura v Canada, NAFTA Award, UNCITRAL, 2 August 2010, para 257.  
353 For a general discussion on lawful expropriation see – Reinisch (2008),  171.  




‘content-indicative’. The expropriation provision in 16 IIAs belongs to this group (Table 3.1). 
Both these types are discussed below.  
 
Table 3.1 – Anatomy of Expropriation provision in Indian IIAs  
 
Expropriation formulation type  Number of IIAs  
‘Limited-Content’  57 
‘Content-Indicative’  16 
 
Source – Author’s study of 73 Indian IIAs  
 
3.1.1 ‘Limited-Content’ Type   
 
Out of the 57 ‘limited-content’ expropriation provision, the expropriation provision in as 
many as 46 IIAs provides ‘investments shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subject to 
measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’ ... Thus, as per these 
46 IIAs, India is not only prohibited from nationalising and expropriating foreign investment 
but also from adopting a regulatory measure that has effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation. These IIAs are with developed countries like Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, 
UK and with developing countries like Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Oman, Indonesia and Myanmar. 
Further, this includes IIAs signed in the mid-1990s and also those signed in late 2000, though 
majority of these IIAs were signed during the mid-1990s and first half of 2000, barring IIAs 
with countries like – Macedonia (signed and enforced in 2008), Libya (signed in 2007 and 
enforced in 2009) and Myanmar (signed in 2008 and enforced in 2009). In other words, there 
is no distinct pattern amongst the expropriation provision in Indian IIAs containing such 
formulation. 
  
More or less same formulation exists in two more IIAs; India-Morocco IIA – ‘any other 
measure having equivalent effect’; and India-France IIA – ‘any other measure having the 
effect of dispossession’.   
 
In this ‘limited-content’, there are five IIAs (India-Kuwait; India-Qatar; India-Uzbekistan; 




For example, India-Qatar IIA states ‘the investment shall not be subject, either directly or 
indirectly, to any act of expropriation or nationalisation or to any other procedure of similar 
effect ...’. Thus as per this provision, India cannot expropriate foreign investment either 
directly or indirectly nor can it subject foreign investment ‘to any other procedure of similar 
effect’.355 The India-Mexico IIA states that neither country may expropriate or nationalise an 
investment ‘either directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or 
nationalisation’. Thus, the expropriation provision in India-Mexico IIA does not talk about 
‘effect’ equivalent to expropriation. Similarly, India-Austria IIA does not talk of ‘effect’ 
equivalent to expropriation. It only states that ‘investments shall not be expropriated’.  
 
3.1.2 ‘Content-indicative’ Type    
 
The expropriation provisions in 16 Indian IIAs,356 like the other 57 IIAs, state that 
investments shall not be nationalised, expropriated, or subjected to ‘measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’. However, there is an important difference. 
These 16 IIAs, unlike the ‘limited-content’ IIAs, provide specific factors that should be taken 
into account in determining ‘measures having effect equivalent to expropriation’. These 
criteria include not just the ‘economic impact’ of the regulatory measure on foreign 
investment but also other factors like the extent to which the measures are discriminatory 
either in scope or in application; the extent to which measures interfere with distinct, 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and the character and intent of the measures 
(Table 3.2) . 
 
                                                
355 Article 1110 (1) of NAFTA provides – ‘no Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation’. In Waste Management v Mexico ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 the tribunal held that the 
phrase ‘take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation’ was intended to add to the meaning of 
the prohibition over and above the reference to indirect expropriation (paras 143 and 144). This argument that 
there exists a third category of expropriation in addition to ‘direct’ and indirect’ has been rejected by other 
arbitral tribunals - see Pope and Talbot, where the tribunal held that in Article 1110 (1) of NAFTA, ‘a measure 
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation’ means nothing more than a ‘measure equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation’ – see paras 96 to 104. The same was said by the Telenor tribunal that measures 
such as ‘equivalent to expropriation’ or ‘measures having similar effect’ do not expand the concept of 
expropriation but means that the IIA includes both indirect and direct expropriation – para 63. Thus, the phrase 
‘any other procedure of similar effect’ is same as ‘indirect’ expropriation and does not expand the ambit of 
expropriation into a third category beyond the well established categories of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ expropriation 
- see Salacuse (2010), 300; Vandevelde (2009),  479. 
356 These 16 IIAs are with the following countries - Slovak Republic; Trinidad and Tobago; China; Iceland; 
Saudi Arabia; Brunei Darussalam; Syria; Jordan; Mozambique; Senegal; Lithuania; Latvia, Singapore, Korea, 




Table 3.2 – Determining Indirect Expropriation in Indian IIAs  
 
Expropriation provision Type  Determining Indirect Expropriation  
‘Limited-Content’  ‘measures having effect equivalent to 
expropriation’   
‘Content-Indicative’  ‘measures having effect equivalent’ to 
expropriation’; but also provides 
factors like ‘economic impact’ and 
‘character of the measure’ that should 
be taken into account to determine 
such measures.   
 
Source – Author’s study of 73 Indian IIAs  
 
3.2 DETERMINING INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION  
 
The majority of Indian IIAs (in both categories) state ‘investments shall not be nationalised, 
expropriated or subject to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation’... This formulation is same as it appears in many other IIAs that have been 
interpreted by different arbitral tribunals. Hence, the section will first briefly discuss the 
different approaches that arbitral tribunals have adopted to determine indirect expropriation. 
The section will then focus on how to determine indirect expropriation in ‘limited-content’ 
and ‘content-indicative’ Indian IIAs based on the treaty language.     
 
3.2.1 Effect vis-à-vis Purpose? 
 
Many arbitral tribunals have followed the ‘sole effects’ doctrine to determine indirect 
expropriation. As per this doctrine, the focus should solely be on ‘effect’ of the regulatory 
measure on foreign investment to determine indirect expropriation. The justification for 




word ‘effect’. For example, in Siemens v Argentina,357 Argentina argued that tribunal should 
not take into account only the ‘effect’ of the measure on foreign investment.358 However, the 
tribunal dismissed Argentina’s argument and held – first, Article 4(2) of the Germany-
Argentina IIA refers to ‘effect’ of the measure and not to the intent of the state to 
expropriate.359 Second, ‘purpose’ of the expropriation is one of the requirements to determine 
whether expropriation is in accordance with the IIA and not to determine whether an 
expropriation has occurred or not360 (the second point is discussed later in the chapter while 
discussing the argument on ‘purpose’ to determine expropriation). Similarly, in AWG v 
Argentina,361 where the expropriation provision in the UK-Argentina IIA contains the phrase 
‘subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’, the 
tribunal held that specific reference to ‘effects’ in the IIA ‘affirms the importance of 
evaluating ‘effects’ of the measure on the investment in determining whether an 
expropriation has taken place’.362 In Encana v Ecuador,  the Canada-Ecuador IIA, which was 
under consideration, had almost similar formulation of the expropriation provision as found 
in majority of Indian IIAs – ‘subjected to measures having an effect equivalent to 
expropriation’. In this case, the tribunal focused on the ‘effect’ of the measure on foreign 
investment to determine whether indirect expropriation had occurred or not.363 
 
Focus on ‘effect’ of the regulatory measure to determine indirect expropriation raises the 
question of how severe the ‘effect’ should be to come to the conclusion that indirect 
expropriation has taken place? 
 
Tribunals have answered this question by saying that ‘under international law, expropriation 
requires a ‘substantial deprivation’’.364 In other words, tribunals have said that the effect 
should be such that substantially deprives the investment and hence the test is of ‘substantial 
                                                
357 Siemens v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 6 February 2007. 
358 Siemens tribunal, para 270.  
359 Id.  
360 Id.  
361 AWG v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010. 
362 Id, para 133.  
363 Encana v Ecuador, paras 173-78. Also see Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy Stratton v TAMS AFFA Consulting 
Engineers of Iran, (1984), 6 Iran-US CTR 219 at 225-26; Starrett Housing Corp v Iran, 4 Iran-US CTR 122, 
Enron v Argentina, para 244 and Patrick Mitchell v The Democratic Republic of Congo (Annulment 
Proceedings) ICSID Case No ARB/99/7, para 53 for ‘sole effect’ doctrine. Also see Vivendi II; Bayindir v 
Pakistan, para 459 stating that one needs to focus on ‘effect’ of the measure and not the intent underlying the 
purpose; Impregilo SpA v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, para 270 also talks of ‘effect’ of the measure 
on investment to determine expropriation.    




deprivation’ to determine indirect expropriation.365 Recently, the arbitral tribunal in AWG v 
Argentina also endorsed the ‘substantial deprivation’ test in determining indirect 
expropriation.366 The effect can certainly be more than substantial such as cases where the 
deprivation is complete or total. For example, the tribunal in Total SA v Argentina367 held that 
under international law those measures that do not constitute direct expropriation may 
nevertheless result in indirect expropriation ‘if an effective deprivation of the investment is 
thereby caused’.368 The tribunal further said that effective deprivation requires a total loss of 
value of the property.369 The Total tribunal provide for a higher threshold by emphasising on 
total deprivation in comparison to those tribunals that require substantial deprivation.    
 
The determination of whether there is substantial deprivation will depend on different factors 
such as the factors given by the Pope and Talbot tribunal like control over investment; 
whether the investor is able to manage the day to day operations of the investment; whether 
officers or employees of investment have been detained by the state; whether the state 
supervises the work of the employees of the investment; whether any part of the sale 
proceeds (apart from taxation) go to the state; whether the state prevents payments of 
dividends to share holders; whether the state interferes with appointment of directors.370 
Many investment arbitration tribunals that have focused on the ‘substantial deprivation’ test, 
referring to the indicators given in Pope and Talbot, have looked at control over investment 
as a key indicator to determine indirect expropriation. For example, in Enron v Argentina, the 
tribunal said that the list of measures given by the Pope and Talbot tribunal are representative 
of the legal standard required to determine indirect expropriation and emphasised on control 
over investment as an integral part of ‘substantial deprivation’.371 This has been described as 
                                                
365 PSEG v Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, paras 278-80; CMS v Argentina, para 262. Also see other 
Argentina cases that have endorsed the ‘substantial deprivation’ test to determine indirect expropriation – LG&E 
v Argentina, para 194; Sempra v Argentina, paras 284-85; BG Group v Argentina, paras 258-66; Enron 
Corporation v Argentina, para 245. Also see Tecmed v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2 
para 115; CME v Czech Republic, (Final Award) 14 march 2003, para 604. This test was also repeated in Corn 
Products International v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB/AF (04) (01), 15 January 2008, para 91 stating that in 
cases where there is no physical taking of the property or forcible transfer of title, ‘taking’ must be a 
substantially complete deprivation of the economic use and enjoyment of rights to property. Also see Higgins 
(1982), 324. 
366 Id, para 134. Also see Chemtura Corporation v Canada Ad Hoc NAFTA Arbitration under UNCITRAL 
Rules (2 August 2010), para 242; Tokois Tokeles v Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/02/18, para 120. Also see 
Schreuer (2006), 145; Hoffman (2008), 156-59.  
367 Total SA v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, 27 December 2010.  
368 Id, para 195.    
369 Id. Also see El Paso v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 31 October 2011, para 244.  
370 Pope and Talbot, para 100. Also see Walde and Kolo (2001), 811 at 837-38.  
371 Enron v Argentina, para 245. Similarly, in CMS v Argentina the tribunal held “control over investment” as 




the legal approach.372 In distinction to the legal approach, some arbitral tribunals have 
focused on the economic approach emphasising on the substantial deprivation of the value of 
the investment.373 In distinction to this, recently, in Chemtura v Canada, the tribunal 
preferred an approach that takes into account both the legal and economic effect of the 
regulatory measure on the investment to determine whether there has been a substantial 
deprivation. The tribunal, discussing the list of measures laid down by Pope and Talbot 
tribunal, held that the criteria must guide the tribunal in determining whether the ‘effects’ of 
the measures challenged are to ‘substantially’ deprive the investor of the benefit of its 
investment – this being a matter of degree and not one of specific conditions.374 The 
Chemtura tribunal also said that determination of substantial deprivation is a fact-sensitive 
exercise, which should be carried out in view of the circumstances of each case.375   
 
Purpose Test     
 
Contrary to the ‘sole effects’ test to determine indirect expropriation, supported by majority 
of arbitral tribunals, is another test supported by some arbitral tribunals376 and scholars377 that 
talks of looking at the purpose of the measure along with the effect of the measure. This is 
referred as the ‘purpose’ test. The ‘purpose test’ attempts to remedy the concern that 
application of the ‘sole effects’ test will fail to distinguish between malafide and bonafide 
regulatory measures if both have the same effect of substantially depriving the investment.378 
The ‘purpose-test’ promises to address this concern and hence serve host country’s regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                  
tribunal said that while effective control over investment was important, it was not necessarily determinative – 
see Meg N Kinnear, A Bjorklund, John FG Hannaford, Expropriation and Compensation, 1110-24.    
372 Montt (2009), 262.    
373 Telenor v Hungary which required ‘a major adverse impact on economic value of the investment’ – para 64 
and Parkerings-Compagniet v Lithuania, requiring substantial decrease in the value of the investment as one of 
the requirements to determine indirect expropriation – para 455. Also see Total SA v Argentina, para 195.    
374 Chemtura v Canada, para 247. Also see Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, where the tribunal held that for any 
expropriation – direct or indirect – the state must deprive the investor of a ‘substantial’ part of the value of the 
value of investment and determination will depend on the facts before the tribunal -   para 120; Reinisch (2008), 
438-39. Also see Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), 107-08.     
375 Chemtura v Canada, para 249.  
376 Methanex v USA; Tecmed v Mexico; LG&E v Argentina; El Paso v Argentina.   
377 See Salacuse (2010), 317-18;  
378 Fortier and Drymer (2004), 293; Paparinskis (2011), 299. Also see Salacuse (2010), 317. In this regard, it has 
been argued that the effects-only approach should be applied in cases of disguised expropriation and those 
substantial interferences with property rights that are in breach of due process - Paparinskis (2011), 304. the 
Azurix tribunal had observed that arbitral tribunals are divided on the issue that whether only effect of the 
measures on investment should be considered or both the effect and the purpose behind the measure should 
considered - Azurix tribunal, para 309. Also see Lowe (2007), 75-76 – pointing out the real uncertainty over 




power. The ‘purpose-test’ can also be seen as a response to the criticism that IIAs do not 
balance investment protection with host country’s regulatory power. However, it needs to be 
ascertained whether this response is compatible with the language of the treaty (IIAs) and 
with the treaty interpretation tools.  
The ‘purpose-test’ to determine indirect expropriation can take two forms.  
 
Police Power test  
 
As per the police power test, once it is determined that there is substantial deprivation, then 
focus shifts to determining whether the impugned regulatory measure was a non-
discriminatory regulatory measure for public purpose applied following due process or not. If 
so, then notwithstanding the effect of the measure on foreign investment, it will not amount 
to expropriation.379 The best exposition of this test is provided by the tribunal in Methanex v 
United States. In this case, the tribunal held that:  
 
…as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public 
purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a 
foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific 
commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then putative foreign 
investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain from such regulation.380  
 
Similarly, the Saluka tribunal held that:  
 
…it is now established in international law that States are not liable to pay compensation to 
a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they adopt in a 
non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are aimed at the general welfare.381  
                                                
379Methanex tribunal, Part IV, Chapter D, para 7; Paparinskis (2011), 311-19; Reinisch (2008), 437; Vandevelde 
(2009), 301-02; Fortier and Drymer (2004), 313-25; Subedi (2008), 163; Mostafa (2008), 273-74.   
380 Methanex v United States, Part IV, Chapter D, para 7. Also see S Fietta (2006), 391 has argued that such 
language that focuses more on specific commitments to foreign investors and less on interference is reminiscent 
more of an ‘FET’ analysis than ‘expropriation’. Also see Encana Corp v Republic of Ecuador, 3 February 2006 
which said that denial of legitimate expectation does not amount to expropriation.  
381 Recently, the tribunal in El Paso v Argentina stated ‘in principle, general non-discriminatory regulatory 
measures, adopted in accordance with the rules of good faith and due process, do not entail a duty of 
compensation’ - El Paso v Argentina, para 240. The exception that the tribunal recognised to this general rule is 





Thus, as per these rulings adoption of non discriminatory regulatory measures for public 
purpose following due process do not amount to expropriation even if they have the effect of 
substantially depriving foreign investment.382  
 
Proportionality test  
 
As per the proportionality test, determination of indirect expropriation will depend on 
whether the regulatory measure is proportionate to the purpose sought to be achieved.383 The 
proportionality test will have three steps.384 First, whether the measure is suitable for the 
legitimate public purpose — this will require a causal link between the measure and its 
object.385 Second, whether the measure is necessary; and the third step will involve balancing 
the effects of the measure on the right that has been affected with the public benefit sought to 
be achieved by the measure.386 This test will weigh and balance purpose with effect and 
hence arguably appears attractive to solve the conundrum between regulation and 
expropriation.387  
 
The Tecmed tribunal, for the first time, applied this test in ITA. The tribunal cited the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence to support the proportionality test 
and applied it to interpret the expropriation provision given in Article 5(1) of the Mexico-
Spain IIA. The tribunal also emphasised the presence of the word ‘effects’ in the 
expropriation provision in Article 5(1) of the Mexico-Spain IIA to support that effects of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
they result in a neutralisation of the foreign investor’s property rights’ - Id, para 241. The approach of the El 
Paso tribunal is close to the Methanex tribunal though it recognises more exceptions to the general rule that 
non-discriminatory; good faith regulation does not amount to expropriation.   
382 For more on this test see Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), 109-111; Sornarajah (2010), 374-75; Kriebaum (2007), 
724-27.  It is also important to note that in none of these cases the concerned expropriation provision contained 
the word ‘effect’ on foreign investment as the criterion to determine indirect expropriation – in Methanex, the 
relevant phrase was ‘tantamount to expropriation’ and in Saluka the relevant word was ‘deprivation’. In fact, the 
Saluka tribunal said that the relevant expropriation provision in the IIA was drafted in a very broad manner - 
para 254. It is also important to note that Saluka’s position on this point is more nuanced as compared to 
Methanex. The Saluka tribunal after saying that states are not liable to compensate for bonafide non 
discriminatory regulatory measures also said that the tribunal will determine whether the measure is bonafide or 
not by assessing the context in which the impugned measure was adopted – Saluka, para 264.  
383 Tecmed v Mexico.   
384 Xiuli (2006), 636-37; Kinsbury and Schill (2010), 85-88. Also see Coe and Rubins (2005).   
385 Id. Also see Hans (2000), 240.   
386 Id.  




action have to be taken into account in determining the economic deprivation of the 
investment.388 However, after emphasising that regulatory measures per se are not excluded 
from the ambit of expropriation, the tribunal introduced the notion of proportionality to 
decide whether the regulatory measure is proportional to the public interest it wishes to 
protect.389 The tribunal, relying on the ECHR jurisprudence,390 stated:  
 
…there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight 





…the foreign investor has a reduced or nil participation in the taking of the decisions that 
affect it, partly because the investors are not entitle to exercise political rights reserved to the 
nationals of the State, such as voting for the authorities that will issue the decisions that 
affect such investors.392  
 
The tribunal relied on the ECHR jurisprudence to support this pronouncement.393 This test 
has been supported by some other arbitral tribunals as well.394 It has also been argued that the 
proportionality test helps to achieve a balance between affected property right and the public 
interest.395 
 
                                                
388 Tecmed v Mexico, para 115.  
389 Id, para 122.  
390 In the case of Mellacher and Others v Austria, judgment of 19 December 1989, 48, p. 24; In the case of 
Pressos Compañía Naviera and Others v Belgium, judgment of 20 November  1995, 38, p. 19; In the case of 
James and Others, judgment of 21 February  1986, 50, pp.19-20, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.     
391 Tecmed v Meico, para 122.  
392 Id.  
393 In the case of James and others, judgment of 21 February  1986.  
394 LG&E v Argentina, para 195; Azurix v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 14 July 2006, para 312; El 
Paso v Argentina, para 241. The Azurix tribunal did not apply the proportionality test – it found no expropriation 
on the basis of impact of the measure being insufficient on investment. The arbitral tribunal in Fireman’s Fund v 
Mexico said (in footnote 162) after noting that the principle of proportionality was used by the Tecmed tribunal 
said ‘The factor is used by the European Court of Human Rights ... and it may be questioned whether it is a 
viable source of interpreting Article 1110 of the NAFTA’. Reference to proportionality was also made in 
Continental, para 276. Also see Ratner (2008), 457. Also see Salacuse (2010), 317-18; Newcombe and Paradell 
(2009), 362-64; Coe and Rubins (2005). Also see Sweet (2010).    
395 Brower and Schill (2009), 486. Also see Fortier and Drymer (2004), 326; Muchlinski (2007); Ratner (2008), 
482-83; Moloo and Jacinto (2011). In this regard, it has also been argued that the approach adopted by the 




3.2.2 ‘Limited-Content’ Type – Interpretation    
 
The determination of indirect expropriation in these 57 ‘limited-content’ expropriation 
provisions cannot be made by relying simply on a particular test or doctrine. This 
determination has to be made by keeping in the mind the treaty language — ‘measures 
having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’ — and by interpreting this 
language using treaty interpretation tools like giving ordinary meaning to the words used in 
view of the context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Other tools such as 
‘any other rule relevant between the parties’ – given in Article 31(3)(c) are also relevant. For 
example, the Saluka396 tribunal relied on Article 31(3)(c) to import customary international 
law into the expropriation provision of the concerned IIA to interpret expropriation.397   
 
The formulation ‘measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’ has 
two parts. One part focuses on ‘effect’ of the measure on foreign investment and the other 
part focuses on ‘equivalence’ of effect to nationalisation and expropriation.  
 
Focus on effect  
 
According to the phrase determination of indirect expropriation depends on the ‘effect’ of the 
regulatory measure on foreign investment. The expropriation provision in the ‘limited-
content’ IIAs does not mention any other factor to take into account for the determination of 
indirect expropriation. The focus solely on ‘effect’ brings into focus the ‘sole effects’ 
doctrine398 to determine indirect expropriation.  
 
Since a majority of ‘limited-content’ type expropriation formulation specifically mentions 
only the requirement to take into account ‘effects’ of the measure in determining 
expropriation, there is a strong argument, on a clear textual basis, to look solely at ‘effects’ of 
the measure in determining whether an Indian regulatory measure amounts to indirect 
expropriation.399 Contrary to the argument that tribunals should rely solely on ‘effects’ of the 
                                                
396 Saluka Investments v The Czech Republic 
397 Id, para 254.    
398 Dolzer (2002), 79.  
399 With regard to giving significance to treaty language for determining expropriation see - Poulsson and 




measure on investment to determine indirect expropriation is the argument that one should 
also take into account the ‘purpose’ of the measure.400 This argument is discussed later in the 
chapter.  
 
Equivalent to Expropriation – Substantial Deprivation  
 
The phrase mentioned above, apart from focusing on ‘effect’, also requires that the effect on 
foreign investment should be equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation for it to be 
expropriatory. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘equivalent’ is ‘similar or identical’. Thus, 
if a regulatory measure adopted by India has effects that are similar or identical to the effect 
had the investment been nationalised or directly expropriated, then the regulatory measure 
will constitute indirect expropriation. Effects of direct expropriation are that the investor will 
be deprived of his investment; lose control over investment and fail to reap economic benefits 
from investment — in other words, fail to use, enjoy or dispose property or lose all 
fundamental rights of ownership.401 The Feldman tribunal characterised the effect of direct 
expropriation as ‘depriving the investor of all meaningful benefits and ownership and 
control.402 Thus, if any regulatory measure adopted by India has effects that are similar to the 
investor losing the right to meaningful utilisation of investment or in simpler terms there is 
‘substantial deprivation’ of the investment,403 the regulatory measure will be expropriatory.404 
 
Hence, ‘measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation’ in 57 ‘limited-
content’ expropriation provision provide an indirect textual basis to the ‘substantial 
deprivation’ test. An important offshoot of this is that not any effect on foreign investment 
that results in economic hardship will qualify as indirect expropriation.405 This allows enough 
                                                                                                                                                  
provision in the IIA between Belgium/Luxembourg and Burundi fused ‘taking’ and ‘expropriation’ and thus any 
‘taking’ had to be compensated.      
400 Salacuse (2010), 317.  
401 Sohn and Baxter (1961), 553, 559; Brownlie (2008), 531; Weston (1976), 103-75. 
402 Feldman v Mexico, para 100. Also see Fireman’s Fund v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/01,which 
said that effect of expropriation is dispositive (para 176).  
403 Mostafa (2008), 280. The effect may not be total deprivation but substantial deprivation, see - Pope and 
Talbot Inc v Canada (UNCITRAL, NAFTA), Interim Award, 26 June 2000, para 96. 
404 Also see Vandevelde (2009), 294. In Impregilo v Pakistan, concerning the expropriation provision of the 
Italy-Pakistan IIA containing the phrase ‘subjected to any measures having similar effects’, the tribunal said that 
‘the effect of the measures taken must be of such importance that those measures can be considered as having 
an effect equivalent to expropriation’ – para 279. Also see Lowe (2007); Dolzer and Stevens (1995), 100.   
405 Hoffman (2008), 159. For example, the tribunal in Impregilo v Argentina held that ‘Expropriation is to be 




space for India to adopt regulatory measures for its various regulatory needs even if they 
result in adverse economic effect on foreign investment till this effect does not reach the high 
threshold of substantial deprivation.406 This threshold will be even higher if the deprivation 
required is total as held in Total SA v Argentina.407 Thus, any Indian regulation that reduces 
profits of foreign investment or that results in other economic hardships but do not reach the 
threshold of substantial deprivation will not qualify as ‘measure having effect equivalent to 
expropriation’. As the Argentina cases demonstrate that even in situations of severe 
economic crisis that had other social and political fall outs, Argentina’s regulatory measures 
did not result in substantial deprivation of foreign investments and hence no indirect 
expropriation was found, though Argentina was guilty of breaching other IIA provisions like 
FET.   
 
This interpretation is also consistent with the customary international law principle that a 
country has the right to regulate its internal affairs.408 Hence, this interpretation serves India’s 
regulatory power although one should not forget that the arbitral discretion may still be 
exercised in favour of adopting an expansive interpretation on the lines of the definition of 
expropriation given in Metalclad409 or Occidental.410      
 
Conceptual Severance   
 
The indirect textual reference to the ‘substantial deprivation’ test in ‘limited content’ 
expropriation does not answer one question — ‘substantial deprivation’ of which investment? 
Let us assume that a foreign investor runs an enterprise and this enterprise is entitled to get a 
tax refund. Further assume that this tax refund has been denied due to a new regulatory 
measure adopted by India; however, this denial of tax refund has not affected the investor’s 
enterprise as a whole. The question will be: is non payment of the tax refund due to the 
                                                                                                                                                  
measures may also have serious economic effects for the investor but do not constitute expropriation’ - 
Impregilo v Argentina, para 270. Also see Mostafa (2008), 282-84.  
406 Moloo and Jacinto (2011), 24. 
407 Total SA v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1), 27 December 2010.  
408 Also see Vandevelde (2009), 271.  
409 Ewing-Chow and Teck (2008), 33. Also see Dearden (1995), 117-21 supporting a broad view on 
expropriation.  
410 In Occidental Exploration v Ecuador the tribunal stated ‘the respondent in this case did not adopt measures 
that could be considered as amounting to direct or indirect expropriation. In fact, there has been no deprivation 
of the use or reasonably expected economic benefit of the investment, let alone measures affecting a significant 
part of the investment’ (para 89). In other words, the Occidental tribunal recognised ‘deprivation of the use or 




foreign investor expropriation?411 It is here that an arbitral tribunal will enjoy discretion in 
determining whether a regulatory measure adopted by India amounts to indirect 
expropriation. 
 
This brings us to the issue of conceptual severance.412 Conceptual severance implies breaking 
the bundle of rights of the foreign investor into different individual rights and then assessing 
whether the state’s regulatory measure interfering with any of these individual rights is to the 
extent of taking away the right and whether this taking amounts to expropriation. In the above 
example, one approach that an arbitral tribunal can take is to sever ‘rightful claims to money’ 
from the overall bundle of the investor’s rights and then come to the conclusion that since this 
is recognised as investment in all the ‘limited-content’ IIAs, refusal to pay tax refund is total 
deprivation of ‘rightful claims to money’ and thus expropriation. For example, in Eureko v 
Poland, the tribunal held that since Poland deprived the investor from buying additional 
shares in a company, and which was an asset under the IIA; this deprival amounted to 
expropriation notwithstanding the fact that the investor’s existing shares in the company had 
not been affected and in fact continued to earn dividends.413 Thus, in this case, the right to 
buy additional shares was severed from the overall investment activity to come to the 
conclusion that the right to buy additional shares had been indirectly expropriated. On the 
other hand, another approach that can be take is that if investor’s enterprise is taken as a 
whole, then non-payment of tax refund shall not amount to expropriation because this has not 
substantially deprived the investor’s overall enterprise or overall investment taken as a whole. 
The Telenor tribunal adopted this approach:  ‘the investment must be viewed as a whole and 
that the test the tribunal has to apply is whether, viewed as a whole, the investment has 
suffered substantial erosion of value’.414  
 
Since the expropriation provision in the ‘limited-content’ expropriation provisions does not 
provide any guidance on conceptual severance, this determination is open to different 
interpretations. Thus an arbitral tribunal can adopt the position taken in Eureko v Poland to 
sever individual rights and to look at the impact on these rights to decide an indirect 
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expropriation claim. Such severance, depending on its degree, may result in India’s 
regulatory measures being held expropriatory. The Indian thinking on this issue is not 
known.415 However, in the recent ITA case involving India, (White Industries v India) India 
argued that the correct test to determine indirect expropriation is to assess the impact of the 
state’s behaviour on the rights of the investor in the investment and not the impact on the 
value of the investment.416 Thus, India favoured an approach similar to the one adopted by 
the Eureko tribunal.417   
 
‘Limited-content’ Expropriation provision and the ‘Purpose’ Test  
 
The discussion below will show that although the ‘purpose-test’ promises to serve India’s 
regulatory power, the formulation of the ‘limited-content’ type expropriation provision and 
the structure of the Indian IIAs do not allow the adoption of ‘purpose’ test to interpret these 
expropriation provisions. This is discussed under the following heads – public purpose; 
presence of NPM provision; and the context of Indian IIAs.    
 
Public Purpose     
 
Both versions of ‘purpose’ test take into account ‘public purpose’ as the criterion to 
determine indirect expropriation. However, the phrase ‘measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalisation or expropriation’ contains only ‘effect’ as the criterion to determine indirect 
expropriation and not ‘public purpose’. For example, Article 5(1) of the India Germany IIA 
states:  
 
Investments of investors of either contracting party shall not be expropriated, nationalised, or 
subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation in the 
territory of the other contracting party except in public interest, authorised by the laws of 
that party, on a non-discriminatory basis and against compensation.  
 
                                                
415 India’s current and former investment treaty negotiators when asked about this question had no answer to 
offer. It was pointed out that these issues have not been examined and thought out in detail.  
416 White Industries v India, UNCITRAL, 30 November 2011, paras 5.5.5 and 12.3.5.  




In all Indian IIAs containing the ‘limited-content’ expropriation formulation, ‘public purpose’ 
exists as a criterion to determine lawful expropriation and not expropriation, which is the first 
of the two analytical steps to be performed in interpreting expropriation provision: first, 
determination of expropriation; second, if expropriation is found then whether India has 
complied with the conditions necessary to have a lawful expropriation, which includes the 
presence of ‘public purpose’.  
 
In other words, by giving an ordinary meaning to the words occurring in the ‘limited-content’ 
expropriation formulation one can state that the expropriation provision does not preclude 
India from regulating for public purpose. However, the provision recognises that India can 
adopt regulatory measures that are expropriatory to achieve a public purpose provided 
compensation is paid.418 Using public purpose as a criterion to determine expropriation, 
which is the first step, will be inconsistent with the structure of the ‘limited-content’ 
expropriation provision in these IIAs because such interpretation will subsume the second 
step into the first step.419 Such subsuming will also result in a contradictory situation where 
expropriation is not allowed till there is public purpose and compensation, and at the same 
time public purpose is used to distinguish between regulation and compensable 
expropriation.420  
 
Argument in favour of relying on ‘purpose’ to determine indirect expropriation even if the 
expropriation provision in ‘limited-content’ expropriation provision refers only to ‘effect’ and 
not to ‘purpose’ could be made by relying on the general principle, as part of CIL, that a state 
does not commit an expropriation and is not liable for adopting general regulatory measures 
that are commonly accepted as part of states’ police powers like the Saluka tribunal.421 The 
importation of this CIL principle into ‘limited-content’ expropriation provision can be 
justified by relying on Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT; and thus arguing that this is a relevant 
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states to adopt sweeping regulatory measures in order to further the claim for a large public benefit in order to 
avoid paying compensation – Vandevelde (2009), 296. 




rule of international law to interpret ‘measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation’.  
 
While many authorities support the right of the host state to regulate for bonafide public 
purpose even if it considerably affects foreign investment;422 what is challenging is to answer 
whether this right has any limits. According to the ‘police power’ test it has no limits barring 
the limit of legitimate expectations given by the Methanex tribunal.423 On the other hand, it 
has been argued that ‘historically, police powers have never been meant to cover regulations 
amounting to expropriations, except perhaps in situations where there is a state of emergency 
or a state of necessity.’424 In other words, it is one thing to state that India has the right to 
adopt non-discriminatory regulatory measures for public purpose; quite different to decide 
how this will be applied in light of the fact that India has herself accepted restrictions on its 
right by signing so many IIAs. Furthermore, one needs to distinguish between those 
situations where India exercises regulatory power to adopt regulations in good faith even if 
such regulations adversely affect foreign investment from those situations where the same 
good faith regulations neutralise foreign investment. As per the approach adopted by the 
Methanex and El Paso tribunals no expropriation will be found even in the latter cases unless 
the regulation violates investor’s legitimate expectations or are unreasonable. However, a 
bonafide regulation that totally destroys the value of the investment should be compensated 
because international law does not allow putting such high burden on an individual for the 
benefit of the society.425 Further, the very purpose of having expropriation provisions in IIAs 
is to ensure that if a regulation for public purpose and in accordance with due process crosses 
the threshold, the foreign investor should be compensated.426 Many tribunals have also not 
supported the assertion that bonafide regulation for public purpose is not expropriatory. The 
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for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, 
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‘economic disadvantage’ and ‘substantial deprivation’.  
425 Paulsson and Douglas (2004), 157. In this regard it has also been argued that it is not right to put all cost of a 
bonafide regulation on the foreign investor – see Brower II (2009).  Also see Ewing-Chow and Teck (2008), 38.  




tribunal in ADC v Hungary427 said that while a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right 
to regulate its domestic affairs, the exercise of this right must have its boundaries.428 The 
tribunal recognised that the relevant IIA provided such boundaries.429 The Azurix tribunal 
found the criterion that ‘host state is not liable for economic injury that is the consequence of 
bonafide regulation within the accepted police powers of the state’ insufficient to determine 
indirect expropriation and recognised that a legitimate measure serving public measure could 
give rise to a compensation claim.430 The tribunal in Pope and Talbot stated that ‘a blanket 
exception for regulatory measures would create a gaping hole in international protection 
against expropriation’.431 The tribunal in Vivendi II stated that ‘if public purpose 
automatically immunizes the measure from being found to be expropriatory, then there would 
never be a compensable taking for a public purpose….’432  
 
Another complex issue in this context is how to determine which public purpose is bonafide 
and thus not compensable? The ‘limited-content’ type expropriation provision in these 57 
Indian IIAs do not provide any basis to determine that a particular regulatory measure is or is 
not for a bonafide public purpose and hence compensable or not. If this determination is done 
by using the broadest rule that ‘any non discriminatory regulatory measure for public 
purpose’ is outside the ambit of expropriation, notwithstanding the effect, it will push almost 
all non-discriminatory regulatory purposes for public purpose implemented by following due 
process outside the scope of the expropriation provision making the expropriation provision 
in these 57 IIAs redundant.433 This will violate the very object and purpose of majority of 
Indian IIAs, which is to provide protection to foreign investment. If determination of public 
purpose is made by giving deference to India, it may lead to the possibility of India invoking 
‘public purpose’ to basically negate protection against expropriation to foreign investment.434 
This is evident from the broad interpretation given to ‘public purpose’ in Indian law. The 
Supreme Court of India has held that ‘public purpose’ is not a static concept435 and has also 
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said that no hard and fast definition of public purpose is possible.436 It has been argued that 
whatever furthers the general interest of the community, as opposed to particular interest of 
the individuals, may be regarded as public purpose.437 Indian courts have showed a good deal 
of deference to the legislative and executive organs of the Indian state on the matter of public 
purpose,438 though public purpose remains justiciable.439  
 
Will the arbitral tribunal adopt an approach of going along a spectrum where some purpose 
excludes expropriation and some don’t?440 Deciding this issue may not be easy because there 
is no internationally recognised ‘taxonomy’ of ‘police powers’; although arguments have 
been made to develop such a ‘taxanomy’.441 Newcombe and Paradell characterise three 
categories of police power for which state’s action shall remain non-compensable: (a) public 
order and morality – thus property seized for criminal activities shall not be expropriation – 
authors argue that there is a greater possibility of widespread state practice and opino juris 
with respect to police powers in core areas of criminal law;442 (b) protection of human health 
and environment, and; (c) taxation.443 However, authors also recognise problems related to 
developing such a taxanomy because it remains unclear to what extent can a host country use 
regulatory measures to dispossess investors of their investments.444 Further, concepts such as 
public morality will differ across countries.445   
 
The Saluka tribunal mentioned that international law is yet to identify comprehensibly and 
definitely which regulations are ‘permissible’ and will be accepted as falling within the police 
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or the regulatory power of states.446 Thus, the tribunal said that it will have to determine 
whether the concerned regulatory measure crosses the line that separates regulation from 
expropriation.447 As per this, the ad hoc arbitral tribunals will have the discretion to 
determine whether a contestable regulatory measure is part of ‘police power’ of the state and 
hence a regulation or an expropriation.448 However, this gives much discretion to arbitrators 
to decide complex value laden question of what bonafide public purposes are and what are 
not for the state concerned (India) with the discretion to replace the host states’ (India) public 
purpose with their own notion of public purpose without having specific and local knowledge 
about the issue at hand that a national regulator will have. Such complex questions are often 
resolved by national judges in national courts. Even here, it is now argued in India that judges 
should not step into the shoes of the executive to decide policy issues.449  
 
Same analysis applies to the proportionality test.450 The difference between ‘police power’ 
test and ‘proportionality’ test is that in the former the assessment will not be in comparison 
with the effect of the measure, whereas in the latter, the comparison will be with the effect of 
the measure on the investment in question. Furthermore, the proportionality test runs the risk 
of very important public policy objectives being trumped by interests of investors in 
situations where the arbitral tribunal is of the view that costs of the effect outweigh the 
benefit. Proportionality test has been proposed in ITA as one of the solutions to balance 
investment protection with host country’s regulatory power and hence further the legitimacy 
of the international investment law regime.451 The argument to use proportionality test is 
based on developing the international investment regime as a constitutional and global 
administrative regime having coherent and universal standards of investment protection.452 It 
has been argued that the claim to use proportionality analysis in ITA is at odds with other 
perspectives that look at IIAs as ‘the entrenchment of one legal point of view against an 
opposing position.’453  
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The use of the principle of proportionality in determining indirect expropriation is 
problematic given the unique system of resolving investor–state disputes in ITA – use of 
private law adjudicative model to settle public law questions. In other words, in the Indian 
domestic constitutional arrangement, a proportionality test shifts the burden of decision 
making from policy makers to the judges of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of India 
who assess whether the policy makers have found the balance between competing claims.454 
These judges are embedded in the Indian system and understand the Indian social and 
political context in which they operate. However, the same does not hold true for the ITA 
tribunals who are not embedded in the political and social system of the communities whose 
disputes they decide455 and have no or inadequate knowledge of the overall legal, political 
and social context related to the dispute.456 This position makes them less suitable to adopt an 
intrusive review of the kind contained in a proportionality analysis.457  Furthermore, other 
factors such as the ad hoc nature of the ITA tribunals; the fact that arbitrators are appointed 
by the parties influenced by the positions taken by them in other arbitrations and academic 
writings;458 issues related to conflict of interest and independence such as an individual acting 
as an arbitrator and a counsel in another dispute at the same time or wishing to win future 
appointments as arbitrators by safeguarding their reputation amongst investors or host 
states;459 pose questions on the claim that ITA tribunals should wield power related to 
exercising discretion by using the test of proportionality on issues of public purpose.460  
 
Presence of NPM provision  
Another difficulty surfaces when one takes into account the Non Precluded Measures (NPM) 
(the NPM provisions are discussed in detail in chapter 6; however here a brief introduction is 
useful) in these 57 IIAs that contain ‘limited-content’ type expropriation provision. NPM 
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provisions in an IIA (starting with words like – ‘nothing in this agreement precludes...’) 
provide the regulatory latitude to host countries to deal with threats to important national 
interests notwithstanding its inconsistency with all other IIA provisions.461 For example, the 
NPM provision in IIAs containing ‘limited-content’ type expropriation formulation have 
permissible objectives like essential security interest, public order, protection of human and 
animal health etc. The presence of these permissible objectives in the NPM provisions in 
these Indian IIAs makes it clear that India and its treaty partners have agreed to certain 
situations in which they can deviate from the treaty provisions including expropriation 
without incurring any liability. In other words, since India has already expressed the non-
investment values for which it can deviate from its treaty obligations, it will be inappropriate 
for an arbitral tribunal to second guess these purposes as part of the expropriation analysis.   
 
The difficulty due to the presence of the NPM provision is more profound in case of the 
proportionality test. Let us assume that India adopts a measure to protect its economy at the 
time of crisis. Further, assume that this measure results in ‘substantial deprivation’ of the 
foreign investment. This foreign investor alleges expropriation whereas India counter-argues 
that its measure has been adopted to save its economy. In this case, a proportionality test to 
determine indirect expropriation will mean that the arbitral tribunal will perform the three 
steps, mentioned above, including the final step of weighing and balancing the regulatory 
measure with the effect on investment and find an expropriation only if the adverse impact on 
investment outweighs the benefits achieved from the regulatory measure.  
 
Let us assume that the tribunal finds an expropriation. India can now argue that this violation 
of the IIA is excused under the NPM provision, which allows India to adopt measures for the 
protection of its ‘essential security interest’ provided it is necessary to do so (assuming 
‘necessary’ is the nexus requirement)462 notwithstanding anything contained in the treaty. Let 
us also assume that India is able to convince the tribunal that its regulatory measure to protect 
the economy is an ‘essential security interest’ (ESI). Next step for the tribunal will be to show 
that this measure is ‘necessary’.   
 
This is where the conceptual difficulty will arise. How will the arbitral tribunal determine that 
the measure adopted by India, even if it violates the expropriation provision, is necessary to 
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achieve ESI? The tribunal has two options: first, interpret necessary using the least restrictive 
alternative test, and second, interpret necessary using the proportionality test where the least 
restrictive alternative test is one of the steps, as mentioned above. In both situations, the 
arbitral tribunal will only be duplicating the analysis already undertaken to find out whether 
indirect expropriation occurred and will result in the same finding. In other words, if the 
arbitral tribunal didn’t find India’s measure necessary as part of the proportionality test, then 
it will obviously not find it necessary under the NPM provision either; and similarly, if the 
measure was not proportionate under the expropriation analysis it will obviously not be 
proportionate under the NPM provision.463  
 
One exception is possible to the analysis offered above. There could be a possibility of 
undertaking a proportionality analysis for a different permissible objective in the NPM 
provision. For example, the tribunal might have carried out the proportionality test under the 
expropriation provision with public health as the purpose whereas in the NPM provision the 
permissible objective could be public order. In such a situation, India’s measure will be 
judged against two different non investment values: once under expropriation and then under 
the NPM provision. It is possible that measure could disallowed under the expropriation 
provision but allowed under the NPM provision — in other words, the measure may not be 
proportional to public health and hence a violation of the expropriation provision, but may be 
found proportional to public order on the basis that public order is broader than public health. 
However, even here there is no doctrinal basis for an arbitral tribunal to undertake such a 
balancing act as part of the expropriation provision when India and its treaty partner intended 
to have, if at all, such balancing as part of the NPM provision.    
 
The use of ‘police power’ test and proportionality test in the expropriation provision runs the 
risk of negating the very purpose and presence of the NPM provisions in the IIAs having the 
‘limited-content’ expropriation provision. The NPM provisions in these IIAs exist for the 
purpose of finding a safe haven for those regulatory measures that violate the expropriation 
provision.464 Hence, both versions of the ‘purpose test’ violate the ‘effective treaty 
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interpretation’ principle, which is recognised as part of the ‘good faith’ obligation of Article 
31(1) of the VCLT.465  
 
Context     
Another important issue is related to the context of these 57 IIAs. The Tecmed tribunal relied 
on ECHR jurisprudence to introduce the proportionality test. However, the normative values 
that bind EC cannot be cross applied to the network of Indian IIAs, which have different 
normative values and goals — hence a different context. Such cross regime application might 
serve the normative value of stopping the fragmentation of international law as some scholars 
have argued;466 however, will violate the requirement of interpreting a treaty in its ‘context’.  
For example, Kurtz, in rejecting the proportionality test to interpret ‘necessary’ in Non 
Precluded Measures (NPM) in IIAs, has argued that the use of proportionality test in the 
context of EC is to further the normative goal of positive integration of EC and is in fact a 
part of judicial activism due to the failure of the legislative arms of the EC to further this 
goal.467 No such normative goal is to be pursued by IIAs. It is important to note that the 
European Convention on Human Rights recognises right to property as a human right. Thus, 
use of proportionality test as a means to balance state’s action with curtailment of this right 
may be justified given the specific context. Further, protocol to the convention for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms recognises provides ... the right of a 
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties’. This also provides a clear textual basis to undertake a test that examines whether 
the measure adopted by the state to achieve the aim, which subverts the right to property is 
necessary or not.468 However, none of these things are present in the ‘limited-content’ 
expropriation provision and hence the ‘contextual’ difference.469 Another key distinction 
between ECHR and the ‘limited content’ type expropriation provision is that the European 
                                                                                                                                                  
investment – paras 198-200. Further, it used the CIL notion of necessity to interpret Article XI (NPM provision) 
and not the proportionality test, which would have been more close to the language of Article XI.   
465 See Qureshi (2006), 13-14; Gardiner (2008), 159-61.  
466 Kingsbury and Schill (2010), 104.  
467 Kurtz (2010), 373. Also see Xiuli (2006), 637 who has argued that in EU law the principle of proportionality 
is becoming a constitutional principle of Europe. Also see Maduro (1998). For a detailed and up to date 
discussion on proportionality test in ECJ see Harbo (2010).  
468 Id.  
469 In this regard it has also been argued that there was neither textual basis not basis in CIL for the Tecmed 




Convention on Human Rights provides the protection of the European Court of Human 
Rights after domestic remedies have been exhausted.470 This is not the case with Indian IIAs 
where the foreign investor can bring disputes against Indian even without exhausting 
domestic remedies.  
 
It is also important to note the key methodological variation in the proportionality test as 
applied by the Tecmed tribunal. In the ECHR jurisprudence, cited by this tribunal, the 
proportionality test was used to decide whether an expropriation was justified and not to find 
out whether an expropriation had occurred.471 Another notable point is that the above tribunal 
justified the use of proportionality to determine indirect expropriation based on the 
justification given in the ECHR jurisprudence that since non nationals would not have played 
a role in the election of the measures adopted by the host state thus nationals should bear a 
greater burden than the non-nationals for the regulatory measure adopted.472 David 
Schneiderman has challenged this approach arguing that use of democratic theory to place 
foreign investors at par with enfranchised citizens is inappropriate.473 Empirical studies show 
that foreign corporations (vehicles of foreign investment) influence political process even if 
they are not able to cast vote.474 There are many examples in India of foreign corporations 
lobbying and influencing for changes in policy like recently global pharmaceutical companies 
made a representation to the Prime Minister of India’s Office (PMO) in August 2010 to 
review India’s patent laws with the objective of increasing the term of patent protection 
beyond 20 years and also bring about other changes.475 This representation resulted in the 
PMO issuing a letter to different ministries asking for their views on this matter, 
notwithstanding the vociferous opposition by the public health groups.476 There have been 
instances of multinational media firms lobbying for changes in India’s policy on satellite 
television.477 Thus, foreign corporations can exert influence on the policy making process and 
on the power centers and thus to compare them with enfranchised citizens whose property 
might have been taken away by the state will be erroneous.  
                                                
470 Pirker (2011).  
471 Kriebaum (2007), 728.  
472 Id.   
473 For an elaborate critique see - Schneiderman (2010), 909.   
474 Id.  
475 PMO Circulates Note on IPR Tweaks for Drug MNCs available at 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-08-19/news/27571507_1_indian-drugmakers-indian-patent-
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3.2.2 ‘Content-Indicative’ type – Interpretation    
 
As mentioned in section 3.1 on ‘Anatomy’, ‘content-indicative’ type expropriation 
formulation implies that expropriation provision in these IIAs states what is indirect 
expropriation and provide detailed criterions on how to determine indirect expropriation. It 
has been argued that much of the controversy surrounding the debate between regulation and 
expropriation has arisen due to IIAs not providing proper definition of these terms.478 In this 
sense, the ‘content-indicative’ expropriation formulation is more definite and clear on when 
an indirect expropriation takes place.  
 
Before we look at these IIAs in detail, it is important to point out that they are based on and 
inspired from the expropriation provision present in the 2004 US Model IIA.479 Further, it is 
important to keep in mind that the ‘content-indicative’ expropriation provision do not provide 
the detailed criterions to determine indirect expropriation as part of the IIA but as a separate 
protocol or annex, which reflects the shared understanding of the parties regarding the 
interpretation of expropriation. For example, Article 5 of the India-China IIA provides the 
same expropriation provision as is contained in the rest 57 ‘limited-content’ indicative IIAs. 
However, the India-China IIA also contains a protocol that gives the shared understanding of 
India and China regarding the interpretation of the expropriation provision clearly stating that 
this protocol is part of the agreement (IIA).480 The same is the case with other ‘content-
                                                
478 Muchlinski (2007).  
479 For more on the expropriation provision in the US Model 2004 IIA see Vandevelde (2009), 478-84.  
480 The Protocol on India-China IIA states – ‘With regard to the interpretation of expropriation under Article 5, 
the Contracting Parties confirm their shared understanding that: 
1) A measure of expropriation includes, apart from direct expropriation or nationalization through formal 
transfer of title or outright seizure, a measure or series of measures taken intentionally by a Party to create a 
situation whereby the investment of an investor may be rendered substantially unproductive and incapable of 
yielding a return without a formal transfer of title or outright seizure. 
2) The determination of whether a measure or a series of measures of a Party in a specific situation, constitute 
measures as outlined in paragraph 1 above requires a case by case, fact based inquiry that considers, among 
other factors: 
i) the economic impact of the measure or a series of measures, although the fact that a measure or series of 
measures by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not 
establish that expropriation or nationalization, has occurred; 
ii) the extent to which the measures are discriminatory either in cope or in application with respect to a Party or 
an investor or an enterprise; 
iii) the extent to which the measures or series of measures interfere with distinct, reasonable, investment-backed 
expectations;  
iv) the character and intent of the measures or series of measures, whether they are for bona fide public interest 
purposes or not and whether there is a reasonable nexus between them and the intention to expropriate. 
3) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory measures adopted by a Contracting Party in 
pursuit of public interest, including measures pursuant to awards of general application rendered by judicial 




indicative’ type expropriation provisions in all 16 IIAs barring the India-Saudi Arabia. In this 
IIA, the detailed factors to determine indirect expropriation are part of the expropriation 
provision. The discussion below, relying on Article 31(2)(a) of the VCLT, which states ‘any 
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty’ will interpret the expropriation provision in these IIAs.481  
 
India’s IIA with Singapore, entered in 2005, was the first IIA to have an expropriation 
provision like this.482 Since this IIA, 15 more Indian IIAs have been signed with such 
formulation of the expropriation provision. However, it is important to note that not all Indian 
IIAs post India-Singapore IIA contains a ‘content-indicative’ type expropriation provision. In 
fact, out of the 30 IIAs starting with the India-Singapore IIA, entered by India during this 
period, 16 contain similar expropriation provision like this. Thus, this practice of having 
detailed expropriation provisions has not been consistently followed. The significance of 
some of the newer Indian IIAs having such expropriation provision is that it reveals one of 
the very few changes that India has made due to the global increase in the number of 
investor-state investment treaty disputes involving expropriation and the attendant concern of 
                                                
481 See the debate on whether such protocols fall under Article 31(2)(a) or under Article 31(1) of the VCLT. It is 
also stated that the substance is more important than the form or classification - Gardiner (2008), 213. Also see 
Qureshi (2006), 19-20.  
482 The Annex of the India-Singapore IIA states the following on determination of indirect expropriation - The 
Parties confirm the following understanding with respect to the interpretation and/or implementation of 
Chapter 6 on Investment of the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (the 
‘Agreement’):  
(a) Article 6.5 of the Agreement is intended to reflect customary international law concerning the 
obligations of States with respect to expropriation;  
(b) a measure of expropriation includes, apart from direct expropriation or nationalisation through 
formal transfer of title or outright seizure, a measure or series of measures taken by a Party that has 
an effect equivalent to direct expropriation or nationalization, without a formal transfer of title or 
outright seizure;  
(c) an action or series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with 
a tangible or intangible property right or property interest in an investment;  
(d) the determination of whether a measure or series of measures of a Party in a specific factual 
situation, constitute measures as referred to in paragraph (b) above requires a case-by-case, fact-
based inquiry that considers, among other factors:  
(i) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the fact that a measure 
or series of measures by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, 
standing alone, does not establish that measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation, has occurred;  
(ii) the extent to which the measure or series of measure interfere with distinct, reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations;  
(iii) character of the measure or series of measures, including inter alia, their intent, 
objectives, purpose, and degree of nexus between the measures and outcome or effects that 
forms the basis of the expropriation claim; and  
(e) except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and 
applied for legitimate public welfare objectives such as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute 




curtailment of regulatory power due to broad and undefined expropriation provisions.  
However, India has basically mirrored this kind of expropriation provision from the 2004 US 
Model IIA because the US model provided a readymade formulation that could be directly 
incorporated483 although there are subtle differences discussed below. However, India has not 
carefully thought this through, which is illustrated by the fact that its practice is random in 
having this type of provision in some IIAs and not in others. Further, as it will be discussed 
later in the chapter, this type of expropriation provision is also not consistent with the manner 
in which India understands expropriation domestically.    
 
13 IIAs out of the 16 that contain the ‘content-indicative’ formulation explicitly recognise 
that indirect expropriation results from a measure or a series of measures that have an effect 
equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure. Thus, 
according to these IIAs, indirect expropriation occurs when the state’s measures have effects 
similar to a formal transfer of title or outright seizure (direct expropriation). Some of these 
IIA go a step forward and even specify what is meant by effect equivalent to direct 
expropriation. For example, Ad Article 5 of the Protocol to the India-China IIA specifies that 
measures or a series of measures that create a situation whereby ‘the investment of an 
investor may be rendered substantially unproductive and incapable of yielding a return ...’ is 
a measure of expropriation.  
 
The India-Saudi Arabia IIA is the only IIA in this category that does not spell out indirect 
expropriation as clearly as the rest 13 IIAs. Article 4.2 of the India-Saudi Arabia IIA states 
that ‘to determine whether an action or a series of actions is tantamount to expropriation 
(indirect expropriation), a case by case fact based inquiry shall be made in accordance with 
the provisions of this agreement and principles of customary international law...’. Thus, this 
IIA although recognising that an action or a series of actions could tantamount to 
expropriation; does not explicitly mention that indirect expropriation implies a situation 
where state’s action or series of measures have an effect equivalent to direct expropriation 
without formal transfer of title, etc. 
 
Some of the IIAs [India-Singapore (Expropriation Annex 3 (1) (c)); India-Malaysia (Annex 
10-10; India-Korea (Annex 10-A)] out of the 13 that explicitly provide for what does indirect 
                                                




expropriation mean, also make it clear that an action or a series of actions do not constitute 
expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right or property 
interest in an investment. This provision is present in the 2004 US Model IIA as well. It has 
been argued that this language in the 2004 US Model IIA was inserted in response to 
arguments made in some of the NAFTA cases like Pope and Talbot and Methanex that 
reduction or elimination of market share could constitute expropriation.484  
 
Pointer to proportionality test 
 
Although 13 IIAs mention that indirect expropriation involves situations that have an effect 
equivalent to direct expropriation; they provide other criterions, along with ‘effect’ in 
determining expropriation. All the 16 IIAs contain at least three factors:  
 
a) Economic impact of the measure; though it is stated that simply because a measure has an 
adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, will not establish that 
indirect expropriation has taken place.  
b) The extent to which measures adopted by India interfere with distinct, reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations.485 This feature has been blindly copied from the 2004 US 
Model IIA where it is inspired from the US national law. The US Supreme Court in Penn 
Central Transportation Company v City of New York486 had identified this factor as one of 
the factors to determine regulatory takings. The expropriation provision in the 2004 US 
Model IIA is an attempt by the US to internationalise its national law.487 India has adopted 
this US internationalisation in the IIAs containing the ‘content-indicative’ type expropriation 
formulation although the Indian law on takings (discussed below) nowhere recognises such a 
factor in determining expropriation. In fact, India’s investment treaty negotiators do not fully 
know that this provision goes beyond Indian domestic law pointing the lack of technical 
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expertise as discussed in the introductory chapter. Further, as discussed in the chapter on 
FET, the doctrine of legitimate expectations has limited role in Indian law. Although this 
principle has been supported by some arbitration tribunals, it is important to question the 
usefulness of a standard like this to determine expropriation. This principle is often used by 
arbitral tribunals to determine FET violations. Thus, using this standard for expropriation 
unnecessarily conflates two different concepts of expropriation and FET.488 Determination of 
expropriation is primarily about deprivation and not about investor’s expectations.       
c) The character of the measure.  
In addition to these three, some IIAs [Ad Article 5 (1) (2) (ii) of the India-Trinidad and 
Tobago; Ad Article 5 (1) (2) (ii) of the India-China; and Ad Article 5 (1) (2) (ii) of the India-
Iceland] also provide another factor – the measure adopted should be non discriminatory.  
 
The presence of these three factors implies that none of these IIAs provide for the ‘substantial 
deprivation’ test to determine indirect expropriation because the focus is not just on the 
impact of the measure but also on the character and the purpose of the measure. Thus, these 
IIAs conceive those situations where an investor might have suffered severely; however, the 
measure will still not be indirect expropriation because of its character and purpose. This 
refers to adopting a test to determine indirect expropriation, which will take into account not 
just the impact of the measure on foreign investment but also the character and the purpose of 
the measure such as police power and the proportionality test. However, the proportionality 
test appears to be more suitable because the formulation suggests weighing and balancing 
effect of the measure on the investment with the purpose behind the adopted measure to find 
out indirect expropriation. The use of the proportionality test is further strengthened by the 
clear language of some of these IIAs. For example, Protocol on Article 5 (d) of the India-
Brunei Darussalam IIA states that one of the factors in assessing the character of the measure 
is to consider the ‘degree of nexus between the measures and outcome or effects that forms 
the basis of the expropriation claim’.  
 
‘Except in rare circumstances’ clause  
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‘Content-indicative’ expropriation provisions also mention that - ‘except in rare 
circumstances non-discriminatory regulatory measures adopted by a Contracting Party in 
pursuit of public interest, including measures pursuant to awards of general application 
rendered by judicial bodies do not constitute indirect expropriation or nationalization’.489  
 
This clause makes it clear that India can adopt genuine regulatory measures to pursue 
legitimate public welfare objectives such as public health and environment.490 A clause like 
this is present in all ‘content-indicative’ expropriation provisions barring India-Japan IIA.  
 
However, in some of the IIAs this clause is not prefaced by ‘except in rare circumstances’ 
[India-Trinidad Tobago (Ad Article 5(3); India-Saudi Arabia (Article 5(3); India-Malaysia 
(Annex 3)]. The significance behind not having this phrase as the preface is that it means that 
in no situation a legitimate measure adopted by India for a public welfare objective shall 
amount to expropriation. This formulation endorses the ‘police power’ test. However, this is 
problematic for two reasons. First, this provision signifying the ‘police power’ test will be 
hard to be reconciled with those provisions in the expropriation provision that provide for a 
proportionality test. For example, in India-Trinidad and Tobago IIA, Paragraph 2 of the 
Annex on Expropriation provides for the proportionality test in determining whether a 
measure or a series of measures constitutes indirect expropriation; and at the same time 
Paragraph 3 states that non discriminatory regulatory actions to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives do not constitute expropriation without being prefaced by the phrase 
‘except in rare circumstances’. Second, such a broad provision swings the pendulum too far 
in India’s favour and subject to misuse.   
 
Few IIAs like the India-Brunei Darussalam IIA [give the meaning of ‘except in rare 
circumstances’. Ad Article 5 (d) of the India-Brunei IIA states that ‘except in rare 
circumstances’ implies that ‘measures are so severe in light of their purpose that they cannot 
be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith’. Thus, this 
formulation states that the measure adopted by India will have to be assessed against the 
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purpose for which it has been adopted and if the adverse effect of the measure (on foreign 
investment) outweighs the purpose (benefits of the measure), then the measure will be viewed 
as non reasonable and not adopted in good faith. Similarly, Annex 10 A 3 (b) of the India-
Korea IIA states that ‘except in rare circumstances’ implies ‘when measures are extremely 
severe or disproportionate in light of its purpose and effect’. Thus, if India adopts a 
regulatory measure for a public welfare objective under the ‘except in rare circumstances’ 
clause, then whether this measure is expropriatory or not will depend on whether the benefits 
of the measure are severely disproportionate with the effect of the measure on foreign 
investment. In order to determine this, the arbitral tribunal will have to use the test of 
proportionality.  
 
Problem might arise in interpreting ‘except in rare circumstances’ in those ‘content-
indicative’ expropriation provisions that do not define this phrase. One interpretation of this 
clause could be by using the proportionality test. It can be argued that ‘except in rare 
circumstances’ means that India’s regulatory measure adopted for public welfare objectives 
shall not be expropriatory except in situations where the costs of the adverse effect of the 
measure on foreign investment outweigh the benefits of the measure. In other words ‘rare 
circumstances’ can be defined as those circumstances where costs of the effect exceed the 
benefits of the measure. Another interpretation could be that ‘rare circumstances’ refers to 
situations that may arise rarely and hence most of the regulatory measures adopted by India 
will not be expropriatory. In other words, this interpretation will tilt more towards the ‘police 
power’ test and less to the proportionality test.    
  
Intention to Expropriate   
 
Seven IIAs, out of these 16 IIAs, focus on intent. Thus, as per Ad Article 5 (2) (iv) of the 
India-China IIA, measure or a series of measures to be expropriation should have been taken 
intentionally by the state. The same is the case in India- Trinidad and Tobago (Ad Article 5 
(2) (iv)); India-Iceland (Ad Article 5 (2) (iv)); India-Syria (Ad Article 5 (2) (iv)); India-
Jordan (Ad Article 5 (2) (iv)); India-Mozambique (Ad Article 5 (2) (iv)); India-Senegal (Ad 
Article 5 (2) (iv)). In other words, if India adopts a regulatory measure that renders the 




it will not be indirect expropriation if India can show that it did not have the intention to do 
so. 
 
Such formulation is certainly useful from the perspective of India’s regulatory power as India 
will not incur any liability for indirect expropriation even if its regulatory measure has an 
effect equivalent to direct expropriation provided the measure was adopted for a genuine 
regulatory purpose and not with the intention to create such a situation for the investor. 
However, this formulation swings the pendulum too far in favour of India’s regulatory power 
and is subject to misuse. It provides an opportunity to cover up expropriatory measures as not 
intended. In other words, India can adopt expropriatory measures and when impugned could 
always argue that it never intended to expropriate. Thus, this formulation does not balance 
India’s regulatory power with foreign investment protection. Furthermore, a formulation that 
focuses on intent is also inconsistent with the established principle of ‘objective 
responsibility’ of a state in public international law.491 In other words, state’s responsibility in 
international law is to be fixed on the basis of the result of the action and not the intent 
behind the action.492 The same argument has been made in context of expropriation of foreign 
property493 with one author explicitly stating that lack of intent cannot be a defence to a claim 
of expropriation.494      
 
Issuance of Compulsory Licenses and Expropriation  
 
Another key provision in four ‘content-indicative’ expropriation provisions, inspired from 
Article 6.5 of the US Model IIA, is a specific mention that the expropriation provision shall 
not apply with respect to the grant of compulsory licenses (CL) concerning intellectual 
property in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement (Article 92.5 of India-Japan IIA; Article 
10.7 (6) of India-Malaysia IIA; Article 10.12 (6) of India-Korea IIA; Article 6.5 (6) of India-
Singapore IIA).495 While India-Malaysia and India-Japan IIAs only talk about the non 
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applicability of the expropriation provision in the situations of issuance of CL, India-Korea 
and India-Malaysia go beyond this and also exempt the application of expropriation provision 
to revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property provided such revocation, 
limitation and creation is consistent with the TRIPS agreement. In other words, these two 
IIAs provide additional regulatory flexibility to India to revoke intellectual property 
protection by means not just limited to issuance of CL but also other means such as 
cancelling intellectual property protection provided such revocation is consistent with the 
TRIPS agreement. 
 
Problems related to use of proportionality test in ‘content-indicative’ expropriation   
 
The use of proportionality test in the expropriation provision in these 16 IIAs containing the 
‘content-indicative’ expropriation provision will pose a conceptual problem when one reads 
these IIAs as a whole. This conceptual problem will arise because of the presence of the 
NPM provision for reasons that have been discussed above in context of using proportionality 
test in those IIAs that contain ‘limited-content’ type expropriation provision.  
 
3.2.4 Regulatory or Indirect Expropriation in Indian law  
 
This section will discuss how expropriation is understood in Indian law. This will provide 
useful insights to India’s treaty practice on expropriation. In the Indian context, the journey of 
‘right to property’ in the Indian Constitution from being a fundamental right496 when the 
Constitution was adopted in 1950 to a constitutional right in 1978 has been riveting.497 Right 
to property was a fundamental right till 1978. The period from the adoption of the 
Constitution till 1978 saw six amendments to right to property exhibiting a tussle between the 
judiciary and the parliament on various issues like what amounted to deprivation of property; 
the question of compensation and also other constitutional issues like whether the parliament 
has the power to amend fundamental rights – discussing these issues is beyond the scope of 
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this work.498 The tussle on the issue of compensation is dealt in Section 3.3. Finally in 1978, 
the Parliament passed the 44th amendment and deleted right to property from the list of 
fundamental rights as well as from the chapter on fundamental rights and inserted Article 
300A - ‘No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law’. The 
significance of degrading right to property from fundamental right status to a constitutional 
right is that the right will be available against executive interference but not against 
legislative interference.499 Supreme Court of India has made it clear that the executive cannot 
deprive a person of his property without the authority of ‘law’, which means ‘an act of 
parliament or of a state legislature, a rule, or a statutory order, having the force of law, that 
is positive or state-made law’.500 The moot question is when it can be said that a person has 
been ‘deprived’ of his property. In order to fully comprehend this question one will have to 
briefly understand the jurisprudence on right to property that started to emerge immediately 
after the adoption of the Constitution of India and the several amendments that were made to 
right to property.  
 
Article 31(1) and 31(2) (related to right to property as a fundamental right) as originally 
enacted were in the following terms:  
 
(1) No Person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.  
(2) No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owning 
any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public 
purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless 
the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and 
either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the 
manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given.’501       
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This was interpreted by the Supreme Court of India in early 1950s in Dwarkadas v Sholapur 
Spinning and Weaving Co.502 In this case, the Supreme Court recognised that state’s power to 
eminent domain was subject to three conditions – 1) legislative sanction as a prerequisite for 
the exercise of the power; 2) deprivation can only be for public purpose; and 3) payment of 
compensation for compulsorily taken property. The issue of compensation is discussed along 
with the compensation requirement as part of the lawful expropriation later in the chapter. 
The discussion here will focus on the issue of ‘deprivation’. It was further held in this case 
that ‘acquisition’ and ‘taking possession of’ given in clause (2) should have the same 
meaning as ‘deprivation’ given in clause (1).503 On this basis, the court held that protection of 
property is against ‘taking’ away not just with respect to two forms of taking – acquisition 
and requisition - but also by other restrictions.504 The correct approach, according to Justice 
Mahajan should be this: ‘what in substance is the loss or injury caused to the owner and not 
the manner and method has been adopted by the state in taking the property’.505 The court 
also held an abridgement could be so substantial as to amount to deprivation.506 One of the 
judges in the case said - ‘by substantial deprivation I mean the sort of deprivation that 
substantially robs a man of those attributes of enjoyment which normally accompany rights 
to, or an interest in, property. The form is unessential. It is the substance that we must 
seek’.507 From these initial cases of 1950s one can distil two key principles, first, the Supreme 
Court of India, by recognising that a ‘taking’ can take place by means other than acquisition 
or requisition, recognised that restrictions on the right to enjoyment of property even if it does 
not amount to acquisition by the state may still violate right to property;508 second, it 
recognised that the test for whether a regulatory measure results in ‘deprivation’ of property 
                                                
502 AIR 1954 SC 119. It was recognised by the Supreme Court that Article 31(1) and (2) dealt with eminent 
domain whereas Article 31(5) covered the situations of exercise of police power.  
503 Also see Saghir Ahmad v State of UP AIR 1954 SC 728; Sathe (1970), 743; Sathe (1971), 1824.   
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508 In this regard see the arguments of Professor Tripathi who developed the concept of ‘constructive eminent 
domain’ and argued that the intention of the constitution makers of India was to recognise that in certain 
situations a regulatory legislation involving no appropriation but resulting in deprivation of the property may be 
challenged as ‘acquisition’ or as ‘taking’ – Tripathi (1972), 229-30. Also see Jain (2003), 1480; Sathe (1970), 




is if the deprivation is ‘substantial’, which ‘seriously impairs’ the right to use and enjoy the 
property .509  
 
These cases prompted the Parliament of India to amend the right to property by bringing the 
Fourth Amendment Act in 1955.510 Among other things, the fourth amendment inserted 
Article 31(2)511 and (2-A)512 according to which compensation would only be required if the 
property is compulsorily acquired (transfer of ownership to state or to any other body owned 
or controlled by the state) or requisitioned (transfer of right to possession to state) by the state 
and not by any other means despite the fact that the property may have been deprived.513 In 
other words, this amendment ensured that expropriation of property can happen only if there 
was deprivation-acquisition (by the state) and deprivation alone, even if substantial, was not 
compensable. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v AP 
SRTC,514 a case that came up in 1959 after the fourth amendment act. In this case, the court 
confirmed that compensation is to be paid only for those ‘takings’ that take place by 
acquisition or requisition515 thus, moving away from the pre-fourth amendment cases.516   
 
Post 1978 cases also elucidate the significance of compulsory acquisition and requisition as 
the means to ‘take’ away the property and hence amount to expropriation, which is 
compensable.517 Tara Singh v Union of India,518 a case that dealt with ‘coal nationalisation’ 
in late 1970s, is important in this regard. The issue in this case was whether the Coal 
                                                
509 In this context, it has been argued that the Supreme Court refused to distinguish between exercise of eminent 
domain and exercise of police power – See Sathe (1971), 1824.  
510 Austin (1999), 101-10; Allen (2007), 198. The first amendment in 1951 had also amended Article 31 by 
adding Articles 31-A and 31-B with the objective of fully securing the constitutional validity of zamindari 
abolition and other agrarian reform legislation – see Singh (2008), 275.  
511 Article 31(2) as inserted provided,  ‘No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a 
public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or 
requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation …’. 
512 Article 31(2A) inserted through fourth amendment provided, ‘Where a law does not provide for the transfer 
of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by 
the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, 
notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property.’ For a critique of the Fourth amendment see Tripathi 
(1972), 231-33.  
513 Sathe (1970), 743; Singh (2008), 281.  
514 AIR 1959 SC 308. Also see MM Pathak v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 803.  
515 Id.  
516 It is interesting to note that in this case the permit of the private business was terminated and a permit was 
issued to a state corporation. The Court held that this did not amount to a transfer or acquisition by the state 
because the regulatory body terminated one permit and issued another permit – thus the act involved two 
different permits – and hence did not amount to acquisition of the private operator’s property (permit) by the 
state.  
517 For in-depth discussion on right to property under Constitution of India after the 44th amendment see –  
Tripathi (1980), 49; Seervai, 1088-89; Basu (1998), 807-08.     




Nationalisation Act, which terminated the leases and sub-leases (on coal mining) held by 
different private parties amounted to taking of the property or not. The Supreme Court held 
that since the Act only provided for the termination of the leases without anything which 
provided for vesting these interests in the state, this didn’t amount to ‘acquisition by the 
state’. The court said “essential difference between ‘acquisition by the State’ on the one hand 
and ‘modification or extinguishment of rights’ on the other is that in the first case the 
beneficiary is the State  while in  the second the beneficiary is not the state.519 Another 
important aspect of this case is related to right vesting in the state as a direct or immediate 
flow from the termination of the right (property) held by a private party. The court held that if 
the vesting is not direct and immediate, in other words, if there is an intervening act between 
the termination of the property rights of the private party and state acquiring the right, there 
will be no ‘acquisition by the state’.520 This reasoning was affirmed in Vij Resins Pvt Ltd v 
State of Jammu and Kashmir.521 The court held that if the state terminates the contract that it 
had entered into with a private property, which is a property and the same right (which was 
given in the terminated contract) now being directly vested in the state is ‘acquisition of 
property’ and hence compensable.522 Again, in Bhuri Nath v State of Jammu and Kashmir,523 
the Supreme Court held that compensation was not payable for mere deprivation of property 
or extinction of ownership unless or until the state was the beneficiary.524 Same was held in 
Delhi Cloth and General Mills v Rajasthan SE Board.525 In this case, the Supreme Court held 
that mere extinction of a property right without acquisition by the state is not compensable.526  
 
Similarly, in another case,  Jilubhai Nanbhai v State of Gujarat,527 on Article 300A, the 
Supreme Court said ‘the deprivation of the property shall be only by authority of law, be it an 
Act of Parliament or State Legislature, but not by executive fiat or an order. Deprivation of 
property is by acquisition or requisition or taking possession of for a public purpose’.528 The 
Court further said ‘Generally speaking preservation of public health or prevention of damage 
                                                
519 Id.  
520 Compare this with the deprivation-acquisition conceptualisation offered by Andrew Newcombe for 
expropriation in IIAs - Newcombe (2005). Newcombe has argued that termination of a lease is also like indirect 
appropriation. However, Paulsson (2006) has argued that such analogy is erroneous.   
521 AIR 1989 SC 1629.  
522 Id.  
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to life and property are considered to be public purposes. Yet deprivation of property for any 
such purpose would not amount to acquisition or possession taken under Article 300A. It 
would be by exercise of the Police power of the State’.529 The court distinguished between 
exercise of police power and eminent domain and restricted the understanding of 
expropriation to exercise of ‘eminent domain’.530 This distinction was recently observed by 
the Supreme Court of India in KT Plantation v State of Karnataka.531 Dealing exhaustively 
on Article 300A, the court observed ‘Eminent domain is distinguishable alike from the police 
power, by which restriction are imposed on private property in the public interest, e.g., in 
connection with health, sanitation, zoning regulation, urban planning and so on from the 
power of taxation, by which the owner of private property is compelled to contribute a 
portion of it for the public purposes and from the war-power, involving the destruction of 
private property in the course of military operations. The police power fetters rights of 
property while eminent domain takes them away’.532 The court also held that public purpose 
is a pre-condition for deprivation of property under Article 300A.533  
 Thus, under Article 300A deprivation of the property will not be compensable if it does not 
result in acquisition by the state.534 In other words, a regulatory measure that imposes 
restrictions on the use of property, even if it results, in substantial deprivation, is not 
compensable if there is no acquisition or requisition of the property by the state535 provided 
the regulatory measure is consistent with the requirement of reasonableness. This shows that 
understanding of expropriation in Indian law is narrower in comparison to Indian IIAs where 
expropriation without acquisition and requisition is also recognised.536       
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532 Id, para 90.  
533 Id, para 143.  
534 In this regard, it is important to mention that the Supreme Court in KT Plantation v State of Karnataka, 
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para 119. This, in other words means, that deprivation is not synonymous to acquisition and requisition; but it is 
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have any other meaning apart from ‘acquisition’ and ‘requisition’.   
535 Jain (2003), 1523.  
536 Indian treaty negotiators were surprised when told about this and said that domestic understanding of the 
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IIAs to internationalise its domestic understanding of indirect expropriation, India has been doing the opposite 
of accepting the US domestic law version of indirect expropriation in its ‘content-indicative’ expropriation 




3.3 COMPENSATION     
 
The compensation provision is an integral part of the expropriation provision in all the 73 
Indian IIAs. A brief discussion of the compensation provision to show how it has evolved 
from India’s earlier stand on the issue and how it is broader than the compensation 
requirement in domestic law is relevant before winding up the expropriation chapter.  
 
Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) provides 
that each state has the right ‘to nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign 
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such 
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that 
the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a 
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its 
tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful 
means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the 
principle of free choice of means’. The charter clearly recognises the right to expropriate. 
Further, the charter states that compensation for expropriation shall be determined on the 
basis of domestic law. India, in its IIAs, has departed from this provision primarily due to a 
change in its economic approach towards foreign investment as has been elaborately 
discussed chapter 2. Most importantly India’s stand on the issue of compensation for 
expropriation has evolved from what is given in Article 2(2)(c) of CERDS as the study of 73 
Indian IIAs reveals.   
 
More than 50 of these 73 IIAs contain a provision for fair and equitable compensation. Five 
of these 55 IIAs contain adequate compensation as the standard of compensation. However, 
these five IIAs, in addition to the adequate compensation provision, also contain other 
standards such as compensation should not just be adequate but also effective and should be 
paid without delay [India-Netherlands – Article 5(1); India-Malaysia – Article 10.7; and 
India-Finland – Article 5(2)]. Some of the Indian IIAs surveyed also provide for effective and 
expeditious compensation along with adequate compensation. One IIA [India-Italy – Article 
5 (1)] requires that the compensation should be full in addition to expeditious and effective. 
From the study of the anatomy of the compensation provision in these 73 Indian IIAs, one 




through most Indian IIAs surveyed is the requirement to pay fair and equitable compensation. 
In addition, there are requirements of prompt and expeditious compensation making the 
compensation provision stringent. Second, Indian IIAs also contain principles on the basis of 
which the compensation that is to be paid to the investor will be calculated. Out of the 73 
Indian IIAs surveyed, more than 60 IIAs state that the value of the compensation should be 
either the genuine value of the investment or the genuine market value of the investment or 
the fair market value of the investment. 4 of the IIAs state that the value of compensation 
should be the real or the actual value of the compensation. Further, all the Indian IIAs require 
that interest is to be paid to the investor on a fair and equitable rate or at a commercial rate. In 
other words, Indian IIAs put India under an obligation to pay compensation equivalent to 
what the foreign investor has been deprived of.    
 
3.3.1 Compensation for expropriation in Indian Law  
 
It will be interesting to briefly compare the compensation provision in Indian IIAs with the 
compensation to be paid under Indian law for ‘takings’. The issue of compensation for 
property ‘taken’ has been an equally fascinating journey in Indian law ever since the 
Constitution of India was adopted. The requirement to pay compensation, if the state takes 
property, was part of the fundamental right to property as mentioned in Article 31(2) above, 
as originally enacted. The provision mentioned that compensation has to be paid if the state 
acquired the property. However, the word ‘compensation’ was not qualified by any adjective 
like ‘just or equivalent’. Notwithstanding this, the Supreme Court in cases before 1955 held 
that the word ‘compensation’ meant just and equivalent compensation.537These rulings 
perturbed the Central Government because paying full market value compensation for 
property taken will be too onerous and adversely affect the goal of achieving socio-economic 
equality.538 Hence, the fourth amendment was passed in 1955 which made adequacy of 
compensation non justiciable.539 Notwithstanding this, the Supreme Court of India continued 
to exercise the power of judicial review on the issue of compensation although in a different 
form. In cases after the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court held that although the quantum 
of compensation was not justiciable, the principles on which compensation was based 
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1965 SC 190. This is despite the fact that the Constitutional Assembly debates made it clear that the legislature 
was the final authority on adequacy of compensation – Sathe (1970), 743.      
538 Jain (2003), 1483.  




were.540 However, there was a difference. Some cases like Vajravelu v Special Deputy 
Collector and Union of India v Metal Corporation of India held that the principles on which 
compensation was based should provide for ‘just equivalent’ and only if the principles 
provide for such compensation they will be outside the pale of judicial scrutiny. This was not 
followed in State of Gujrat v Shantilal, where it was held that as long as principles provided 
for compensation and the compensation was not illusory, the court could not intervene. 
However, the earlier line was resurrected in RC Cooper v Union of India by the Supreme 
Court.541      
 
The approach of the Indian judiciary (Supreme Court) in cases before and after the fourth 
amendment focusing on ‘just equivalent’ compensation is same as what is reflected in 
majority of Indian IIAs. However, it is important to note that the approach of the Indian 
executive, at that time, was not in favour of paying compensation at the full market rate 
because paying full compensation would impose onerous burden on state’s resources to carry 
out many socio-economic programmes in a country that was extremely poor and had just 
gained independence from 200 years of British rule.  
 
The tussle between the Indian judiciary and Indian executive finally saw the enactment of the 
25th amendment in 1971. This amendment replaced the word ‘compensation’ with ‘amount’. 
After this amendment, the Supreme Court of India in Kesvananda Bharti v State of Kerala542 
held that amount fixed by law can be questioned in court only if the amount is illusory or if 
the principles given for fixing the amount are irrelevant.543 Cases under Article 300A of the 
Constitution have also upheld the principles laid down in cases after the 25th amendment that 
the payment for the expropriated property may not be equal to just equivalent and could be 
less than that provided the payment is not illusory and the principles for determining 
compensation must be relevant to arrive at a fair compensation.544 The Supreme Court in the 
KT Plantation case held that while right to claim compensation is in-built in Article 300A, 
the state has to justify the compensation granted, ‘which may depend on scheme of the 
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statute, legislative policy, object and purpose of the legislature and other related factors’.545 
The court also said that ‘measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for 
lesser compensation and such a limitation by itself will not make legislation invalid or 
unconstitutional or confiscatory’.546 Thus, the Indian position is that compensation for the 
property acquired or requisitioned could be less than full market value provided it is not 
illusory and the concerned legislation contains the relevant principles to determine 
compensation.547 This position is different from the compensation provision that India has 
undertaken in its IIAs which require market value of investment along with interest to be paid 




The current formulation of the expropriation provision in the ‘limited-content’ expropriation 
provisions requires sole focus on effect of the measure, which should be same as effect that 
would result had the investment been directly expropriated. Thus, the indirect textual 
reference is to the ‘substantial deprivation’ test. However, this formulation is silent on the 
issue of conceptual severance, thus opening up the possibility of a broad interpretation of the 
‘substantial deprivation’ test where the bundle of investor’s property rights could be severed 
to determine indirect expropriation. Higher degree of severance could result in more 
regulatory measures being held expropriatory.  
 
While the use of ‘purpose-test’ promises to serve India’s regulatory power, the present 
formulation of the ‘limited-content’ type expropriation formulation in 57 IIAs does not 
support this test. These tests are a response to the critique of IIAs failing to balance 
investment protection with host country’s regulatory power. Though one needs to strike a 
balance between regulation and investment protection, this cannot be done by misinterpreting 
the ‘limited-content’ type expropriation provisions and hence doing violence to their 
formulation and language sidetracking rules of treaty interpretation to achieve a particular 
objective. Both the versions of the ‘purpose-test’ are a result of a faulty treaty interpretation 
methodology. Furthermore, even this interpretation is no assurance that India’s regulatory 
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power will be safeguarded if the proportionality test is followed because of the inherent 
value-laden discretion that such a test bestows on ad hoc arbitrators. The police power test 
will serve India’s regulatory power better because of the wide amplitude of public purpose 
that can pass muster under it although this test runs the risk of failing to strike balance 
between regulation and investment protection.  
 
The formulation of the ‘content-indicative’ expropriation provisions provides many factors to 
determine indirect expropriation. The intent clearly is to balance investment protection with 
India’s ability to exercise regulatory power. It also provides safe haven for bonafide 
regulatory measures for public purpose notwithstanding the effect on foreign investment.   
However, some of the formulations swing the pendulum too much in favour of India’s 
regulatory power and thus do not strike balance between investment protection and India’s 
regulatory power. Further, whether this formulation will be able to preserve India’s 
regulatory power will depend on the outcome of the proportionality test. Proportionality test 
vests much discretion in the hands of the ad-hoc arbitration tribunals. Hence, one cannot rule 
out situations where even a measure adopted for important public welfare objectives could be 
held expropriatory if the tribunal is of the view that although the benefits of the public 
purpose are great; the adverse costs imposed by the impugned measure are greater. Moreover, 
the formulation of the ‘content-indicative’ expropriation provisions is not consistent with the 
NPM provisions in the same IIAs. Further, some of these IIAs along with the proportionality 
test also contain the police power test. This is problematic for two reasons, first, it swings the 
pendulum too much in favour of India’s regulatory power, and second, it is irreconcilable 
with the proportionality test. Also, India’s provisions on expropriation and compensation for 
expropriation are much broader in comparison to the understanding of these terms in Indian 
domestic law. India has been following the formulation of expropriation provision and 
compensation for expropriation in its IIAs without giving much thought about the 
relationship of these provisions with the understanding of these terms in India’s domestic 










CHAPTER 4  
 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT 
 
Fair and equitable treatment (FET) has emerged as the most important standard of treatment 
in IIAs548 and has attracted considerable scholarly attention.549 FET provision occurs in 
almost all IIAs;550 often without much guidance about its meaning and content.551 The vague 
and expandable nature of the FET provision has made it extremely popular amongst foreign 
investors to challenge host state’s regulatory measures.552 In fact, it has become a catch-all 
provision capable of sanctioning many legislative, regulatory and administrative actions of 
the host state due to a largely unresolved scope and content of the FET provision.553 Many 
eminent scholars corroborate this view. For example, according to Dolzer and Schreuer FET 
is ‘the most frequently invoked standard in investment disputes’;554 and ‘a majority of 
successful claims pursued in international arbitration are based on a violation of the FET 
standard’.555 Vandevelde, writing on the FET provision, states ‘because the language by its 
terms can apply to virtually any instance of host-state conduct, it is potentially a basis for 
recovery in any situation’.556 Sornarajah has described the FET provision as ‘nebulous’.557 
FET provision has attracted considerable attention in investor state disputes in view of the 
difficulty in finding an expropriation.558  Hence, it should not come as a surprise that a wide 
array of host country’s regulatory measures related to privatisation;559 monetary 
                                                
548 Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 254. Salacuse describes FET as the grundnorm or basic norm of the 
investment treaty system – See Salacuse (2010), 219.  
549 Mann (1981), 241; Vasciannie (1999), 99; UNCTAD (1999); Thomas (2002), 21; Yannaca-Small (2005); 
Dolzer (2005), 87; Schreuer (2005), 357; Choudhury (2005), 297; Schill (2006); Fietta (2006), 375; Westcott 
(2007), 409; Mayeda (2007), 273; McLachlan et al (2007); Dolzer and Schreuer (2008); Paradell (2007), 117; 
Tudor (2008); Newcombe and Paradell (2009); Salacuse (2010); Vandevelde (2010); 43; Klager (2011).  
550 Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 254.  
551 Scholars have described FET as wide, tenuous and imprecise – See Sornarajah (2004), 332; Lowe (2002), 9; 
Schreuer (2005), 364; UNCTAD (2007), 41; Salacuse (2010), 221; Vandevelde (2010), 69.       
552 Salacuse (2010), 218.  
553 Picherack (2008), 255; Subedi (2008), 172-173. Also see Mayeda (2007), 291 and Van Harten (2007), 89.    
554 Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), 119.  
555 Id.  
556 Vandevelde (2010), 203.  
557 Sornarajah (2010), 349 
558 Subdei (2008), 175. Dlozer and Schreuer (2008) also make the point that tribunals have preferred to find a 
violation of FET over finding an expropriation.  Also see Schreuer (2009), 2-4. Also see PSEG Global Inc et al 
v Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/02/5, para 238.    




sovereignty;560 and environment561 have been challenged by foreign investors as violations of 
the FET provision with varying degrees of success. These developments have given rise to a 
wide debate on whether FET provisions restrict host country’s regulatory power.562  
 
In light of this overall debate between FET and regulation, this chapter will study the FET 
provision in 73 Indian IIAs in order to answer the central question of the thesis – will the 
present formulation of the FET provisions in Indian IIAs lead to interpretations giving 
precedence to investment protection over India’s regulatory power? Section 4.1 of the chapter 
will discuss the anatomy of the FET provision in 73 Indian IIAs carefully noting the textual 
difference in the provision in different Indian IIAs. Since, an important issue surrounding the 
FET provision in IIAs relates to the nature of the FET standard – whether it is same as the 
international customary law of minimum standard of treatment (MST) of aliens or is it an 
autonomous treaty standard,563 section 4.2 will discuss India’s riveting stand on MST of 
aliens under customary international law (CIL). Section 4.3 will focus on determining the 
content of the FET standard in these 73 Indian IIAs. The content will be determined by 
relying on treaty interpretation tools and the approaches adopted by different arbitral 
tribunals. Drawing from the previous discussion, this section will also deal with the issue of 
whether India is under an obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment as part of CIL.   
 
4.1 ANATOMY OF THE FET PROVISION IN INDIAN IIAs    
 
A study of 73 Indian IIAs reveals that as many as 71 Indian IIAs contain the FET provision. 
The two Indian IIAs that do not contain the FET provision are with Turkey and Singapore. 
India-Turkey IIA was signed in 1998 but came into force in 2007 and India-Singapore IIA 
came into force in 2005.  
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These 71 Indian IIAs, which contain the FET provision, can be divided into three types. First, 
‘model-IIA’; second, ‘modified-model IIA’; and third, ‘content-indicative IIA’. The ‘model-
IIA’ type means those IIAs where the FET provision is same as the FET provision in the 
model Indian IIA. ‘Modified-model IIA’ type means those FET provisions that are slightly 
different from the one given in the ‘model-IIA’ type. ‘Content-indicative IIA’ type means 
those FET provisions that provide some indication of its possible content. Let us understand 
each of these and their trends.   
 
Table 4.1 – Indian IIAs containing FET standard  
 
FET provision  Number of IIAs  
Present  71  
Absent  2 – India-Singapore and India-Turkey. India-
Turkey IIA mentions about FET only in the 
preamble.  
 
Source – Author’s study of 73 Indian IIAs  
 
4.1.1 ‘Model-IIA’ type FET provisions   
 
Article 3 (2) of the Indian model IIA gives the FET provision - ‘Investments and returns of 
investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable 
treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party’. The meaning of FET is not given in 
the model IIA. It only states that foreign investment has to be accorded FET ‘at all times’. 
The FET provision is part of Article 3, which is titled as ‘Promotion and Protection of 
Investment’. Paragraph 1 of Article 3 states – ‘Each Contracting Party shall encourage and 
create favourable conditions for investors of the other Contracting Party to make investments 
in its territory, and admit such investments in accordance with its laws and policy’. Thus, the 
sub-article of the provision containing FET emphasises on encouraging and creating 
favourable conditions for foreign investment.  
 
The FET provision in the model IIA (although part of the title ‘promotion and protection of 




security of investments or with national treatment and most favoured nation clause. The same 
formulation of FET exists in as many as 36 Indian IIAs (including the model-IIA) out of the 
71 that contain the FET provision, and thus, the FET provision in these 36 Indian IIAs is 
called the ‘model-IIA’ type. There is no one specific trend about this kind of FET 
formulation. Such formulation occurs in India’s IIAs with both developing and developed 
countries like Australia, Israel, Poland, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Vietnam, Romania, China, 
Indonesia, Mozambique, Senegal, Latvia and others. Further, there is no one trend in terms of 
time period. India’s earliest IIAs with Israel entered in 1996 and India’s later IIAs signed 
with countries like China, Latvia and Mozambique in 2006, 2010 and 2009 respectively 
contain the same model-IIA FET provision.     
 
4.1.2 ‘Modified-model IIA’ type   
 
‘Modified-model IIA’ type represents those FET formulations, which are not very different 
from the formulation in the model Indian IIA. The minor features that distinguishes ‘model-
IIA’ type FET formulation from ‘modified-model IIA’ type formulation is that in the latter, 
the FET provision does not exist in a standalone form but in combination with either full 
protection and security, or in combination with national treatment and MFN (India-
Denmark), or in combination with the requirement to promote investments. In ‘modified-
model IIA’, FET formulations in IIAs with the following countries exists in combination with 
full protection and security - UK, Germany, Italy, Czech Republic, Spain, Switzerland, 
Uzbekistan, Morocco, Sweden, Thailand, Argentina, Finland, Hungary, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Hellenic Republic, Iceland, Mexico, Brunei, Syria, Yugoslavia, Korea. For example, Article 
3 (2) of the India-UK IIA provides – ‘investments and investors of each contracting party 
shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and 
security in the territory of the other contracting party.’  
 
Table 4.2 – Anatomy of the FET provisions in 71 Indian IIAs  
 
Type of FET Formulation  Number of Indian IIAs 
having this type of FET 
formulation  




‘Modified-Model IIA’ 29   
‘Content-Indicative’  5 
 
Source – Author’s study of 71 Indian IIAs that contain the FET provision   
 
In some IIAs [with Italy - Article 3 (2); Finland - Article 3(3); and Trinidad and Tobago – 
Article 3 (2)] along with full protection and security, FET exists in combination with another 
provision according to which the host country is barred from adopting unreasonable and 
discriminatory measures against foreign investment. Similarly, India-Finland IIA (entered in 
2002), which provides FET in Article 3(3), along with full protection and security, also 
imposes an obligation on India not to impair management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal of investment by adopting unreasonable or discriminatory measures. Similar sort of 
formulation also exists in India-Mauritius IIA. Article 4(1) provides that ‘Investments and 
returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party 
shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal or investments in its territory by investors of the 
other Contracting Party’.   
 
Out of 29 ‘modified-model IIA’ FET provisions, in 25 of them the FET obligation is part of 
the provision titled ‘promotion and protection of investment’. In four ‘modified-model IIA’ 
FET formulations, the FET obligation is contained in provisions having titles other than 
‘promotion and protection of investment’ such as India-Mauritius IIA where the FET 
provision is part of an Article titled ‘treatment of investments’.  
    
The important unifying factor in the two types of IIAs is that they do not provide the 
normative content of the FET provision. In other words, the FET provision in ‘modified-
model IIA’ also remains undefined barring the IIAs with Denmark – Article 3(2) and Kuwait 
– Article 5 (1), which mention that FET standard cannot be below national treatment and 
MFN and hence providing the floor.  
 
It is difficult to draw any specific trend in the formulation of the FET provision when both 




both ‘model-IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ FET formulations almost at the same time. The 
FET formulation in India-Germany IIA and India-Italy IIA both entered in 1995 is of 
‘modified-model IIA’ type whereas the FET formulation in India-Poland IIA entered in 1996 
is ‘model-IIA’ type.    
 
The only interesting trend to note is that after the Enron debacle,564 India’s IIA with 
Singapore, which was negotiated almost at the same time when the Enron debate was going 
on, does not contain the FET provision. However, lack of FET is not a feature of any of the 
other IIAs signed by India at that time. Thus, except for India-Singapore, all Indian IIAs of 
that time such as India-China IIA contain a FET provision. Similarly, India-Malaysia and 
India-Japan IIAs, though have investment provisions similar to those given in India-
Singapore IIA, also provide for a FET provision. The FET formulation in these IIAs will be 
discussed in detail in the ‘content-indicative’ IIA part of the chapter.   
 
4.1.3 ‘Content-Indicative IIA’  
 
Out of the 71 IIAs that contain the FET provision, five IIAs provide some content or 
direction regarding the meaning of the FET provision and hence are referred as ‘content-
indicative’ IIAs. These IIAs are with France, Mexico, Korea, Malaysia and Japan. In these 
IIAs reference is made to the minimum standard of treatment. In India-France IIA, the 
reference is not so clear because Article 4(2) says that FET treatment is to be extended in 
accordance with internationally established principles to investments.  
 
India’s IIAs with Mexico,565 Korea (Article 10.4.1), Malaysia (Article 10.5) and Japan 
(Article 87.1) clearly provide that FET standard shall not require treatment in addition to the 
MST of aliens under CIL. For example, Article 10.4 (1) of the India-Korea IIA states – ‘Each 
Party shall accord to an investment of an investor of the other Party in its territory “fair and 
equitable treatment” and “full protection and security.” The concepts of “fair and equitable 
treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or 
                                                
564 Capital India Power Mauritius I and Energy Enterprises (Mauritius) Company v. Maharashtra Power 
Development Cooperation Limited, International Court of Arbitration of the ICC, Case No. 12913/MS.   
565 In response to the ruling in Tecmed SA v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/2, 29 May 
2003 involving Spain-Mexico IIA, where it was held that the FET provision is autonomous, in 2006 Spain and 
Mexico renegotiated their existing IIA to change the FET formulation by linking it with MST of aliens under 
customary international law.  Similarly, Mexico has followed this type of FET formulation in its IIA with China 




beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens’. Article 87 of the India-Japan IIA states – ‘Each Party shall accord to 
investments of investors of the other Party treatment in accordance with international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security’. It further provides 
‘This paragraph prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment 
of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of 
the other Party. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens. A determination that 
there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a separate 
international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this paragraph’. 
A similar kind of provision linking FET with MST of aliens under CIL exists in Article 10.5 
of the India-Malaysia IIA.  
 
4.2 INDIA’S STAND ON THE MST OF ALIENS UNDER CIL  
 
India’s stand on MST of aliens under CIL has evolved over the years and can be linked to 
India’s economic policy and thinking - discussed in chapter 2. Dependence on foreign 
investment to meet India’s investment needs in early decades after India’s independence was 
kept quite low.566 As it has been elaborately discussed in chapter 2, India’s economic policy 
and thinking in the 1950s and till about 1980s was based on import substitution, self-reliance 
and promoting indigenous industries. The period of 1950s and 1960s witnessed India and 
other countries of Asia and Africa, who had gained independence from their European 
colonial rulers, asserting themselves to build a new international legal order emphasising 
their sovereign status.567 A key development in 1950s was the setting up of Asian Legal 
Consultative Committee (ALCC) on 15 November 1956 with India along with six other 
Asian countries being the founding members.568 In 1958, African countries also become 
members of this group and later this group came to be known as Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Organization (AALCO) with its primary objective being to act as an advisory 
body to member states on international law matters. At the fourth session of this committee, 
                                                
566 Chandra et al (2008), 452.  
567 Work of Indian scholars of that time reflect this - Anand (1961), 383; Guha Roy (1961), 863; Anand (1966), 
55. Also see Pacht (1962), 76.   




member countries adopted a document called ‘Principles Concerning Admission and 
Treatment of Aliens’.569 Article 11 of this document states ‘Subject to local laws, regulations, 
and orders and subject also to the condition, imposed for his admission into the State, an 
alien shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property’. Further Article 12 (1) 
states ‘The State shall, however, have the right to acquire, expropriate or nationalise the 
property of an alien. Compensation shall be paid for such acquisition, expropriation or 
nationalisation in accordance with local laws, regulations and orders’. This language clearly 
signaled that while the alien will be lawfully treated without arbitrariness, this treatment will 
be as per the national laws of the host country and thus, will be in accordance with the 
principle of national treatment. In other words, this stand of India and other Asian and 
African countries rejected a minimum standard of treatment of aliens independent of national 
treatment.  
 
In 1957, the Indian member of the International Law Commission (ILC), Radhabinod Pal, 
mounted a very strong challenge to the draft report of the Special Rapporteur Garcia Amador 
who linked the issue of content of the international minimum standard with fundamental 
human rights concept.570 Pal challenged the European hegemony of international law arguing 
that the geography of international law has changed in the post-war period with the rise of a 
large number of newly independent nation states in Asia like India and hence these countries 
should be involved in developing international law.571 Thus, Pal challenged the content of the 
proposed international minimum standard in economic relations and argued that it was 
nothing but an attempt to thrust on the rest of the world the European notion of the 
international minimum standard without understanding the social and economic difficulties of 
countries like India.572  
 
                                                




570 Garcia Amador (1957), 112-116.  
571 Pal (1957), 158. Garcia Amador’s position has also been criticised by Sir Ian Brownlie – See Brownlie 
(2008), 527.  




In 1960s, the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution declaring permanent 
sovereignty over natural wealth and resources573 also indicated the rejection of the law 
relating to responsibility of states espoused by developed countries.574 As it has been 
elaborately discussed in chapter 2, this was followed by India and other developing countries 
by attempting to develop a New International Economic Order (NIEO).575 As a part of this 
process the United Nations General Assembly, on 12 December 1974, adopted the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS). Article 2(2) (a) of the Charter states that 
each state has the right ‘to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its 
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with 
its national objectives and priorities. No state shall be compelled to grant preferential 
treatment to foreign investments’. This provision was opposed by 10 developed countries 
(mainly capital exporting countries) who wanted host countries to treat foreign investments as 
per what they thought to be the international obligations.576 However, India and other 
developing countries maintained that all investors, foreign or national, should function as per 
the national laws of the country and there should not be any preferential treatment for foreign 
investors.577 In other words, India, in 1974, based on its economic ideology rooted in import 
substitution and self-reliance, argued for national treatment as the minimum international 
standard and not for an autonomous minimum standard for foreign investments different from 
the treatment given to Indian investors.  
 
Similarly, Article 2(2) (b) of CERDS on transnational corporations (TNCs) states that each 
state has the right to regulate and supervise the activities of the TNCs within its national 
jurisdiction in accordance with its laws, regulations, economic and social policies. An Indian 
scholar commenting on this in 1977 has written that ‘developed countries recognized that a 
state may control their entry and activities within its territory, they wanted the corporations 
to retain the protection of the international standards applicable to foreigners’,578 which was 
not acceptable to India and other developing countries. An Indian official writing on NIEO in 
                                                
573 General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, ‘Permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources’ available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/resources.htm 
574 See the arguments of late Professor R P Anand, one of India’s prominent international law scholars – Anand 
(1966), 69.  
575See the Introductory chapter for more details on NIEO.    
576 Rao (1975), 360.  
577 Id, 360.  




1978 mentioned that developing countries wanted to create a new international economic 
order based on equality which would enable them to subject TNCs to national discipline.579  
 
The biggest opposition to accepting an international minimum standard different from 
national treatment was reflected in Article 2(2) (c) of CERDS on the question of 
compensation for expropriation. As discussed in chapter 3 (on expropriation), the question of 
compensation for expropriation was to be decided as per the national laws. On the demand of 
developed countries that the question of compensation should be decided as per the principles 
of international law, India and other developing countries denied the existence of any such 
principle in international law.580   
 
Further, developed countries wanted to include another paragraph to Article 2 to provide that 
measures taken in exercise of rights provided in the Article ‘shall fulfill in good faith their 
international obligations’.581 This was an attempt by developed countries to make sure that 
countries abide both by treaty law and by what they considered the CIL to be. However, India 
and other developing countries argued that they will accept this only if the above provision 
was qualified by ‘freely undertaken’.582 This was a clear indication to reject the version of 
CIL advocated by developed countries because of the belief that countries like India, which 
gained independence only in 1947, didn’t take part in the development of this customary law 
and hence were not bound by it.     
 
However, India’s position started to change in 1990s when it made a paradigm shift in its 
economic policy due to a severe balance of payment crisis in 1991 as discussed elaborately in 
chapter 2. This change in economic policy and thinking also led to a change in India’s 
understanding on international law related to foreign investments. With the desire to welcome 
foreign investment, India started entering into IIAs with broad investment protection 
provisions including the obligation to treat foreign investors fairly and equitably. This 
showed India’s change of heart from opposing the international minimum standard in the 
post-colonisation period to adopting a more pragmatic approach in the 1990s to negotiating 
investment protection agreements due to the changed economic scenario, as pointed out by a 
                                                
579 Shukla (1978), 291.  
580 Rao (1975), 361; Agarwala (1977), 267. Also see Sornarajah (2010), 123 according to whom Article 2 (2) (c) 
is in effect a restatement of the Calvo Doctrine. For discussion on how contentious this article was - see White 
(1975), 546.   
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prominent Indian official, who headed the legal and treaties division in India’s foreign 
ministry.583 Although there has been a change in India’s stand on MST of aliens under CIL 
like accepting the prompt and effective standard of compensation for expropriation in its 
IIAs, as discussed in chapter 3; it is doubtful whether India has fully embraced other issues 
like accepting to treat foreign investment as per some international standard different than the 
national standard. This issue is further discussed in Section 4.3.3.      
 
4.3 CONTENT OF THE FET STANDARD   
 
Determining the content of the FET standard is important in order to find out its implications 
on exercise of regulatory power. The content of the FET provision in Indian IIAs will be 
determined first by focussing on the ‘model-IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ FET 
formulations. Both these types of formulations are discussed jointly because of the similarity 
in their formulations. This will be followed by focussing on the ‘content-indicative’ IIA FET 
formulation. As it will be discussed below, based on the treaty language, two different 
interpretative routes can be followed to interpret the FET provision in Indian IIAs. First, the 
‘autonomous approach’ which interprets the FET provision independent of the MST of aliens 
under CIL; second, the equating approach that equates the FET provision with the MST of 
aliens under CIL. In other words, content of the FET provision will be determined by 
determining the content of the MST of aliens under CIL. The chapter will also discuss a third 
approach, called the ‘convergence approach’. According to this approach the FET provision 
in IIAs has converged with CIL and has become part of CIL.584 
 
4.3.1 ‘Model-IIA’ and ‘Modified-model IIA’ FET formulations    
 
The interpretation of the ‘model-IIA’ type and ‘modified-model IIA’ type FET formulation 
will examine both the interpretative routes by focussing on the language of the treaty.    
 
Autonomous Approach  
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As mentioned above, an autonomous approach to interpreting the FET provision in an IIA 
implies finding the content of the FET provision independent of any MST of aliens under 
CIL. In other words, the content of the FET provision will not hinge on international 
minimum standard and may be broader than the narrower minimum standard.585  
 
The ‘model IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ FET formulations do not explicitly link to MST 
of aliens under CIL. There is also no reference or mention of FET treatment being no less 
than that required by international law.586 It only imposes an obligation on India to treat 
foreign investors fairly and equitably without providing any guidance on whether such 
treatment is to be determined by taking cognizance of the MST of aliens under CIL. Hence, it 
can be argued that the absence of the treaty making an explicit link between the FET 
provision and MST of aliens under CIL clearly indicates that the FET provision in these 66 
IIAs supports an autonomous interpretation of the FET provision independent of any MST of 
aliens under CIL. In other words, if India would have intended to limit FET to MST of aliens 
under CIL it would have specifically provided for that in the treaty.587  
 
There is lot of academic literature that supports the argument that the FET provision should 
be considered an autonomous standard in those IIAs that do not link the FET provision with 
the MST of aliens under CIL.588 Many arbitral tribunals have also adopted this approach. The 
Saluka tribunal, for example, had to interpret Article 3(1) of the Netherlands-Czech and 
Slovak Republic IIA, which provides – ‘Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and 
equitable treatment to the investments of investors of the other Contracting Party and shall 
not impair, by unreasonable or discriminatory measures, the operation, management, 
                                                
585 See Cargill, Incorporated v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/05/2, para 285; PSEG v 
Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB/02/5, para 239; Enron Corp Ltd v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, para 258.    
586 See Article 2(2) of Argentina-US BIT, which provides for FET, and also states that investments shall ‘in no 
case be accorded treatment less than required by international law’. In fact, recently, the tribunal in AWG Group 
v Argentina, UNCITRAL, 30 July 2010 deciding on the FET provision in Argentina-France IIA, which referred 
to the ‘principles of international law’ and not to the minimum standard under customary international law held 
that reference to international law is not same as reference to MST – para 184. In this regard see the arguments 
of some authors who argue that it is inconsequential whether an explicit mention of ‘international law’ is made 
or not – Knoll-Tudor (2009), 317.      
587 Also see Schreuer (2005); AWG v Argentina, para 184. 
588 See Mann (1981), 1244; Gudgeon (1986), 125; McLachlan et al (2007), 226-247; Dolzer and Stevens (1995), 
60; Vasciannie (1999), 104-105; Schreuer (2005), 364; Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), 124; Yannaca-Small 
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maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by those investors’. This FET formulation is 
quite similar to the FET formulation of the ‘modified-model IIA’ type. The Saluka tribunal 
held that omission of any reference to customary international standard in the FET 
formulation points to the autonomous character of the FET standard.589 More recently, the 
arbitral tribunal in Lemire v Ukraine590 while interpreting a FET provision which stated 
‘Investments shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full 
protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by 
international law’ held that the FET standard in the IIA is an autonomous treaty standard.591  
Adoption of the autonomous approach to determine the content of the FET provision makes 
the issue of whether the FET provision in Indian IIAs reflects the MST of aliens under CIL 
non-consequential.592 However, some tribunals adopting the autonomous approach have also 
passed observations on whether FET reflects MST of aliens under CIL - this is discussed in 
Section 4.3.3.  
 
The fact that FET provision in these 66 Indian IIAs is autonomous from the MST of aliens 
under CIL does not help much in determining the content of the FET standard. Hence, the 
discussion below will focus on using other treaty interpretation tools given in Articles 31 and 
32 of the VCLT to determine the content of the FET standard. 593 As it has been discussed 
elsewhere, Article 31 (1) requires interpreting the treaty by giving ordinary meaning to the 
terms used. According to the Oxford dictionary, the word ‘fair’ means ‘treating people 
                                                
589 Saluka tribunal, para 294. The tribunal in MTD Equity Sdn Bhd &MTD Chile SA v Chile, ICSID Case No 
ARB/01/7, 25 May 2004  also stated that since there was no reference to customary international law in relation 
to the FET provision in the BIT, it was obliged to apply the standard autonomously – paras 111-112. Also see 
Tecmed v Mexico, para 155; PSEG v Turkey, para 239; Sempra Energy International v Argentina, ICSID Case 
No ARB/02/16, 28 September 2007, para 302; Enron v Argentina, para 258; AWG v Argentina, para 186. The 
tribunal in National Grid v Argentina said that since there is no reference to MST of aliens under international 
law therefore the tribunal will proceed to examine the ordinary meaning of the words ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ – 
para 167. Furthermore, in Azurix v Argentina, where Article 2.2 (a) of the IIA, containing the FET provision, 
also states that treatment shall in no case be less than required by international law, the tribunal held that this 
formulation allows to interpret FET as a higher standard of investment protection – para 361.  
590 J C Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/06/18.   
591 Id, para 284. The tribunal said that the reference to international law in the IIA is to set the floor and not the 
ceiling – para 253.   
592 See Occidental, CMS and Enron tribunals. Also see generally Newcome and Paradell (2009), 273; BG Group 
Plc v Argentina, UNCITRAL (Final Award), 24 December 2007, paras 289-310; 
593 Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 263; Tudor (2008), 145. Also see UNCTAD (2007), 41 which provides that 
the interpretation of the FET provision will vary significantly based on the language of the text. See Enron 
tribunal, para 259 where the tribunal states that it is bound to interpret the provision on FET as per Article 31 of 
the VCLT. In this regard arguments have also been made that arbitral tribunals have not given different 
interpretation or meaning to the FET standard based on the context in which the standard appears – Vandevelde 
(2010), 203. Also see Choudhary (2005) pointing to textual differences in treaty provisions as the reason for 
lack of a universally accepted definition of the FET standard and hence pointing to the significance of treaty 




equally without favouritism and discrimination’ and ‘just or appropriate in circumstances’. 
The word ‘equitable’ means ‘impartial or reasonable’. The word ‘treatment’ is defined in the 
English Oxford dictionary as ‘the manner in which someone behaves or deals with someone 
or something’.594 This definition essentially means focussing on the conduct of the person 
concerned. Thus, FET is a standard of host state’s conduct vis-à-vis foreign investment.595 
FET requires India’s conduct towards foreign investment to be just and impartial or 
reasonable. However, finding the ordinary meaning does not help much in finding the 
meaning of FET because the ordinary meaning of ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ throws up words, 
which are equally vague and broad.596  
 
The next important step is to find the ‘context’ in which these words appear. In all ‘model-
IIA’ FET formulations and in majority of ‘modified-model IIA’ FET formulations, the FET 
provision occurs under the heading of ‘promotion and protection of investments’. This 
indicates that determination of whether host state’s conduct towards foreign investment is fair 
and equitable should be guided by values such as promotion and protection of investment.597 
Furthermore, the immediate context of the FET provision is that the obligation to treat 
foreign investment fairly and equitably exists along with a provision according to which the 
host country shall encourage and create favourable conditions for foreign investors. The 
presence of this provision under the same heading of ‘promotion and protection of 
investment’ and as the ‘immediate context’ for the FET obligation also points towards values 
like promotion and creating favourable conditions for foreign investments as guides to 
determining whether  India’s conduct as a host nation towards foreign investment is fair and 
equitable or not.  
 
In ‘modified-model IIA’ FET formulations, the immediate context of FET is that it exists in 
combination with other investment protection clauses like ‘full protection and security’ and 
restrict to impose or adopt ‘unreasonable and discriminatory measures’. The presence of 
                                                
594 See http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/treatment?region=us 
595 Also see the separate opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken in AWG v Argentina who describes FET as a 
standard of conduct – see para 19 of his dissenting judgment. Generally on dissenting opinions by party-
appointed arbitrators in ITA see – Berg (2011), 821.  
596 Saluka, para 297. Also see MTD, para 113.   
597 See Siemens AG v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, 6 February 2007, para 290; Azurix v Argentina, 
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treaty interpretative methodology and came to the conclusion that FET should at least be understood to be 
treatment which is not proactively encouraging foreign investment does not at least deter foreign investment by 




these clauses point towards interpreting FET with investment protection as the key guiding 
principle.598 It is also interesting to note that while almost all Indian IIAs recognise limited 
exceptions to national treatment and most favoured nation treatment such as not extending 
MFN to foreign investors due to an existing or a future customs area or not extending 
national treatment in matters related to taxation; no such specific exception exists for the FET 
provision barring the general exception that exists in the form of a Non Precluded Measure 
(NPM) clause (see the discussion chapter 6). This also indicates the importance that India has 
attached to the obligation of providing FET to foreign investment.599 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the overall object and purpose of the majority of Indian IIAs is 
investment protection and promotion. Thus, the context, and the object and purpose of the 
‘model-IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ FET formulations suggests that the interpretation of 
FET in these Indian IIAs should be such that promotes the goal of investment protection and 
promotion. Such broad and unqualified ‘model-IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ FET 
formulation coupled with the discussion on context, and object and purpose, supports the 
adoption of an expansive interpretation.600 An autonomous and expansive interpretation of 
the FET provision implies that a large range of host state’s regulatory conduct can be brought 
under the ambit of the FET provision.601 It gives much scope for arbitral discretion to read 
into the FET provision what the arbitrators think fit.602 A recent example of this discretion is 
the reasoning of the ITA tribunal in El Paso v Argentina.603 The tribunal introduced an 
unknown concept of ‘creeping violation of the FET provision’.604 According to this, even if 
individual regulatory measures do not violate the FET provision, a cumulative effect of all 
such regulatory measures may violate the FET provision.605 The discussion below will focus 
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on how this arbitral discretion has been exercised in other IIAs to understand the 
interpretations that can be adopted for FET standard in Indian IIAs.606      
 
There is enough literature to show that arbitration tribunals have interpreted FET standard to 
include - denial of justice and due process; lack of arbitrariness and non-discrimination; and 
legitimate expectations (including transparency and stability of legal framework).607 Out of 
these concepts, legitimate expectations poses the main challenge because in many cases host 
country’s regulatory measure was found violating the FET standard and hence illegal because 
of the failure to honour investor’s legitimate expectations.608 Hence the concept of legitimate 
expectations requires to be understood in detail.  
 
Legitimate expectations  
 
Legitimate expectations is a concept used in domestic administrative legal regimes of many 
countries though without a common settled understanding. For example, in Canadian 
administrative law, a legitimate expectation is limited to expectations of due-process in 
decision making.609 In Indian administrative law, as discussed later in the chapter, legitimate 
expectation can be one of the grounds for judicial review but the granting of relief is very 
much limited.610 
 
The preliminary point to note about legitimate expectations is that IIAs including Indian IIAs 
do not contain this term. Nevertheless, arbitral tribunals have made legitimate expectations an 
integral part of the FET provision so much so that it has ‘become ubiquitous in IIA claims 
and awards’.611 One is unsure of the source of legitimate expectations in IIAs. Some argue 
that the source of legitimate expectations in FET is the doctrine of legitimate expectations in 
                                                
606 In this regard, also see the arguments that in order to find the normative content of the FET standard, one has 
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domestic law like Professor Walde’s separate opinion in International Thunderbird case;612 
some argue that the basis of legitimate expectation is general principles of law.613 However, 
this has been questioned by scholars like Sornarajah arguing that as a general principle 
legitimate expectation provides only procedural protection and not substantive remedies.614 
Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, in his separate opinion in AWG v Argentina, posed a serious 
challenge to the concept of legitimate expectations as part of the FET provision. Arbitrator 
Nikken said ‘the assertion that fair and equitable treatment includes an obligation to satisfy 
or not to frustrate the legitimate expectations of the investor at the time of his/her investment 
does not correspond, in any language, to the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms “fair 
and equitable.” Therefore, prima facie, such a conception of fair and equitable treatment is 
at odds with the rule of interpretation of international customary law expressed in Article 
31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). In addition, I think that the 
interpretation that tends to give the standard of fair and equitable treatment the effect of a 
legal stability provision has no basis in the BITs or in the international customary rules 
applicable to the interpretation of treaties.’615  
 
The debate does not end on whether legitimate expectation is part of the FET provision. Even 
if one were to assume that legitimate expectation is part of the FET provision, the larger issue 
is about the meaning of ‘legitimate expectation’. As the discussion below will show, different 
arbitral tribunals have given different meanings to this term, which has created a confusion 
regarding its meaning.616   
 
One of the earlier cases which highlighted the concept of legitimate expectations as part of 
the FET provision is Tecmed v Mexico. In this case the tribunal said – The foreign investor 
expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any 
and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments… to be able to plan its 
                                                
612 Also see Fietta (2006), 376-378; McLachlan et al (2007), 234.  
613 See Vicuna (2005).   
614 Sornarajah (2010), 354-355.  
615 Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken in AWG v Argentina, para 3. Also, Qureshi and Ziegler state 
that ‘the notion of ‘legitimate expectations’ as such and what can be their basis is controversial in itself’ -  
Qureshi and Ziegler (2011), 509.  
616 See Fietta (2006), 393 pointing to divergent and ambiguous explanation of three tribunals – Methanex, 
Saluka and International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, 26 January 
2006. Also see Qureshi and Ziegler (2011), 509 who state that interpretation of the FET provision by different 




investment and comply with such regulations.617 This makes legitimate expectation an overly 
expansive, unrealistic, catch-all phrase for all regulatory measures of the host state and has 
been criticised.618 The Tecmed ruling links legitimate expectations with stability and 
continuance of the regulatory framework in place when the investment was made. This is so 
even if the host country didn’t make any assurance to continue with the regulatory regime nor 
the investor has any legal entitlement in the host country’s domestic law for the continued 
existence of the regulatory regime.619 For example, in Occidental v Ecuador, although 
Ecuador had not given any assurance regarding the continuation of the legal regime based on 
which the investment was made, the tribunal held that Ecuador had violated the FET standard 
by changing the legal and regulatory regime that existed at the time when investment was 
made.620 The tribunal, in yet another instance of relying on broad preambular language, 
reached the conclusion that stability of legal and business framework is an essential part of 
the FET standard.621 The same approach was followed in CMS v Argentina and Enron v 
Argentina where Argentina’s measures adopted to tackle a massive financial crisis were held 
as violating the regulatory framework in place when the investment was made and hence a 
breach of legitimate expectations.622 An extremely expansive interpretation of the notion of 
legitimate expectations has been recently given by an arbitral tribunal in Walter Bau AG v 
Thailand623 where it was held that the foreign investor had a legitimate expectation to have a 
reasonable rate of return from an investment project even if the host state had not made any 
such assurance.624 Thus, this case links legitimate expectations to the subjective expectations 
of the foreign investor.625  
 
                                                
617 Tecmed, para 154.  
618 MTD Equity v Chile (Annulment Proceeding), para 67; Douglas (2006), 28; Ryan (2008), 739-740; Dugan et 
al (2008), 513. Also see AWG v Argentina, which admits that certain broad elements of the Tecmed tribunal 
have been criticised – para 224.  On the issue of lack of transparency violating the FET standard also see - 
Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, para 83.   
619 Bonnitcha (2011). Also see Montt (2009), 360-362.  
620 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No UN3467, 1 July 
2004, para 184.    
621 Id, para 183.   
622 CMS v Argentina, paras 274-277; Enron v Argentina, paras 264-267. For a critique of the CMS tribunal 
ruling that emphasised on ‘stability in the regulatory framework see – Costamagna (2006), 9; Mayeda (2007), 
278. Also see UNCTAD (2012), 66-67. Other cases that link investor’s expectations with stability in the overall 
legal framework – Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, 18 
August 2008, para 340; PSEG v Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, 19 January 2007, paras. 252–253.  
623 Walter Bau AG v The Kingdom of Thailand, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Award, 1 July 2009.  
624 Id, para 12.2 and 12.3 




In contrast to these rulings, some other arbitral tribunals have concurred with the host state 
amending its regulatory framework. For example, the Parkerings tribunal denied violation of 
legitimate expectations because the state did not give any explicit or implicit promise that the 
legal framework would remain unchanged.626 The tribunal also stated ‘It is each State’s 
undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative power. A State has the 
right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its own discretion. Save for the existence of an 
agreement, in the form of a stabilisation clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable 
about the amendment brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an investor 
made its investment.’627 Recently, the ITA tribunal in Impregilo v Argentina said that ‘The 
legitimate expectations of foreign investors cannot be that the State will never modify the 
legal framework, especially in times of crisis, but certainly investors must be protected from 
unreasonable modifications of that legal framework’.628 This standard is less strict in 
comparison to what Tecmed and Occidental tribunals have said. Nevertheless, the statement 
that ‘investors must be protected from unreasonable modifications’ of the legal framework is 
contentious. It is not clear what is meant by ‘unreasonable modifications’.629     
 
Likewise, some ITA tribunals have held that legitimate expectations are subject to certain 
requirements.630 Thus, expectations are considered to be legitimate and reasonable if they are 
based on specific unilateral assurances given by the host state to the foreign investor.631 For 
example, the Parkerings tribunal said that ‘the expectation is legitimate if the investor 
received an explicit promise or guarantee from the host state, or if implicitly, the host state 
made assurances or representation that the investor took into account in making the 
investment’.632 Similarly, in Thunderbird v Mexico, the arbitral tribunal held that legitimate 
expectations relates ‘to a situation where a Contracting Party’s conduct creates reasonable 
and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on 
said conduct, such that a failure by the NAFTA Party to honour those expectations could 
                                                
626 Parkerings tribunal, para 334.  
627 Also see BG Group v Argentina, para 298; Lemire v Ukraine, para 285.  
628 Impregilo v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, 21 June 2011, para 291.  
629 In Impregilo v Argentina, the tribunal held that Argentina’s changes in the regulatory framework were 
unreasonable because it failed in restoring an equilibrium, which was disturbed due the emergency legislation 
enacted by Argentina in response to the financial crisis – para 330.  
630 UNCTAD (2012), 67.  
631 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part 
IV, Chapter D, page 5, para 7.  




cause the investor (or investment) to suffer damages’.633 The Thunderbird tribunal also 
emphasised on ‘detrimental reliance’ as an integral part of a claim of violation of legitimate 
expectation.634 On the other hand, it has been argued that ‘detrimental reliance’ should not be 
strictly required to establish legitimate expectation.635  
 
The tribunal in Duke Energy v Ecuador also stated that for expectations to be reasonable they 
must arise ‘from the conditions that the State offered the investor and the latter must have 
relied upon them when deciding to invest’.636 The tribunal also stated two more factors that 
need to be taken into account in deciding whether investor’s expectations are reasonable - 
first; facts surrounding the investment; second, political, cultural, socioeconomic and 
historical conditions prevailing in the host country.637 The reference to take into account the 
second point to determine whether the expectations of the investor are reasonable allows 
taking into account the regulatory powers of the host country while deciding whether the 
expectations of the investor are legitimate. The same point was made by the Saluka tribunal 
more directly stating that one of the requirements for an investor’s expectation to be 
reasonable is to weigh it against the host country’s regulatory power.638  
 
As against the above mentioned cases that base legitimate expectations on specific unilateral 
assurances of the host state, some ITA tribunals seem to root the legitimacy of expectations 
into legal entitlements that can be enforced by law under the laws of the host state and not on 
unilateral assurances given by the host state to the foreign investor.639 For example, in Enron 
v Argentina and in LG&E v Argentina, Argentina didn’t make any specific representations to 
                                                
633 Thunderbird, para 147. Also see Waste Management v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, para 98; 
Metalclad Corp v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, 30 August 2000, para 148; National 
Grid v Argentina, para 173.    
634 Thunderbird, para 147. It has also been argued that ‘detrimental reliance’ was pointed out by the tribunal in 
Biwater v Tanzania also – see Yost (2010). Also see AWG v Argentina, para 226;  
635 Snodgrass (2006), 45. Also see Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 285 who argue that ‘A breach of fair and 
equitable treatment is more likely to arise where the state has made specific representations about the use or 
enjoyment of the rights that the investor has acquired and where the investor has detrimentally relied on those 
representations’. This shows that a breach of legitimate expectation can also arise even in those situations where 
there is no ‘detrimental reliance’. Also in MTD v Chile, though the foreign investor argued for ‘detrimental 
reliance’ as part of the legitimate expectation claim, it was not emphasized by the tribunal in its analysis of 
legitimate expectation.    
636 Duke Energy v Ecuador, para 340 
637 Id.  
638 Saluka, para 305-306. The arbitral tribunal also stated in National Grid v Argentina that for expectations to 
be legitimate and reasonable, the context in which the measures were adopted (referring to Argentina’s severe 
economic crisis) should be taken into account – para 180. Also see Total SA v Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/01, paras 113-123. Also see Salacuse (2010), 233; McLachlan et al (2007), 234-235, 239.      




the foreign investors.640 Likewise, the recent arbitral decision in AWG v Argentina held that 
expectations generated through a contract (distinguishing it from expectations generated by 
unilateral state assurances) which forms the basis of foreign investment and which is 
enforceable as per law would be legitimate.641 Similarly, in BG v Argentina, the tribunal held 
that apart from specific commitments made by Argentina to the foreign investor, the 
regulatory framework that was guaranteed by Argentina to investor was of particular 
importance.642 The tribunal held that the investor could reasonably rely on this regulatory 
framework, which Argentina violated and hence violated the principles of stability and 
predictability, which are an integral part of the FET provision.643  
 
Another important case involving contractual relationship between the host state and the 
foreign investor is Eureko BV v Poland.644 In this case, Poland was found guilty for violating 
the legitimate expectation of the investor that he would have acquired majority stake in the 
company through a public offering, which never took place.645 This ruling has been criticised 
because of its sweeping requirement of contractual stability.646 In contrast to Eureko v 
Poland, in some other cases such as Total v Argentina,647 tribunals have adopted a more 
differential approach (giving deference to the host state) in judging the question whether 
breach of the contract violates the legitimate expectation of the investor.648  
 
Legitimate Expectation in Indian law  
 
                                                
640 UNCTAD (2012), 69.  
641 AWG v Argentina, para 231.  
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643 Id, para 307. Also see MCI Power Group v Republic of Ecuador ICSID Case NoARB/03/6, Award, 31 July 
2007, para 278; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona and Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic 
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The above discussion on legitimate expectations demonstrates that this concept, as developed 
by ITA tribunals, goes very far in comparison to the understanding of legitimate expectations 
in Indian law. To start with, legitimate expectations in India cannot be used against the power 
of the legislature to make new laws, repudiate or amend existing laws even if an individual 
had relied on the previous legal framework and the changed situation is to her detriment.649 
Legitimate expectation has been recognised by Indian courts as a ground for judicial review 
for administrative actions.650 The courts have recognised that legitimate expectation arises 
because of the representation or past conduct or practice of the state and that anyone relying 
on this doctrine will have to show reliance on the said representation and detriment due to the 
denial of the expectation.651  
 
The law has been very clearly laid down by the Supreme Court of India in a recent case and 
deserves to be quoted in full.   
 
‘...a case for applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, now accepted in the 
subjective sense as part of our legal jurisprudence, arises when an administrative body by 
reason of a representation or by past practice or conduct aroused an expectation which it 
would be within its powers to fulfill unless some overriding public interest comes in the way. 
However, a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first 
instance, has to satisfy that he has relied on the said representation and the denial of that 
expectation has worked to his detriment. The Court could interfere only if the decision taken 
by the authority was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in 
violation of principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest. But a claim based on 
mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke 
these principles. It is well settled that the concept of legitimate expectation has no role to 
play where the State action is as a public policy or in the public interest unless the action 
taken amounts to an abuse of power. The court must not usurp the discretion of the public 
authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is expected to 
apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice 
which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left 
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entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the 
decision is taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground of 
procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be 
affected. Therefore, a legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the grounds which may 
give rise to judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited.’652 This 2008 ruling 
was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of India in 2011 in APM Terminals v Union of India653 
stating that where state action is based on public policy and public interest, the concept of 
legitimate expectation has no role to play unless state’s action amounts to abuse of power.654   
 
This passage also makes it clear that a claim based on legitimate expectation can be set aside 
if public interest is involved.655 In other words, if an investment has been made based on the 
promise or specific assurances given by the executive or administrative bodies, change in the 
policy shall not violate legitimate expectations even if it is to the detriment656 of the investor 
if the change is due to a public interest. Further, Indian courts have held that deference should 
be provided to the executive or administrative bodies in deciding what public interest is and 
courts must step in only if there is a gross abuse of power.657 In this regard, the preferred test 
is the Wednesbury test of reasonableness.658  
 
The discussion on legitimate expectations in Indian law shows that while an Indian investor 
can rely on the doctrine of legitimate expectations in limited circumstances; a foreign 
investor, because of the expansive interpretations developed by arbitral tribunals, can rely on 
legitimate expectation not only to challenge India’s administrative decisions but even 
changes in the legislative and regulatory framework.659 This gives foreign investors an 
advantage over Indian investors.   
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655 Also see Punjab Communication v Union of India; Union of India v Hindustan Development Corporation; 
MRF v Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) Sales Tax and Others (2006) 8 SCC 702. 
656 On the issue of detriment see – National Building Construction v S Raghunathan AIR 1998 SC 2776.  
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Critical Review of Legitimate Expectations 
Most arbitral tribunals refer to legitimate expectation as part of the FET provision without 
any clear doctrinal basis. The conclusion that legitimate expectation is part of the FET 
provision is reached not by using treaty interpretation rules but by relying on past arbitral 
awards even though these awards are not binding. Further, ITA tribunals are at variance in 
deciding when violation of legitimate expectations takes place. While there are some cases 
that talk of deciding the claims on violation of legitimate expectations by taking into account 
the host state’s regulatory power660, there are also cases, which have interpreted legitimate 
expectations broadly indicating an undue restriction on host state’s regulatory power.661 It is 
important to remember that Argentina adopting measures to protect itself from an 
extraordinary economic crisis was found guilty of violating the FET standard.662 If the 
Argentinean situation was to be judged under the Indian jurisprudence, such an extraordinary 
economic crisis would have been a reason enough to trump any claim of violation of 
legitimate expectation.  
 
This shows that an ITA tribunal will enjoy a wide degree of discretion if it was to interpret 
the FET standard in the ‘model-IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ FET formulations. This 
arbitral discretion can be exercised to make findings similar to the ones made in Tecmed, 
MTD, Occidental, CMS, Eureka or Walter Bau, which will adversely impact India’s exercise 
of regulatory power. In light of the discussion on the context and the object and purpose of 
‘model-IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ FET formulation in Indian IIAs, an expansive 
interpretation of the FET standard in favour of the foreign investor is plausible.663 On the 
other hand, an ITA tribunal may adopt a Saluka or a Total type analysis giving due 
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weightage to India’s regulatory power in determining whether India has violated the FET 
provision.  
 
Stability and predictability in the regulatory framework are important for foreign investment. 
However, linking legitimate expectation to stability and predictability of the legal and 
regulatory framework in a manner where the host country finds it difficult to change its 
regulatory framework is particularly problematic. A multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-
religious country like India with high income-inequalities has to deal and resolve all kinds of 
complex problems and multitude competing interests between different stakeholders. Thus, it 
cannot afford such an expansive interpretation of legitimate expectations. India opposed the 
broad Tecmed standard of stability in the regulatory and legal framework in White Industries 
v India.664 India argued against legitimate expectations being treated as an independent treaty 
standard.665 India preferred a narrow definition of legitimate expectations limited to 
application of due process in administrative decision making, consistent application of law 
and with representations made to the foreign investor, which are specific enough to justify 
reliance.666 India also argued that these expectations should be reasonable based on objective 
criteria as against vague and general representations giving rise to subjective expectations.667  
A country of India’s size and diversity will require sufficient regulatory flexibility to evolve, 
change, and adapt its legal and regulatory framework based on new challenges it faces and 
also in an effort to find new and better ways to govern itself.  
 
The most apt example that captures the problems related to a very high standard of stability 
and predictability in the regulatory framework is related to India’s taxation law on taxing 
offshore transactions involving capital assets not situated in India but having a link with 
India. This issue involved imposing a capital gains tax on Vodafone, which was reversed by 
the Supreme Court of India as mentioned in chapter 2. India wishes to reverse the ruling of 
the Supreme Court by amending its tax law to provide for imposing tax on such Vodafone-
like transactions retrospectively. It wants to bring about this amendment so as to maximise its 
revenue collection.668   
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Other contemporary examples include the issue of FDI in multi-brand retail. The present 
government is planning to open the multi brand retail sector for FDI;669 however, this is being 
opposed by the principal opposition party and also by other political parties on ideological 
and other grounds. It is quite possible that the policy of FDI in multi-brand retail, if adopted, 
may be reversed in future, based on which political party is voted to power by the people of 
India or even in situations where the Indian government thinks that the policy of allowing 
FDI in multi-brand retail is not yielding the desired results and hence the need to change the 
policy.670 Similarly, India is contemplating to change its land acquisition law due to several 
protests and agitations by farmers who have been arguing that the existing land acquisition 
law is inadequate in protecting their interests.671 The proposed law will increase the 
compensation to be paid to farmers and land owners manifold.672 Such a legislative change is 
meant to address the aspirations of the farming community so that benefits of land acquisition 
percolate to all sections of the society. However, increasing the compensation manifold is 
certainly going to have an adverse impact on the industry including foreign corporations.  
 
Adopting such policy and legal changes is a function of India’s sovereignty provided such 
changes are not arbitrary and do not constitute a gross abuse of public power. However, 
viewing such reversals of policy or changes in law from the Tecmed standard of certainty and 
predictability in the regulatory framework, will adversely impact India’s regulatory power. 
Even if one were to evaluate such measures in view of the not so strict standard provided by 
the Impregilo tribunal, these changes will have to pass the test of not being ‘unreasonable 
modifications’ in the regulatory framework.  
 
Even if an ITA tribunal adopts a more deferential Total-like approach and takes India’s 
regulatory power into account to determine violation of legitimate expectations, one is unsure 
how this extremely difficult balance will be struck.673 Some tribunals have stated that a 
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reasonableness test should be used.674 Some argue that this balancing should be done by 
using the test of proportionality.675 In other words, the arbitral tribunal should carry out the 
three-step proportionality test involving the suitability of the measure, necessity (least 
restrictive test) and weighing and balancing host country’s regulatory power with the effect 
on foreign investment (proportionality stricto sensu) to decide whether the regulatory 
measure is legal or in violation of the host state’s obligation to treat foreign investment fairly 
and equitably.676 Recently, the arbitral tribunal in Lemire v Ukraine mentioned the 
proportionality test in finding out the violation of FET standard by stating that one of the 
countervailing factors that should be taken into account in determining FET violation is ‘the 
State’s sovereign right to pass legislation and to adopt decisions for the protection of its 
public interests, especially if they do not provoke a disproportionate impact on foreign 
investors’.677   
 
As it has also been discussed in other chapters of the thesis (chapters 3 and 6), the 
proportionality test gives much discretion to the arbitrator to decide whether host state’s 
regulation, adopted in public interest, trumps the adverse impact on foreign investment. The 
tribunal will decide this by weighing and balancing public interest with adverse impact on 
foreign investment. An outcome of this weighing and balancing could be that harm caused to 
foreign investment outweighs the public interest and hence the conclusion that India has 
violated the FET provision. Such an outcome will adversely affect the exercise of India’s 
regulatory power. Also, as discussed in chapter 3, whether an ITA tribunal is qualified to 
make such policy choices, by stepping in the shoes of the Indian executive and legislature, is 
a moot point.   
 
Equating Approach   
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The equating approach to interpret the FET provision implies that such a provision in the 
IIAs reflects the MST of aliens under CIL. This approach has been supported either by the 
text of the treaty or by using other treaty interpretation rules like Article 31(3) (c) of the 
VCLT.  
 
Some arbitral tribunals have held that the FET standard in the IIA reflects the MST of aliens 
under CIL by undertaking a textual analysis of the FET provision at hand. The arbitral 
tribunal in MCI v Ecuador678 held that FET provision in the IIA obliges the countries to 
respect standard of treatment required by  CIL, which arise from the repeated, general and 
constant practice of the state observed because the country is ‘aware that it is obligatory’.679 
The FET provision that had to be interpreted read as follows – ‘Investments shall at all times 
be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in 
no case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law’. This FET 
provision refers to ‘international law’. Such a reference in the provision was used by the MCI 
tribunal, pursuant to use of treaty interpretation methodology, to bring in the notion of CIL in 
interpreting the FET provision.680 Similarly in Genin v Estonia681 it was held that the 
requirement to provide fair and equitable treatment under international law means the 
obligation to provide an international minimum standard devoid of host state’s law but that is 
indeed a minimum standard.682 In this case also, the FET provision had a reference to 
‘international law’. Article II (3) (a) of the US-Estonia IIA, apart from providing for fair and 
equitable treatment, also states that ‘no investment shall be accorded treatment less 
favourable than that required by international law’. On the other hand, the ITA tribunal in 
Total v Argentina, interpreted the FET provision in France-Argentina IIA, which referred to 
‘international law’ differently. The Total tribunal said that reference to ‘international law’ in 
the FET provision didn’t mean treatment required in conformity with MST of aliens under 
CIL.683 According to the tribunal ‘international law’ in the FET provision meant referring to 
international law principles.684     
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An important inference of holding that the FET provision reflects the MST of aliens under 
CIL, will be that whether the host country has violated the FET provision will depend on 
whether host country has violated a rule that is part of CIL.685 This means that the threshold 
for the violation of the FET provision shall be higher in comparison to the threshold required 
for violation of the FET provision if its content is determined using the autonomous 
approach.686 In Genin v Estonia, it was held that – ‘Acts that would violate this minimum 
standard would include acts showing a wilful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action 
falling far below international standards, or even subjective bad faith’.687 A higher threshold 
for the violation of the FET provision will certainly allow host countries more regulatory 
power to pursue non-investment policies without worrying about the violation of the FET 
provision.          
 
However, neither the ‘model-IIA’ or ‘modified-model IIA’ FET formulations, link FET with 
MST of aliens under CIL or have any reference to ‘international law’. In other words, there is 
no textual basis to use the equating approach to interpret the FET provision in these 66 Indian 
IIAs. The tribunal in Enron v Argentina also said that apart from treaties like NAFTA, which 
specifically link the FET standard with MST of aliens under CIL, the FET standard in other 
treaties is broader688 - in other words, cannot be linked to MST of aliens under CIL.   
 
In this regard, the role of Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT, which states, ‘relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’, becomes important.689 It 
needs to be examined whether Article 31(3) (c) can be used to follow the equating approach 
in interpreting the FET provision in ‘model-IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ FET 
formulations. 
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It has been argued that MST of aliens under CIL is a relevant rule under Article 31(3) (c), 
which should guide the determination of the nature of the FET standard.690 One scholar 
relying on Article 31(3) (c) and also on Article 31(4) and 32 of the VCLT has argued that the 
FET standard cannot go beyond the international minimum standard.691 However, the 
universal acceptance of MST of aliens under CIL is still uncertain and its content 
unknown.692 The content of MST of aliens under CIL is as indeterminate693 as the FET 
provision; hence how can one provision (FET in the IIA) be equal to something that is still 
largely unknown (MST of aliens under CIL) especially when the treaty does not provide for 
any such equating. More importantly, an indeterminate concept will fail to pass the test of 
‘applicability’ ‘in the relations between the parties’ under Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT.694 In 
other words, since the content and existence of the MST of aliens under CIL remains 
equivocal, one is not sure whether Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT can play a role in justifying 
the use of the ‘equating approach’ to determine the nature of the FET standard in the ‘model-
IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ formulations.   
 
Another argument made in favour of equating the FET provision with MST of aliens under 
CIL is that since this term, historically, was extremely sensitive, developing countries like 
India may have preferred to use a politically neutral term in the form of FET to convey an 
acceptance of the international minimum standard.695 However, in India’s case there is no 
evidence to support this argument. India copied the western model of investment protection 
treaties, which included the FET provision, in an effort to change its image from being 
unfriendly to foreign investment to being an attractive destination for foreign capital. Since 
the contracting country needed some assurance on treatment of its investment, Indian IIAs 
allowed introduction of the FET provision for investments as a treaty provision without any 
                                                
690 Montt (2009), 303-306. It has been argued that although a customary law is ‘any relevant rule’ under Article 
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691 Montt (2009), 303-306. Also see McLachlan (2008) on the role of Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT in 
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intent of it reflecting MST of aliens under CIL.696 For India, the main guiding principle for 
investment protection has generally been that foreign investment would get the same 
treatment as domestic investment and not as per some international minimum standard.697 
Thus, there was no conscious effort to incorporate the FET standard in its IIAs as a politically 
neutral term for MST of aliens under CIL. This is not surprising in view of the fact that India 
has always opposed the existence of such MST of aliens under CIL. Consequently, it is 
difficult to infer that FET in these 66 Indian IIAs equals the MST of aliens under CIL698 
(Also see the discussion in Section 4.3.3).  
 
Therefore, in view of the arbitral jurisprudence discussed above, there is a much greater 
possibility of interpreting the ‘model-IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ FET formulations in an 
autonomous manner not linked to the MST of aliens under CIL. This, depending on arbitral 
discretion, could result in interpretations giving precedence to investment protection over 
India’s regulatory power.   
 
4.3.2 Interpreting ‘Content-Indicative’ type FET formulation         
 
The three ‘content-indicative’ Indian IIAs with Korea, Japan and Malaysia state that FET 
provision does not require treatment in addition to MST of aliens under CIL. The title of the 
provision containing the FET provision in the India-Malaysia IIA (Article 10.5) and India-
Korea IIA (Article 10.4) is ‘minimum standard of treatment’ and not ‘promotion and 
protection of investment’. In India-Mexico IIA, the FET provision occurs under the heading 
‘Minimum Standard of Treatment’ in Article 5, which is as follows.    
 
1. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments of investors of the other Contracting 
Party fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall not deny justice to investments of investors of the other 
Contracting Party. 
3. For greater certainty: 
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(a) the obligations set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 above do not require treatment in addition 
to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens; and 
(b) a determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of 
a separate international Agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this 
Article. 
 
India-Mexico IIA includes ‘denial of justice’ as part of the FET provision.   
 
The preamble of the India-Malaysia, India-Korea, India-Japan IIAs refer to multiple values 
such as ‘rights to pursue economic philosophies suited to their development goals’; ‘rights to 
realise their national policy objectives’; and ‘optimal use of natural resources in accordance 
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment’.699 The preamble in the India-Mexico IIA is not as elaborate as three IIAs 
mentioned above; however, it does contain values like ‘economic prosperity’. Apart from this 
the treaty provisions in these IIAs also contain provisions that recognise the importance of 
exercise of regulatory power.700 Thus, the context and the object and purpose of these three 
agreements are not just investment protection and promotion. These IIAs talk of achieving 
investment promotion and protection in a manner harmonious with India’s ability to exercise 
regulatory power. 
 
The ‘content-indicative’ FET formulations resemble the FET formulation that exists in 
NAFTA after the FTC interpretation note. This note was a response to the Pope and Talbot 
ruling701 through which NAFTA member countries intended that the FET standard 
incorporates customary international law standard and nothing more.702 Though, the content 
of MST remains a moot point the understanding clearly seems to be that it is more stringent 
than an autonomous FET standard.703  
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Since FET provision in these IIAs is linked to MST of aliens under CIL, the ‘content-
indicative’ FET formulations support adopting the ‘equating approach’ to interpret the FET 
provisions. Accordingly, the content of the FET provision will be determined by determining 
the content of the MST of aliens under CIL. This will require determining India’s consistent 
state practice and whether this practice is being followed because of a sense of legal 
obligation or not (opino juris). This will have to be factually ascertained.704 In other words, to 
show that India has violated the FET provision, it will have to be shown that India has 
violated CIL. While ascertaining state practice is not so difficult, establishing opino juris is 
certainly challenging. The Glamis tribunal stated that the onus is on the claimant to establish 
a change in custom.705  
 
In the context of NAFTA, different arbitral tribunals have provided different thresholds to 
determine whether a country has violated the MST of aliens under CIL. In Glamis Gold v 
United States, a NAFTA tribunal held that the Neer standard was still the relevant standard to 
determine whether a country has violated the MST of aliens under CIL.706 This will require a 
very high threshold for the violation of the FET provision. Other NAFTA tribunals have held 
that MST of aliens under CIL has evolved beyond the Neer standard and that the threshold 
for the violation of the FET provision is not as high as the Neer standard.707 However, even 
these tribunals have held that the threshold for the violation of the FET provision still remains 
high.708 For example, the tribunal in Waste Management v Mexico stated that the FET 
provision will be violated if the host state’s conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, or involves 
lack of due process.709 India supports the Waste Management tribunal’s approach of requiring 
a high threshold for the violation of the FET provision.710  
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A much lower threshold for the violation of MST of aliens under CIL was given by the 
NAFTA tribunal in Merrill and Ring v Canada. The tribunal made a distinction between 
evolution of minimum standard in a limited context as specified in the Neer context, on the 
one hand, and evolution of minimum standard in the context of business, trade and 
investment, on the other.711 Giving an extremely expansive interpretation to FET, the tribunal 
held ‘A requirement that aliens be treated fairly and equitably in relation to business, trade 
and investment […] has become sufficiently part of widespread and consistent practice so as 
to demonstrate that it is reflected today in customary international law as opinio juris. In the 
end, the name assigned to the standard does not really matter. What matters is that the 
standard protects against all such acts or behavior that might infringe a sense of fairness, 
equity and reasonableness.’712 The Merrill and Ring tribunal significantly lowered the 
threshold for the violation of the FET provision. It gave a broader meaning to the FET 
provision notwithstanding the treaty clearly stating that it is no more than MST of aliens 
under CIL.713 As per this approach, the MST of aliens under CIL has evolved so as to 
converge with the content of an autonomous FET standard as developed by arbitral 
jurisprudence. Thus, not just denial of justice and due process but even maintaining a 
transparent and predictable legal system and honouring the legitimate expectations of foreign 
investors are part of CIL.714 Such an interpretation removes any distinction between the two 
formulations. Sir Ian Brownlie has criticised this tendency of some tribunals and writers to 
give the international minimum standard a very ambitious content.715  
 
Adopting the Merrill and Ring approach to ‘content-indicative’ IIAs will make the difference 
between ‘content-indicative’ FET formulations and ‘model IIA’ and ‘modified model IIA’ 
FET formulations, redundant. As per the Merrill and Ring approach, FET in ‘content-
indicative’ IIAs is to be expansively interpreted with lower threshold, which is same as would 
be the case for autonomous FET provision. This reasoning ignores the key differences in the 
context and the object and purpose of the two different types of IIAs. As it has been discussed 
above the context and the object and purpose of the Indian IIAs containing ‘model IIA’ and 
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‘modified model IIA’ FET formulations is very different from the ‘content-indicative’ IIAs. 
To argue that in spite of this, FET standard in both types of IIAs has the same meaning is not 
persuasive. India has deliberately adopted a different formulation of the FET standard in the 
‘content-indicative’ IIAs and hence the intent is to have a meaning different from the ‘model-
IIA’ and ‘modified-model IIA’ FET formulations.  
 
The discussion above once again demonstrates the existence of arbitral discretion even with 
respect to FET formulations where the FET provision is linked to MST of aliens under CIL. 
Glamis and Merrill and Ring approaches show the two extremes of this discretion. Hence, 
one is unsure which way arbitral discretion will be exercised for the ‘content-indicative’ FET 
formulations. The approach adopted by the Merrill and Ring tribunal is discussed further 
below under the ‘convergence approach’.    
 
4.3.3 Convergence Approach - Is providing fair and equitable treatment part of CIL for 
India?  
 
Convergence approach signifies that the FET provision has become part of CIL. Hence, the 
content of an autonomous FET is identical to the MST of aliens under CIL. Some tribunals 
adopting the autonomous approach to interpreting the FET standard have asserted that the 
content of FET determined by adopting the autonomous approach also forms part of the MST 
of aliens under CIL.716 For instance, the CMS tribunal after adopting the autonomous 
approach to FET interpretation and having determined that Argentina had violated the FET 
provision came to the conclusion that MST of aliens under CIL has evolved and is now same 
as the expanded and autonomous FET provision.717 The tribunal reached to this conclusion in 
just three paragraphs.718 Another way of stating this argument will be that countries are now 
under a customary international law obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment to 
foreign investors and the content of the FET will be determined by using the autonomous 
approach.719 The central argument of those who make this assertion is that repeated 
appearance of the FET provision in IIAs over a period of time and by so many countries has 
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resulted in a metamorphosis of the FET provision into a customary international law 
principle.720 This has been countered by other scholars who have argued that numerical 
explosion of IIAs cannot contribute to identifying the content of an international minimum 
standard because none of these IIAs give the content of that standard.721 The content of the 
FET standard is still subject to a wide degree of debate not just amongst commentators but 
also among tribunals who have given the FET provision different meanings (issue discussed 
throughout the chapter).722 Thus, how can a state have a customary international law 
obligation of a standard whose content is unknown? As Sornarajah has argued ‘emptiness 
multiplied several times over can still produce only emptiness’.723  
 
The convergence approach suffers from a serious methodological flaw. It has been rightly 
argued that none of the tribunals that adopt the ‘convergence approach’ have shown that what 
is claimed to be part of CIL fulfils the conditions of consistent state practice and the fact that 
countries have been following such practices from a sense of legal obligation.724 The 
tribunals reach this conclusion simply on the basis of the previous arbitral tribunals. For 
example, the tribunal in Duke Energy v Ecuador only cited Azurix and CMS tribunals as the 
basis to come to the conclusion that the FET standard has converged with the minimum 
standard.725  
 
Adopting the convergence approach would put India under an obligation to treat Singaporean 
and Turkish investors fairly and equitably in the sense in which FET is understood in arbitral 
jurisprudence even if India’s IIAs with Singapore and Turkey do not contain the FET 
provision. Not just that, India will be bound to provide fair and equitable treatment to all 
foreign investors even in situations where India has not signed an IIA with their home 
countries.726 In other words, proving fair and equitable treatment will become like a de facto 
multilateral obligation that India will owe to all foreign investors.    
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It is useful to reflect on India’s practice on this issue to show that India has looked at the FET 
provision merely as a treaty standard and nothing more. India resisted the attempt to have a 
multilateral agreement on investment under the aegis of the WTO. Thus, India refused to bind 
itself to multilateral rules on investment protection.727  India, in its submission to the WTO, 
said that it has consciously adopted a bilateral model to undertake international investment 
commitments aimed at attracting investment flows.728 While recording the salient features of 
Indian IIAs, signed till 1999, India listed FET under the heading of ‘investment 
protection’.729 It linked the FET provision to investment protection as a useful treaty standard 
at the bilateral level.730  
 
India’s opposition to a multilateral agreement on investment was reaffirmed by the Indian 
Commerce minister at the Seattle Ministerial meeting of the WTO.731 The minister stated 
categorically that India does not subscribe to the view that a multilateral framework on 
investment is either necessary or desirable.732 This position was repeated by subsequent 
Commerce ministers of different political parties at subsequent ministerial conferences of the 
WTO.733 At the Cancun ministerial conference, held in 2003, Indian commerce minister, 
Arun Jaitley, stated that a multilateral agreement on investment ‘will certainly curtail the 
policy space of developing countries’.734 India argued that bilateral IIAs on the basis of 
economic need are a much better way to attract FDI rather than agreeing to multilateral rules 
such as providing fair and equitable treatment to foreign investments of all WTO member 
countries.735 This clearly shows that India has opposed any effort to be bound by investment 
protection rules multilaterally (FET provision becoming part of CIL will bind India 
multilaterally). It also signals India’s intention to be bound by obligations like FET only in 
IIAs at the bilateral level where it has voluntarily undertaken to be bound by it and not 
otherwise.   
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Further support for the argument that India looks at the FET provision in its IIAs purely for 
attracting foreign investments comes from the recent statement of India’s Finance Minister.736 
While introducing the Indian IIA programme in the compendium of Indian IIAs, the minister 
stated that IIAs provide an enabling environment for flow of global investments by ensuring 
fair and equitable treatment on reciprocal basis.737 This statement links FET to reciprocity 
where both India and its treaty partner country owe each other the obligation to treat each 
other’s investment fairly and equitably. This reciprocal arrangement has its basis in the IIA. 
Stated differently, since the obligation of fair and equitable treatment is owed on a reciprocal 
basis, India does not owe this obligation to any foreign investment not falling under an IIA or 
if the IIA does not contain this provision.738      
 
This clearly shows that FET provision in Indian IIAs is only a treaty standard and will bind 
India only in situations where India has voluntarily undertaken this obligation and not as a 
standard of CIL. At any rate, it is untenable to argue that India has an obligation under CIL to 
treat foreign investors fairly and equitably when what is fair and equitable standard still 




FET provision is an important provision in Indian IIAs. This chapter discussed the FET 
provision in 71 Indian IIAs and found that in a very large number of these 70 IIAs there is no 
indication of the meaning of the FET provision. The use of treaty interpretation tools also do 
not give a definite meaning of this term although these rules lend weight to adopting 
interpretations that give precedence to investment protection over India’s regulatory power. 
Further, the arbitral discussion on the FET provision undertaken to understand the meaning of 
the FET provision shows that arbitral tribunals have developed the concept of legitimate 
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expectations as part of the FET provision though the meaning of legitimate expectation 
amongst tribunals is different. Further, the arbitral understanding of legitimate expectations 
goes beyond the understanding of this term in Indian law. The chapter has also shown that 
whether the FET provision in Indian IIAs will be interpreted in a manner that balances 
investment protection with India’s regulatory power will depend on arbitral discretion due to 
































CHAPTER 5  
 
MONETARY TRANSFER PROVISIONS   
 
Monetary Transfer Provisions (MTPs) in IIAs regulate the transfer of funds related to 
investment in and out of the host country.740 MTPs are an integral part of the investment 
treaty based protection offered to foreign investment by the host state. A typical MTP in IIA 
identifies the ‘transfer’ or ‘payment’ to which the provision applies and also provides the 
conditions governing such transfers such as whether the transfer is to be made in foreign 
currency and whether the transfer can be made promptly.741 In most IIAs, MTPs cover all 
‘transfers’ or ‘payments’ related to investment.742 Further, depending on the treaty language, 
MTPs cover both inflows and outflows of funds.743 These ‘transfers’ include –  additional 
capital to maintain and increase investment; net operating profits including dividends; 
repayment of any loan including interest; proceeds from sales of their shares, etc.744  
 
MTPs are important for foreign investors because they provide the freedom to transfer all 
funds related to investment for a number of business related needs.745 For example, a foreign 
investor may need to bring in additional capital to support her existing investment or might 
need to repatriate capital back to the home country in order to service debts or to pay 
dividends or to repatriate proceeds of sale of investment, etc.746 Lack of freedom to transfer 
funds related to investment may result in investment not being made in the first place because 
foreign investors will be deprived of the benefits accruing from the investment (such as 
repatriating profits) and will also not have the freedom to work their investment (like 
bringing in additional capital to support the existing investment).747 Thus, a foreign investor 
will like to have a broad MTP in an IIA allowing prompt transfer of all funds related to 
investment in foreign currency with limited or no exceptions to this right.  
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The freedom to transfer funds – in and out of the country  will affect the host country’s 
capital account. Capital account is part of the balance of payments (BoP) account of a country 
reflecting the net change in asset ownership nationally. The BoP account also has a current 
account  which gives the sum of trade balance, net factor income and net transfer 
payments.748 The extent of liberalisation of the capital account of a country depends on the 
capital controls (restrictions that affect the capital account of a country’s BoP) imposed. 
Lesser the controls on capital flows greater will be capital account liberalisation. When these 
controls are completely eliminated we have full Capital Account Convertibility (CAC).  
 
Imposing capital controls is widely recognised as an integral part of the monetary sovereignty 
of a country.749 Capital controls can be of different types like quantity based, price based or 
even administrative or regulatory in nature.750 Quantity based capital controls include – 
minimum stay requirement (for example a country may require that foreign capital invested 
should stay in the host country for a minimum period). Such a capital control is aimed at 
reducing the volatility in capital flows. Price based capital controls include – taxes on capital 
inflows, which might help in stabilising the exchange rate – a case in point is Brazil’s taxes 
on capital inflows imposed in 2009.751 Some capital controls like the unremunerated reserve 
requirement (URR) falls both under price and quantity capital control.752 One can also have 
regulatory capital controls such as prohibiting certain kind of foreign investments or not 
allowing investments in certain sectors or in certain assets.  
 
MTPs, per se, do not prohibit the imposition of capital controls. However, the extent to which 
a host country will be able to impose capital controls on capital account transactions will 
depend on how the MTP in the IIA has been formulated.753 MTP formulation that allows for 
prompt transfer of all funds without recognising any exception to this right to transfer, will 
pose problems in imposition of capital controls by the host state. In other words, if the 
provision on monetary transfer does not recognise exceptions to transfer of capital, then a 
capital control measure adopted by the host state can be challenged by the foreign investor in 
                                                
748 Krugman and Obstfled (8th edition).   
749 Lastra (2006), 22; Qureshi and Ziegler (2011), 147.  
750 Gallahger (2010); Rangarajan (2000), 4424.   
751 ‘Brazil fights Capital Inflows’, Deutsche Bank Research available at 
http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000251631.pdf.   
752 Gallahger (2010), 4. URR is a type of capital control requiring a certain percentage of short term capital 
inflow to be kept in deposit in local currency for a certain period of time and hence it has the characteristic of 
both price and quantity based control. 




ITA as a violation of the MTP. 250 economists, from around the world, in their letter to the 
US Secretary of State, the treasury secretary and the US trade representative have drawn their 
attention to this problem by focusing on America’s trade and investment treaties that restrict 
the ability of America’s trade partners to impose capital controls.754 The letter said “the 
‘capital transfers’ provisions of such agreements require governments to permit all transfers 
relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of its 
territory”.755     
 
In this light, the chapter will study MTPs in 73 Indian IIAs to find out whether they can be 
interpreted in a manner that is supportive of India’s regulatory power to adopt capital controls 
to meet different policy objectives without breaching the IIA? In order to fully appreciate the 
relationship between MTPs and India’s regulatory power to impose capital controls, this 
chapter will start by focusing on the significance of capital controls and the merits and 
demerits of Capital Account Convertibility (CAC) in the global and Indian context (Section 
5.1). Section 5.2 will study the anatomy of MTPs in Indian IIAs discussing their salient 
features and the differences that exist in their formulation. Section 5.3 will focus on two types 
of MTPs occurring in Indian IIAs – ‘free-transfer’ type and ‘regulatory-transfer’ type and 
will analyse their implications on India’s regulatory power.   
 
5.1 GLOBAL DEBATE ON CAC  
 
Whether unrestricted and free mobility of capital is good for countries or whether countries 
should regulate capital flows are moot questions on which economic opinion is divided. The 
                                                
754 ‘Economists Urge US to Rethink Capital-Control Restrictions’ available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/01/31/economists-urge-us-to-rethink-capital-control-restrictions/. Also see 
the open letter written by more than 100 economists on 28 February 2012 to the trade ministers of nine countries 
(USA, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Chile and Vietnam) to consider 
having provisions for imposition of capital controls in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement available at 
http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/TPPAletter.html#statement.       
755 Id. Also see the open letter written by more than 100 economists on 28 February 2012 to the trade ministers 
of nine countries (USA, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Chile and 
Vietnam) to consider having provisions for imposition of capital controls in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement available at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/TPPAletter.html#statement. It is also 
important to note that there are many causes of massive and sudden inflow and outflow of capital. Activities of 
foreign investors, though important, constitute one of the many factors. Capital inflows and outflows also take 
place when citizens of the host country transfer money abroad or domestic companies raise money in the 
international market – also called external commercial borrowings or domestic companies invest abroad, etc. In 
other words, those capital controls that do not affect the activities of foreign investors will fall outside the 




global financial crisis of 2008756 has further intensified the debate on this issue.757 On the one 
hand, some economists like Stanley Fischer of the IMF have argued that free capital 
movement will facilitate an efficient global allocation of savings and channelise resources 
into their most productive uses758 – such as ensuring the flow of capital from developed 
countries (where the return to capital is less) to capital-scarce developing countries (where 
the return to capital is high), which in turn, will result in reducing the cost of capital in 
developing countries and result in more investment and growth.759 On the other hand, free or 
unrestricted capital movement, in a country, can increase economic volatility due to large and 
sudden capital inflows and outflows.760 Large infusions of capital can have adverse 
macroeconomic consequences like appreciation of the country’s currency and hence reducing 
export competitiveness and widening the current account deficit; it can also result in inflation 
by increasing the money supply, which, in turn can have other adverse macroeconomic 
consequences.761 Similarly, large and sudden outflow of capital can have a run on the foreign 
exchange reserves of the country resulting in depreciation of the currency and adversely 
affecting the country’s ability to meet its international financial obligations (such as financing 
its imports).762 It is for these reasons that noted economists like Dani Rodrik,763 Jagdish 
Bhagwati764 and Joseph Stiglitz765 have questioned the benefits of capital account 
liberalisation. Rodrik has argued, on the basis of a sample of 100 countries (for the period 
1973-1996) that there is no evidence to show that countries without capital controls have 
grown faster or invested more or have experienced lower inflation.766 Referring to the East 
Asian currency crisis, Bhagwati argues, how loosening of the capital account controls by 
these countries resulted in these countries getting excessively burdened by short term debt 
capital, which eventually lowered the growth rate of these countries drastically.767 Stiglitz has 
                                                
756 This crisis started as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the USA and then snowballed into a global financial 
crisis affecting not just developed but also developing countries  for a detailed analysis of the crisis see – Islam 
and Nallari (2010); Jones, Ocampo and Stiglitz (2008). According to economic historians this is not the first 
time that a financial crisis has occurred since the 17th century; the world has witnessed 10 major financial crises 
Kindelberger and Aliber (2005), 8. 
757 Arestis and Singh (2010), 225-38; Frenkel and Rapetti (2009), 685; Ocampo, Spiegel and Stiglitz (2008).    
758 Fisher (1998), 2.   
759  Id. Also see Fischer (2003), 1; Rogoff (1999), 21; Summers (2000), 1.   
760 Ocompo and Palma (2008), 170.  
761 Salacuse (2010), 256.  
762 Id.  
763 Rodrik (1998), 55-65.  
764 Bhagwati (1998), 7-12.   
765 Stiglitz (1999), 1508-1521; Stiglitz (2000), 1075-1086; Stiglitz (2002); Stiglitz (2008), 76-90.    
766 Rodrik (1998), 62. In this regard also see – Prasad et al (2003) - which shows that liberalisation of capital 
markets in developing countries is not connected with economic growth.  




been a very strong critic of capital market liberalisation and has argued in several of his 
writings that capital market liberalisation has resulted in more economic insecurity and not 
economic growth.768 
 
The world has witnessed many currency crises in the last two decades or so, like the East 
Asian crisis in 1997;769 the Mexican crisis in 1994;770 crisis in Latin America, over the last 
two decades, due to surges of capital outflows and inflows;771 and the global financial crisis 
of 2008,772 with mass inflows and outflows of capital across borders,773 “which has changed 
the focus from liberalisation to the regulation of capital liberalisation”.774 Many countries 
have successfully adopted capital controls, as a policy tool, to regulate the inflow or outflow 
of capital as per their policy priorities. For example, Chile adopted URR to stem the short 
term volatile inflow of capital and was successful in altering the composition of the capital 
inflow to medium and long term capital inflows.775 In 2007, Colombia’s capital controls 
helped it to mitigate some of the adverse effect of the global financial crisis.776 It has also 
been stated that countries that adopted capital controls in years leading to the financial crisis 
of 2008 were among the least hard hit by the financial crisis.777 Further, an IMF study shows 
that certain situations may warrant imposition of capital controls and thus, such controls are 
an important tool in a country’s policy arsenal.778  
                                                
768 Stiglitz (2008), 76-77. In this regard also see – Henry (2007). 
769 Five countries in East Asia - South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines – faced a financial 
crisis in 1997 when there was a turnaround of $ 86 billion of capital flows from a net inflow of $ 66 billion in 
1996 to a net outflow of $ 20 billion in 1997. This volatility in capital flows resulted in depreciation of the 
currencies of these countries against the US dollar and combined with other factors resulted in drastically 
reducing the growth rate of these countries. For more on the crisis see – Rangrajan (2000), 4421; Kawai, 
Newfarmer and Schmukler (2001).   
770 The Mexican crisis occurred, inter alia, due to reversal of portfolio flows from a peak inflow of $ 20 billion 
in 1993 to net outflow of $ 15 billion in 1995 - Rangrajan (2000), 4423. For a detailed analysis of the Mexican 
crisis see – Gil-Diaz (1997). Also see Lowenfeld (1988), 1061; Lowenfeld (2008), 688-94.  
771 Ocompo and Palma (2008). 
772 This crisis started as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the USA and then snowballed into a global financial 
crisis affecting not just developed but also developing countries.  For a detailed analysis of the crisis see – Islam 
and Nallari (2010); Jones, Ocampo and Stiglitz (eds).  
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774 Qureshi and Zeigler (2011), 217. Also see Hagan (2010), 955.   
775 Le Fort and Lehmann (2003), 50.  
776 Coelho and Gallagher (2010).  
777 Ostry et al (2011). Recently, Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff, rebuked industrialised countries for 
creating a “liquidity tsunami” of speculative capital, which is being tackled by Brazil by extending the tax on 
speculative inflows of capital in Brazil – See Gallagher (2012).    
778 Ostry et al (2010). For a discussion on this note see – Chandrashekar (2010), 10-11; Subramaniam (2010), 
15-17. Also see ‘IMF Backs Capital Controls in Brazil, India’ available at 
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/127011/imf-backs-capital-controls-brazil.html. Other successful 
examples of capital controls on inflows are in Malaysia (in 1994); Colombia (in 1993) and Thailand - Magub 





The IMF Articles even allow its member countries to impose restrictions on their capital 
account transactions. Article VI.3 of these Articles provides that member countries may 
impose controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movement.779 However, the 
member countries while exercising control on international capital movement have to ensure 
that these controls are not exercised in a manner that will restrict payments on current 
account since IMF Articles prohibit such restrictions. Article VIII.2 of the IMF Articles 
provides that subject to certain provisions780 no member country shall impose restrictions on 
the payment of transfers for current international transactions.781 If a member country has to 
impose restrictions on current account restrictions, then it will have to take the permission of 
the IMF.782 An attempt was made in 1997 to amend the Fund articles so as to outlaw 
imposition of controls on capital account transactions.783 The purpose was to extend the 
jurisdiction of the IMF to capital account.784 However, this proposal was abandoned785 due to 
lack of political consensus.786     
 
5.1.1 Debate on CAC in India  
 
The debate on CAC and whether India should exercise capital controls started with the 
adoption of liberalised economic policies in early 1990s. India’s approach to opening of 
capital account has been very cautious and gradual especially because of the BoP crisis that 
India faced in 1990-91.787 India has used different forms of capital controls like regulatory 
controls, which are used, for example, to keep foreign investments out of certain sectors like 
multi-brand retail. It has been argued that this cautious approach and India’s capital controls 
                                                                                                                                                  
on inflows whereas the evidence of benefits on capital control on outflows is inconclusive - Magub and Reinhart 
(2006); Gallahger (2010). 
779 Lowenfeld (2008), 608.  
780 These provisions are – Article VIII 3(b) and Article XIV2 of the IMF Articles. Also important to note that 
once a country notifies to the IMF its willingness to accept the obligations contained in Article VIII, there is no 
going back – Lowenfeld (2008), 607.  
781 A majority of membership of IMF is now under Article VIII regime – see Qureshi and Ziegler (2011), 205. 
For a detailed analysis of the IMF Articles and capital and current account transactions see – Gold (1971); 
Edwards (1985); Qureshi and Ziegler (2011), 202-25; Lowenfeld (2008), 606-22.  
782 Article VIII 2 of the IMF Articles. 
783 Fischer (1997), 9.  
784 Id. 
785 Qureshi and Ziegler (2011), 217 where  it is argued that IMF encouraged capital liberalisation but there is no 
evidence to support the claim that IMF required capital liberalisation per se. Also see IMF (2005).  
786 Waibel (2009), 501. In this regard also see Holder (1998), 407. 




played an important role in avoiding contagion of the East Asian crisis spreading to India.788 
Economists in India have been debating merits and demerits of capital controls and CAC.789 
 
In 1997, a committee was constituted by India’s central bank – Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
(the Tarapore committee – hereinafter called Tarapore I790) to look at the possibility of fuller 
CAC in India.791 This committee recommended movement towards CAC in a phased manner 
provided there was fiscal consolidation, a mandated inflation target and strengthening of the 
financial system.792 However, this report was followed by the East Asian currency crisis and 
as a result movement towards full CAC was put on the back burner. In 2006, another 
committee was constituted to study CAC, under the leadership of SS Tarapore (same person 
who headed the first committee also called Tarapore committee – hereinafter Tarapore II). 
This committee also recommended that movement towards fuller CAC will require a better 
management of the liquidity risk, strengthening of the banking system and also fiscal 
consolidation.793    
 
Although, over the years, India has certainly opened its capital account, it still imposes 
different capital controls. Furthermore, since India does not follow a pre-entry approach in its 
IIAs any restriction such as outright prohibition on capital inflow like in multi-brand retail is 
compatible with India’s IIA obligations. The financial crisis of 2008 calls for a cautious 
approach towards capital accounts liberalisation.794 IMF’s India Sustainability Report of 2011 
very categorically states that ‘the full removal of capital controls must, however, be mindful 
of the risks involved, including a possible increase in domestic interest rates (if Indian 
financial intermediaries decide to move assets abroad), as well as higher volatility of interest 
rates which could be damaging for growth. Furthermore, as capital controls strengthened 
                                                
788 Joshi (2001), 317. 
789 Sen (2007), 292; Prasad (2009); Barua (2006), 1875; Mecklai and Chandrasekhar (2006), 1878.  
790 This committee was headed by SS Tarapore and hence is called the Tarapore committee. 
791 Report of the Committee on Capital Account Convertibility (1997) available at 
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India’s resilience to potentially destabilizing outflows during the recent crisis, authorities 
must retain sufficient flexibility to put them in place if circumstances dictate doing so.’795  
 
India’s sovereign right to impose controls on capital account for different policy priorities is 
consistent with India’s obligations under Article VI(3) of the IMF Articles.796 This sovereign 
right to impose restrictions on capital account transactions has been codified in the Indian law 
on foreign exchange called the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA Act) enacted in 
1999. According to the preamble of the FEMA Act, the purpose of this legislation is - ‘an Act 
to consolidate and amend the law relating to foreign exchange with the objective of 
facilitating external trade and payments and for promoting the orderly development and 
maintenance of foreign exchange market in India’. Section 5 of FEMA Act talks of current 
account transactions. It states that ‘any person may sell or draw foreign exchange … if such 
sale or drawl is current account transaction’. Current account transaction is defined in 
Section 2(j) of the FEMA Act - as a transaction other than a capital account transaction. 
Apart from this general definition, Section 2(j) also gives an illustrative list of current 
account transactions:    
 
i. payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, 
services, and short-term banking and credit facilities in the ordinary course of 
business, 
ii. payments due as interest on loans and as net income from investments, 
iii. remittances for living expenses of parents, spouse and children residing 
abroad, and 
iv. expenses in connection with foreign travel, education and medical care of 
parents, spouse and children. 
 
Section 5 also allows for imposition of reasonable restrictions for current account transactions 
in public interest. Section 6 of the FEMA Act talks of capital account transactions. Capital 
account transaction is defined in Section 2(e) of the FEMA Act as ‘a transaction which alters 
the assets or liabilities, including contingent liabilities, outside India of persons resident in 
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796 India cannot impose restrictions on current account transactions after it became an Article VIII member 





India or assets or liabilities in India of persons resident outside India...’ The Tarapore I 
committee defined it as ‘freedom of currency conversion in relation to capital transactions in 
terms of inflows and outflows’.797 When this freedom is absolute, it will be a case of full 
CAC.   
 
Section 6(1) allows for capital account transactions; however, this is subject to section 6(2), 
which gives the power to RBI to specify, in consultation with the central government – any 
class or classes of capital account transactions which are permissible798 and the limit up to 
which foreign exchange shall be admissible for such transactions.799 Also, section 6(3) gives 
power to the RBI to prohibit, restrict or regulate a number of capital account transactions.800 
Thus, in other words, the capital account transactions are not free and are subject to a number 
of regulatory controls. The central bank of India has the power to impose restrictions or adopt 
capital controls to regulate capital account transactions.    
 
However, a twist in India’s tale on CAC and capital controls is provided by the obligations 
that India has undertaken in its IIAs. The chapter now discusses these issues.   
 
5.2 ANATOMY OF MTPs IN INDIAN IIAs  
 
This chapter has studied 73 Indian IIAs including the Indian model IIA. All the 73 Indian 
IIAs studied contain MTPs. In other words, transfers of funds related to investment is an 
integral part of all Indian IIAs.  
 
Article 7 of the Indian model IIA provides:   
 
 Repatriation of Investment and Returns 
 
(l) Each Contracting Party shall permit all funds of an investor of the other Contracting 
Party related to an investment in its territory to be freely transferred, without unreasonable 
delay and on a non-discriminatory basis. Such funds may include: 
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(a) Capital and additional capital amounts used to maintain and increase investments; 
(b) Net operating profits including dividends and interest in proportion to their share-
holdings; 
(c) Repayments of any loan including interest thereon, relating to the investment; 
(d) Payment of royalties and services fees relating to the investment; 
(e) Proceeds from sales of their shares; 
(f) Proceeds received by investors in case of sale or partial sale or liquidation; 
(g) The earnings of citizens/nationals of one Contracting Party who work in connection with 
investment in the territory of the other Contracting Party. 
 
(2) Nothing in paragraph (l) of this Article shall affect the transfer of any compensation 
under Article 6 of this Agreement. 
 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed to between the parties, currency transfer under paragraph (1) of 
this Article shall be permitted in the currency of the original investment or any other 
convertible currency. Such transfer shall be made at the prevailing market rate of exchange 
on the date of transfer. 
 
The MTPs in 73 Indian IIAs follow the same structure. They all provide a general obligation 
that all funds related to investment can be freely transferred followed by a list of transactions 
that are allowed. Barring a few exceptions, in all IIAs, this list is inclusive. The MTPs in all 
these 73 Indian IIAs can be divided in two categories on the basis of exceptions to the right of 
the foreign investor to freely transfer funds. These two types are “free-transfer” and 
“regulatory-transfer”. The key difference between these two types is that the “free-transfer” 
MTPs do not contain any exception to the right of the foreign investor to transfer funds 
whereas “regulatory-transfer” MTPs recognise exceptions to free transfer of capital. 58 IIAs 
have “free transfer” MTPs whereas 15 IIAs have “regulatory-transfer” MTPs (Table 5.1). 
Before discussing these two types of MTPs (in Section 5.3), the chapter will discuss other 








Table 5.1 - Anatomy of MTPs in 73 Indian IIAs 
 
Type  Number of IIAs 
‘Free-transfer’ type  58 
‘Regulatory-transfer’ type 15 
 
Source – Author’s study of 73 Indian IIAs    
 
5.2.1 Coverage of ‘transfer of funds’  
 
Coverage of ‘transfer of funds’ relates to two things. First, whether the MTP covers only 
outflow or inflow of funds or both; and second, whether it includes all funds related to 
investment to be transferred or is it limited to only certain categories of funds related to 
investment.    
 
Inflows and Outflows  
 
The title of the MTP in many of these 73 Indian IIAs is ‘Repatriation of Investments and 
Returns’. This title connotes that the majority of MTPs in Indian IIAs include only outflow of 
funds and not inflows. However, the text of MTPs in these IIAs contain the following words 
‘all funds of an investor of the other Contracting Party related to an investment in its 
territory to be freely transferred, without unreasonable delay and on a non-discriminatory 
basis’. Giving ordinary meaning to these words as per Article 31(1) of the VCLT, one can 
say that the provision covers both inflows and outflows of funds because of the use of the 
words ‘all funds’ and not just ‘funds’ related to investment. Further confirmation of this point 
comes from the following specific transaction provided in the provision on monetary transfer 
– ‘capital and additional capital amounts used to maintain and increase investments’- which 
means that the investor is allowed to bring in additional capital to maintain his existing 
investment.801 In this regard, it is important to note that Article 94 of the India-Japan IIA, 
titled transfers, specifically states that all transfers can be freely made ‘into and out of its 
area’ thus expressly stating that the MTP covers both inflows and outflows.  
                                                




All transfer of funds  
 
The next issue in ‘coverage of transfers’ is whether MTPs in Indian IIAs cover all kinds of 
transfers (in and out of the country) or is it limited to specific types of transfers. Out of the 73 
Indian IIAs studied, in 70 IIAs, after mentioning that all funds can be transferred, an 
illustrative list of the transfer of funds is provided. This list in these 70 IIAs is inclusive 
meaning thereby that the list is open ended or non exhaustive (see Table 5.2). In other words, 
since the list is illustrative, other transfer of funds, not mentioned in the list, are also included. 
The only limitation recognised is that the transfer of funds should be related to an investment. 
Any transfer of funds that is ‘not’ related to investment is outside the scope of the MTP.802   
 
However, in 3 Indian IIAs [India-Denmark – Article 7 (1), India-Italy – Article 7 (1), India-
Belgium – Article 7 (1)], the list of transfer of funds is exhaustive. In these 3 IIAs, the word 
‘includes’ is not present and hence the argument that the list is exhaustive or closed. For 
example, Article 7(1) of India-Denmark IIA states that ‘Each Contracting Party shall with 
respect to investments in territory by investors of the other Contracting Party allow the free 
transfer of’. This is then followed by a list of funds that can be transferred. Since the treaty 
does not mention words like ‘include’ or ‘may include’ arguably a Danish investor from India 
can transfer only those funds related to investment that are enumerated in the treaty and not 
transfer any other funds related to investment.  
 
Table 5.2 – Coverage of Transfer of funds related to investment in Indian IIAs 
 
Non Exhaustive coverage of 
transfer of funds  
Exhaustive coverage 
of transfer of funds  
70 IIAs  3 IIAs  
 
Source – Author’s study of 73 Indian IIAs 
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transfer that is not ‘related to investment’ was outside the scope of Article V of the US-Argentina IIA. Article V 
of the US-Argentina IIA, like Article 7 of the India model IIA, is broad and covers all transfers related to 




5.2.2 Unreasonable Delay 
 
Out of the 73 Indian IIAs studied, 66 of them provide for a transfer of capital without delay 
(See Table 5.3). Only two Indian IIAs – India-Belgium - Article 7 (1) and India-Argentina – 
Article 7 (1) are silent on whether the funds can be transferred without delay or not. Out of 
the 66 IIAs, that allow transfer of funds without delay, 62 of them provide that foreign 
investors are allowed to transfer funds without unreasonable delay – thus, further qualifying 
the delay requirement. In other words, these MTPs allow for a reasonable delay in transfer of 
capital. However, none of these IIAs, barring five of them, provide any indication as to how 
to find out whether a delay is unreasonable or reasonable. In five IIAs – [India-Denmark -  
Article 7 (1); India-Germany – Article 7 (1); India-Spain – Article 8 (1); India-Austria – 
Article 6 (1); and India-Saudi Arabia – Article 6], there is a reference to the time duration. In 
these five IIAs, if the delay is for more than the stipulated time allowed, then the delay will 
become unreasonable. The time period in these IIAs varies from one to three months from the 
date when the request for transfer is made.  
 




Delay requirement  ‘delay requirement’ 
not mentioned  
Unreasonable delay 
requirement in terms 
of time duration 
62 IIAs 4 IIAs 2 IIAs 5 IIAs  
     
Source: Author’s survey of 73 Indian IIAs.   
 
5.2.3 Currency of Transfer   
 
One of the important issues that will arise each time the foreign investor wishes to transfer 
capital is in which currency can the foreign investor make the transfer? More specifically, if 
the foreign investor wishes to repatriate capital back to her home country, then the question 
will be whether the host country allows her to convert capital into a foreign currency that is     
accepted at the international level or not. If, the host country does not let the investor 




will frustrate the very purpose of having a MTP in the IIA. On the other hand, in certain 
situations such as in the event of an external payment crisis or in situations of BoP difficulty, 
the freedom to choose any currency for transfer could have an adverse macroeconomic 
impact on India. For example, in case of an external financial difficulty, India will like to 
avoid a run on its foreign reserves held in US dollars. Thus, in such a situation, India might 
face difficulty if US dollar is chosen as the currency of transfer by the foreign investor.   
 
Table 5.4 – Currency of transfer in Indian IIAs  
 
  Currency transfer type  Number of IIAs having this particular 
formulation  
transfers in the original currency in which the 
investment was made or any other 
‘convertible currency’ (same as model IIA) 
38 
Transfers in currency of original investment 
or ‘freely convertible currency’  
7 
Transfers in freely convertible currency  16  
Transfers in convertible currency  9 
No mention about currency transfer  3 
 
Source: Author’s survey of 73 Indian IIAs.   
 
As evident from Table 5.4, Indian IIAs have different formulations for currency transfer. 37 
IIAs follow the formulation that exists in the Indian model IIA, i.e., transfer in the original 
currency in which the investment was made or in any convertible currency. However, in this 
category, there is one IIA (India-Belarus – Article 7.2) which states that any other convertible 
currency has to be agreed to between the investor and the contracting party. A provision like 
this gives some flexibility to India in regard to the currency of payment by providing India 
the possibility of negotiating with the investor from Belarus as to the specific convertible 
currency.803 However, barring such a provision, the foreign investor will be able to make 
transfer in currency of her choice – either the currency of investment or any other convertible 
currency. Some Indian IIAs provide for transfer in either freely convertible currency or a 
                                                




convertible currency but do not contain the option of making a transfer in the currency in 
which the investment was made.  
 
Few Indian IIAs give the meaning of “freely convertible currency”. For example, Article 1(b) 
of the India-Australia IIA state - “‘freely convertible currency’ means a convertible currency 
as classified by the International Monetary Fund or any currency that is widely traded in 
international foreign exchange markets”. Thus, this IIA provides for using the IMF definition 
for ‘freely convertible currency’. IMF Articles provide a definition of a “freely useable 
currency” in Article XXX(f). According to this Article a ‘freely useable currency means a 
member’s currency that the Fund determines (i) is, in fact, widely used to make payments for 
international transactions, and (ii) is widely traded in the principal exchange markets’. 
IMF’s Executive board has identified four currencies that meet this standard – US dollar, 
Japanese Yen, British pound and Euro.804 For those Indian IIAs that do not define ‘freely 
convertible currency’, one can have recourse to Article XXX(f) of the IMF Articles by 
relying on Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, for those countries who are also members of the 
IMF. However, there is an interesting point worth noting in this debate. Since Article XXX(f) 
of the IMF Articles gives the definition of “freely convertible currency” and not “convertible 
currency”, arguably, the phrase “convertible currency” cannot be limited to just the four 
currencies mentioned above. Since many Indian IIAs talk of any “convertible currency” and 
not of “freely convertible currency”, under these IIAs, India allowing for conversion in any 
other currency outside the four currencies mentioned above, will be consistent with India’s 
MTPs. Thus, for these Indian IIAs, even Australian dollar or Singapore dollar can be a 
convertible currency.   
 
There are three Indian IIAs that do not mention anything on currency of transfer. These three 
IIAs are – India-France (Article 7); India-Belgium (Article 7 (1)); and India-Saudi Arabia 
(Article 6).  
 
Thus, on these three issues – coverage of funds that can be transferred, currency in which it 
can be transferred, and how quickly the transfer can be made – there is a high degree of 
homogeneity amongst the MTPs in Indian IIAs. Almost all of the Indian IIAs allow for a 
wide range funds to be transferred in a convertible currency and without much delay. 
                                                




Furthermore, almost all Indian IIAs allow the transfers at the prevailing market rate of 
exchange. Therefore, a plain reading of these IIAs certainly restrict India’s regulatory power 
to impose capital controls on foreign investments or in other words, given this broad nature of 
the MTPs, India cannot impose capital controls without violating the MTPs in its IIAs.  
 
In-spite of containing all these broad investor friendly components, the host country’s 
regulatory power to impose restrictions on capital transfers can be preserved, if the MTPs 
contain certain exceptions such as allowing the host country to impose restrictions on capital 
transfers in the event of an external financial difficulty or for any monetary objective such as 
currency stabilisation, maintaining foreign reserves, etc. We now turn to the issue of 
exceptions in MTPs in Indian IIAs.    
 
 
5.3 MTPs IN INDIAN IIAs AND CAPITAL CONTROLS   
 
Whether a MTP in an IIA recognises the regulatory power of India to impose capital controls 
depends on its formulation. A MTP in an IIA can have three types of exceptions to preserve 
host country’s regulatory power to adopt capital controls or other restrictions on capital 
transfers for different policy objectives. First, it could contain an exception that allows the 
host country to restrict transfers in cases of bankruptcy or insolvency, or in cases of criminal 
or penal offences or in cases of ensuring compliance with adjudicatory proceedings.805 All 
these exceptions are aimed at enabling host countries achieve different types of regulatory 
interests. These exceptions are not related at achieving monetary objectives. Thus, we can 
call these exceptions as “non-monetary” exceptions in MTPs.  
 
Second, MTPs can also contain exceptions whose main role is to enable the host country to 
exercise regulatory power in achieving monetary objectives. Thus, a MTP can have an 
                                                
805 For example, Article 94 (3) of the India-Japan IIA provides exceptions to the right of foreign investors to 
transfer funds in the following terms – ‘Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, a Party may delay or prevent such 
transfers through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of its laws relating to: 
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency or the protection of the rights of creditors; 
(b) issuing, trading or dealing in securities or derivatives including futures and options; 
(c) criminal or penal offenses; 
(d) ensuring compliance with orders or judgments in judicial proceedings or administrative rulings; or 




exception that allows host country to impose restrictions on capital transfers for BoP 
purposes and other macroeconomic objectives like maintaining a stable currency, healthy 
foreign exchange reserve. These objectives may either be mentioned separately in the IIA or 
the IIA may be subject to the IMF Articles. For example, Article 10.8 (4) of India-Malaysia 
IIA after recognising the right of the foreign investors to transfer funds provides the 
following – ‘Nothing in this Chapter shall be regarded as altering the rights enjoyed and 
obligations undertaken by a Party as a party to the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund, as may be amended’. This type of exceptions can be called ‘monetary 
exceptions’.  
 
Third, MTPs can also contain exceptions by subjecting the entire MTP to the domestic laws 
of the host country. Such an exception will enable the host countries to exercise regulatory 
power for any policy objective and arguably will give a far greater regulatory power as 
compared to the first two exceptions. This is because an exception of this nature will allow 
the host country to impose restrictions on transfer of payments for any policy objective and 
not just those given in the IIA. For example, an Indian policy requires that investments made 
in developing townships cannot be repatriated for the first three years from completion of 
minimum capitalisation.806 Such a policy, even if not mentioned in the IIA, will yet be 
compatible if the MTPs are made subject to domestic laws. However, such an exception can 
also be misused by the host country, for example by changing the domestic law at will, and 
thus could tilt the balance in favour of the host country over the foreign investor rather than 
balancing investment protection with the host country’s regulatory power.807   
 
As mentioned above, out of the 73 Indian IIAs studied, 58 of them do not contain any 
exception of the type discussed above (free-transfer) (See Table 5.5). In 5 IIAs MTPs are 
subject to domestic laws and in 10 IIAs MTPs recognise specific exceptions to the foreign 
investor’s rights to transfer funds (regulatory-transfer – Section 5.3.3).  
 
Another important point to note is that there is no one common trend or pattern that can be 
seen in the MTPs in Indian IIAs. For instance, there are examples where an IIA signed at the 
same time have different provisions like Article 7 (1) of the India-Italy IIA providing that 
                                                
806 ‘Consolidated FDI Policy’, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce available 
at http://siadipp.nic.in/policy/fdi_circular/fdi_circular_1_2010.pdf.  




transfers have to be made “in accordance with domestic laws and regulations”,808 whereas the 
monetary transfer provisions in India-UK (Article 7) and India-Poland (Article 7.1) IIAs do 
not contain any such qualification. India signed an IIA with Singapore, in 2005, which 
contains provisions that allow for imposing restrictions on transfer of funds in certain 
exigencies.  
 
Table 5.5 – Exceptions to MTPs in Indian IIAs  
 
Nature of Exception to 
MTPs in Indian IIAs  
Number of IIAs having 
such exception 
No exception  58 
Exception in the form of 
“subjecting the MTP to 
domestic law”  
5 
Exception in the form of 




Source: Authors’ survey of 73 Indian IIAs.   
 
Further, it is also not the case that India has negotiated for exceptions in those IIAs where it is 
a net capital importing country and does not have exceptions with those IIA countries where 
it is an exporter. For example, there are no exceptions to free transfer of capital in IIAs with 
countries like UK (Article 7) and Germany (Article 7), who are capital exporters to India. On 
the other hand, it has exceptions in IIAs with countries like Iceland (Article 7.4) and Slovakia 
(Article 6.4), with which foreign investments (both ways) are limited. IIAs containing both, 
“free-transfer” MTPs and “regulatory-transfer” MTPs have been signed at the same time. 
Thus, in other words, there is no one trend or pattern that can be noted about the structure of 
MTPs in Indian IIAs.  
 
Let us understand the implications of both these types of IIAs on India’s regulatory power.  
 
                                                




5.3.1 ‘Free-transfer’ type   
 
MTPs in 58 Indian IIAs neither subjects capital transfers to domestic laws and regulations; 
nor contains any “monetary” or “non-monetary” exceptions. Thus, the “free-transfer” MTPs 
give an absolute right to the foreign investor to transfer funds related to investment. While 
this is certainly advantageous for the foreign investors because it gives them maximum 
freedom to transfer funds related to investment; it will not serve India’s interests as a host 
nation. Adoption of capital controls by India on those transfer of funds related to investment 
that fall under these 58 IIAs can be challenged by foreign investors in ITA809 even if such 
capital controls have been duly adopted under the FEMA Act.810 Important to note that the 
“free-transfer” MTPs do not prohibit India from adopting capital controls. However, if such 
controls are adopted, the “free-transfer” MTPs are capable of interpretation where investor’s 
right to transfer funds will get precedence over India’s regulatory power to impose capital 
controls because these 58 “free-transfer” MTPs do not recognise any exception to the 
investor’s right to transfer funds. 
 
Arguably, India can impose restrictions on transfer of funds, even if MTPs allow for free 
transfer, by relying on other international treaties like the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS)811 and IMF.812 IMF Articles establish an international monetary order, 
whose effectiveness hinges on countries not departing from its foundational element. Thus, in 
the interest of the stability of this order, arguably, India can impose restrictions on transfer of 
funds in the ‘free transfer’ MTPs even if they do not explicitly recognise imposing such 
restrictions.  
 
In order to understand whether India can do so, let us look at how an arbitral tribunal 
interpreted a similar MTP in US-Argentina IIA.813 In Continental Casualty v Argentina, 
                                                
809 For a discussion on what sorts of IIA violations can take place by imposing restrictions on repatriation of 
funds related to investments see Kolo and Walde (2008), 227-36. 
810 The issue of compatibility between MTPs in IIAs (pre accession BITs) and other regulations (EU Treaty or 
the EC law) has also arisen in EU – see – Commission of EU v Republic of Austria, Case C - 205/06 available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006J0205:EN:HTML (as on 2 October 
2010); Commission of EU v Kingdom of Spain, Case C - 249/06 available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006J0249:EN:HTML (as on 2 October 2010).  
811 Article XII of GATS allows countries to impose restriction on trade in services in the event of serious BOP 
problems or external financial difficulties. 
812 Turyn and Aznar (2010), 72.  
813 Article 5 (1) of the US-Argentina provides ‘Each Party shall permit all transfers related to an investment to 
be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers include: (a) returns; (b) 




Argentina argued that notwithstanding the absence of any exceptions in the MTP in US-
Argentina IIA, it could impose restrictions on capital transfer due to two facts – first, 
international treaties like GATT, GATS and IMF allow for such imposition; and second, 
under customary international law countries have the right to regulate monetary transfers as 
part of monetary sovereignty of states.814 Although the tribunal did not decide on this issue 
since it had already found that the concerned transfer didn’t fall in the purview of the MTP 
(Article V) because it was not a transfer related to investment; it did make an important point 
by saying that the MTP in the US-Argentina IIA was lex specialis in respect of the IMF 
regime and also more liberal than the IMF regime.815 The reasoning of the tribunal was that 
IMF distinguishes between current and capital transactions whereas such a distinction is 
missing in the MTP in US-Argentina IIA.816 Although, the tribunal didn’t take this analysis 
further, a logical extension of this will be that in case of a dispute, the tribunal will rely on the 
MTP to find out whether any restriction on capital and current account transactions is 
permitted. In other words, if a MTP does not allow a restriction on capital transfer of funds 
related to investment, restrictions will be held as a breach of the MTP.  
 
An argument that India can impose restrictions on transfer of funds even when none exist in 
the IIA is also not compatible with the basic canons of treaty interpretation. Giving ordinary 
meaning to the terms used in the “free transfer” MTPs, in light of the context and object and 
purpose of the treaty shows that the countries didn’t intend to have any restriction on transfer 
of funds related to investment. Had India and its IIA partner country intended to such 
restrictions, they would have clearly provided such exceptions in the treaty. Further, the 
object and purpose of majority of Indian IIAs also lends weight to such an interpretation. 
India agreed not to have restrictions on transfer of funds in majority of its IIAs because it 
wanted to give assurances to foreign investor that they have all freedom to invest and operate 
in India, including the right to transfer funds related to investment, with the hope that such an 
assurance will result in more investment inflows.817   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
under a contract, including amortization of principal and accrued interest payments made pursuant to a loan 
agreement directly related to an investment; (e) proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an 
investment; and (f) additional contributions to capital for the maintenance or development of an investment.’ 
814 Argentina’s rejoinder in the Continental tribunal, para 297.  
815 Continental tribunal, para 244.  
816 Id, paras 243-44.  




It is doubtful whether the treaty interpreter can borrow the intent of the countries reflected in 
some other treaty into the primary treaty that has to be interpreted, especially when this very 
intent is missing from primary treaty. This is not to argue that the treaty interpreter cannot or 
should not look at other international treaties applicable between the parties – as this is a 
requirement under Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT. Indeed, as it has been discussed above, 
IMF articles can be used to find out the meaning of terms like “freely convertible currency” 
not defined in a MTP. Even, the Continental tribunal relied on Article XXX of the IMF that 
defines current account transactions to find out whether the transfer in question was a fund 
related to investment.818 However, it is disputable whether the treaty interpreter can rely on 
Article 31(3) (c) to borrow the intent reflected in another treaty into the applicable law, i.e., 
the IIA. IMF Agreement is about regulating monetary affairs and IIAs are about investment 
protection. Thus, the context and object and purpose of the two treaties are different. In other 
words, in cases where the MTPs in IIAs do not mention about the IMF regime, the 
presumption is that countries wanted to keep the IMF regime outside the IIA.819   
 
Furthermore, in the context of India, this argument will be even more difficult because there 
are 15 IIAs (discussed in the next section) that allow the host country (India) to impose 
restrictions on capital transfer. Thus, the argument will be that in the treaties where India 
wanted to have restrictions on transfer of funds, it provided for such exceptions. Therefore, 
the IIAs where such exceptions were not put, it clearly means that India didn’t intend to have 
such restrictions against the foreign investors of those countries.   
 
If not IMF articles, arguably India can rely on customary international law to impose 
restrictions even if such restrictions are not mentioned in the MTPs. For example, India can 
rely on customary international law defence of necessity given in Article 25 of the ILC 
Articles to escape liability from a violation of a treaty obligation (like the MTP). However, 
such a situation will be governed by the strict and limited nature of the necessity defence 
available in Article 25 of the ILC Articles.820  
 
                                                
818 Continental tribunal, para 244.   
819 Muchlinski (2009), 60.  




It has also been argued that general international law considers that in the event of serious 
balance of payments difficulties – countries may establish regulations on capital transfers821 
or more generally that under general international law countries have the power to impose 
capital controls as part of their monetary sovereignty.822 However, one is unsure whether an 
ITA tribunal will accept a defence based on general international law. For example, an ITA 
tribunal, like the Continental tribunal, may decide that the MTP is lex specialis and hence 
should be given effect to over the defence based on general international law. Stated 
differently, whether India’s defence based on general international law will be accepted or 
not depends on arbitral discretion because Indian IIAs are not specific on this point.    
 
A violation of the MTP and thus a breach of the IIA can be excused if it falls under any 
exception clause of the IIA such as a Non Precluded Measure (NPM) provision.823 Majority 
of NPM provisions in Indian IIAs are defined narrowly and allow deviations from IIA 
obligations only in cases of essential security interest or in situations of extreme emergency. 
It is a moot point whether essential security interest can be used to justify imposition of 
restrictions on transfer of funds related to investment. Even if one were to argue that essential 
security interest is broad enough to include measures imposed to restrict transfer of funds 
related to investment in the case of extreme BoP problem; it certainly cannot be used in those 
situations where an ‘essential’ ‘security interest’ is not at stake.824 For example, India cannot 
rely on NPM provisions for all kinds of monetary objectives that it might wish to pursue by 
imposing temporary capital controls like stopping the rupee from appreciating beyond a point 
in order to remain export competitive.    
 
5.3.2 ‘Regulatory-transfer’ type  
 
There are 15 IIAs that contain some sort of qualification for the transfers of funds. Hence, 
MTPs in these 15 IIAs are described as ‘regulatory-transfer’ type. The ‘regulatory-transfer’ 
MTP formulation is similar to the ‘free-transfer’ MTP formulation in terms of having same 
broad provisions that cover all sorts of transfer of funds. However, they differ from the ‘free-
                                                
821 Turyn and Aznar (2010), 74.  
822 See Lastra (2006), 22; Qureshi and Ziegler (2011), 147.  
823 NPM provisions in an IIA means those measures, which a country is not prohibited from taking to achieve 
certain regulatory objectives, even if it means not honouring substantive obligations of investment protection. 
On this issue also see Kolo and Walde (2008), 217-26; the NPM chapter.  




transfer’ formulations in one important respect – they recognise some exception to the free 
transfer of funds.    
 
Though, this does not mean that the MTPs in these 15 IIAs have similar formulation. The 
exception in the MTPs in these ‘regulatory-transfer’ type IIAs are worded differently. The 
exceptions are of all the three types mentioned above – first, some IIAs state that funds will 
be repatriated in accordance with domestic laws and policies; second, some IIAs state that 
India, as a host country, can impose restrictions on the transfers of funds in situations of BoP 
difficulty (monetary objectives); and third, restrictions can be imposed for other non-
monetary objectives. Some IIAs contain both ‘monetary’ and non-monetary’ objectives.        
 
Out of these 15, 5 Indian IIAs subject transfer of funds related to investment, to domestic 
laws and policies (see Table 5.5) For example, Article 7(1) of the India-Russia IIA states – 
‘Each contracting party shall, in accordance with the laws and regulations of its state, ensure 
to investors of the other contracting party, the free transfer of payment in relation to 
investments...’ . The other four Indian IIAs are – India-Israel (Article 7.1); India-Italy (Article 
7.1); India-Malaysia (Article 10.8.3); and India-Argentina (Article 7.1). In fact, India-
Malaysia, subjects the transfers to not just national laws and regulations, but also to national 
policies.825 In all these 5 IIAs, transfers of funds related to investments are subject to local 
laws. These IIAs do not contain provisions that allow for imposition of restrictions on 
transfers on account of any economic crisis or any other non-monetary objective. They also 
do not mention anything on compatibility with the obligations under the IMF Articles.  
  
Hence, if India imposes restrictions or regulates or prohibits capital account transactions as 
per FEMA legislation, such measures will not amount to violations of MTPs. Provisions such 
as these have two advantages – first, it ensures that domestic measures on transfers are 
compatible with India’s IIA obligations; and secondly and most importantly it allows exercise 
of regulatory power related to transfers of funds provided the exercise of this power is 
compatible with the domestic law on foreign exchange (FEMA).    
  
The other 10 Indian IIAs (India-Slovakia – Article 6.3; India-Iceland – Article 7.4; India-
Mexico – Article 8.4; India-Singapore – Articles 6.6.2 and 6.7, India-Korea – Articles 10.10 
                                                




and 10.11, India-Japan – Article 94.3, India-Malaysia – 10.8.3, India-Bulgaria – Ad Article 
7.4, India-Romania - Ad Article 7.4, and India-Czech Republic – Ad Article 2) contain 
express exceptions to MTPs. For example, Article 6(3) of the India-Slovakia IIA states 
‘notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 above, a contracting party may prevent or restrict 
transfer through non equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of its laws…’. 
The India-Slovakia IIA then provides that this restriction could be for adoption of safeguard 
measures in circumstances such as macroeconomic or serious BoP difficulties. These 
restrictions are to be imposed for a limited duration and may not go beyond what is necessary 
to remedy the BoP situation.826 This IIA also allows the host country to impose restrictions on 
capital transfer for non-monetary policy objectives like protection of rights of creditors, 
criminal or penal offences and the recovery of proceeds of crime. However, this IIA does not 
mention anything regarding the IMF obligations.   
 
The MTP in India-Iceland IIA is different from India-Slovakia in the sense that it only allows 
imposition of restrictions on transfers in case of serious BoP difficulty or the threat thereof.827 
It does not recognise situations of macroeconomic difficulty (there could be situations of 
macroeconomic difficulty different from BoP difficulty like appreciating currency). It also 
does not recognise other non-monetary objectives like the ones given in India-Slovakia IIA. 
Like the later this IIA also does not mention anything about the IMF Articles.  
 
On the other hand, the MTPs in the other three IIAs - India-Mexico, India-Singapore and 
India-Korea, contain both the monetary and non-monetary objectives and also talk of 
consistency of the measures adopted with the IMF articles. For example, the MTP in India-
Mexico IIA allows for preventing a transfer in cases of bankruptcy, insolvency, or the 
protection of the rights of creditors and similar other situations provided this prevention is 
applied through equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of laws of the 
country adopting these measures.828 Apart from this, India-Mexico IIA also allows the host 
country to adopt restrictions on transfers in cases of serious balance of payments crisis or an 
external difficulty provided the restriction imposed is consistent with the Articles of the IMF; 
avoid unnecessary damage to commercial interest of the investor; are no more than necessary 
to deal with the problem; are temporary and are phased out progressively; are applied on an 
                                                
826 Article 6.4 of the India-Slovakia IIA.  
827 Article 7(4) of the India-Iceland IIA.  




equitable and non-discriminatory basis; and are promptly notified to the other country.829 
Similar sort of provisions exist in India-Korea and India-Singapore IIA.  
 
Here it is important to mention that India’s IIAs with three countries – Bulgaria, Romania, 
and the Czech Republic have been amended in 2007, 2009 and 2010 respectively. These 
amendments by all the three countries have been carried out not on the behest of India but on 
the behest of these three countries in order to comply with their obligations as member states 
of the EU.830 One of the key amendments is of the provision on monetary transfer. The MTP 
in none of these three IIAs recognised any exception to the right of foreign investor to 
transfer funds. However, after the amendment, all these three IIAs recognise that restrictions 
can be made on transfer of funds. For example, Article II of the India-Bulgaria protocol adds 
the following paragraph to Article 7 of their IIA that provides the provision on monetary 
transfer:  
 
“(4) Nothing in paragraph (1) of this Article shall prevent either Contracting Party from 
applying or enforcing, in good faith and in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner, 
their laws and regulations aiming for: 
 
a) issuing, trading or dealing in securities, futures, options, or derivatives; 
b) adoption of safeguard measures, for a reasonable period of time, which may be taken in 
exceptional circumstances such as serious macroeconomic difficulties or serious difficulties 
for the balance of payments for the host Contracting Party or for any customs, economic and 
monetary union, common market, free trade area or regional economic organization, to 
which it is or may become a party; 
c) implementation of any obligation which is binding on that Contracting Party by virtue of 
its membership to any customs union, economic and monetary union, common market, free 
trade area or regional economic organization;  
d) enforcing decisions taken in criminal and adjudicatory proceedings.” 
 
In other words, the protocol amending the MTP in India-Bulgaria IIA clearly recognises 
exceptions of both monetary (adoption of safeguard measures at the time of macroeconomic 
or BoP difficulty) and non-monetary objectives (such as enforcing decisions in criminal and 
                                                
829 See Article 8(4) of India-Mexico IIA.  




adjudicatory proceedings). Similar amendments have been introduced in the IIAs with 
Romania and the Czech Republic.    
 
Notwithstanding these differences amongst the “regulatory-transfer” MTPs, these few IIAs 
strengthen India’s regulatory power to adopt measures linked to restrictions on transfers 
related to investments in cases of an external financial difficulty or for other policy 
objectives. MTPs, in some of these IIAs harmonise the IIA obligations with the obligations 
imposed by the IMF Articles and makes Indian domestic law on transfers compatible with 
IIA obligations.    
 
SUMMARY   
 
MTP is an important provision that allows foreign investors the freedom to transfer funds, 
which is integral for them to work their investment in the host country. From the discussions 
above, one can sum up that MTPs in majority of Indian IIAs provide a broad and unqualified 
right to foreign investors to transfer funds without recognising any restrictions on this right. 
Only a handful of Indian IIAs contain provisions on monetary transfer that recognise India’s 
right to restrict transfer of funds in certain monetary and non-monetary related situations. As 
a result, adoption of capital controls by India can be challenged as a violation of the provision 

















CHAPTER 6  
 
NON PRECLUDED MEASURES  
 
Non Precluded Measures (NPM) provisions in an IIA (starting with words like – ‘nothing in 
this agreement precludes...’) provide the regulatory latitude to host countries to deal with 
threats to important national interests.831 NPM provisions in IIAs provide flexibility to 
countries to deviate from the substantive obligations in certain circumstances that warrant 
giving preference to non-investment policy goals over investment protection.832 Given the 
larger debate on conflict between investment protection and host country’s regulatory power, 
NPM provisions in IIAs are useful tools that allow a host country to adopt measures for the 
pursuance of non-investment objectives without incurring any liability under international 
law. A measure falling under the NPM provision will be legal, notwithstanding its 
inconsistency with all other IIA provisions.833 NPM provisions are important in maintaining a 
balance between investment protection and regulatory power of the host states much like 
Article XX of GATT (the general exceptions clause) – which is a key provision to balance 
free trade with non trade policies.834 It has also been argued that NPM provisions in IIAs 
perform a risk allocation function by transferring costs of harming an investment from host 
states to investors in exceptional circumstances.835 NPM provisions can also be called by 
other names like a general exception clause.  
 
NPM provisions in IIAs were put to a test when a spate of arbitration cases were brought 
against Argentina for adopting measures aimed at addressing an economic crisis in early 
2000.836 For example, US investors claimed that the regulatory measures adopted by 
Argentina violated many provisions of the US-Argentina IIA; whereas Argentina relied on 
                                                
831 Salacuse (2010), 343. Also see Newcombe (2011), 356-357.  
832 In this paper, the phrase ‘NPM provision’ refers to the provision in the treaty (IIA) whereas use of ‘NPMs’ or 
‘NPM’ refers to the measures adopted under the NPM provision.   
833 Vandevelde (2009), 178.  
834 Eeckhout (2010), 8; also see Kapterian (2010), 93-94.  
835 Burke-White and Von Staden (2008), 314. An IIA can also have other kinds of exceptions, which are 
specific to a particular provision like Indian IIAs exempt taxation measures from the application of Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN). However, discussion on such provision specific exceptions is outside the purview of 
this paper. 




the NPM provision given in Article XI of the IIA as a defence for these claims.837 Article XI 
provides - ‘This treaty shall not preclude the application by either party of measures 
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect 
to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its 
own essential security interests’. Although in all these cases it was the same NPM provision 
that had to be interpreted, the tribunals gave divergent rulings. The CMS, Sempra and Enron 
tribunals interpreted the NPM provision by reading the customary law necessity defence 
given in Article 25 of the ILC Articles (hereinafter Article 25)838 into the treaty defence 
(NPM). Article 25 is an extremely stringent exception to escape liability from an international 
wrongful act. Its strict character is confirmed by the commentary on the ILC Draft Articles.839 
On the other hand, LG&E and Continental tribunals and the CMS and Sempra annulment 
committees distinguished between the NPM in the US-Argentina IIA and the Article 25 
defence. In yet another divergence in interpreting ‘necessary’ in Article XI of the US-
Argentina IIA, recently, the El Paso tribunal used one principle of the customary law 
‘necessity’ doctrine to interpret ‘necessary’ occurring under the NPM provision by relying on 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT (see the section on nexus requirement for further discussion on 
this). All these cases have generated debate on the significance of the NPM provision in IIAs 
to protect host country’s regulatory power840 and on the interpretative methodology followed 
by these tribunals.841 Further and as it has been discussed throughout the thesis, these cases 
                                                
837 See CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentina, ICISD Case No ARB/01/8; CMS Gas Transmission Company v 
Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8 (Annulment Proceedings);  Enron Corporation v Argentina, ICSID Case 
No ARB/01/3; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp v Argentina ICSID Case No ARB/01/3 (Annulment 
Proceeding); Sempra Energy International v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16; Sempra Energy 
International v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 (Annulment Proceedings); LG&E Energy Corporation v 
Argentina, ICISD Case No ARB/02/1; Continental Casualty Company v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9. 
El Paso v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 31 October 2011.  
838 Article 25 gives the customary defence of necessity. This defence can be invoked if the adopted measure is 
the ‘only way’ for the state to safeguard an essential interest against a ‘grave and imminent peril’ [25 (1) (a)]. 
Furthermore, this defence is subject to three more stringent conditions – firstly, the adopted measure does not 
impair the essential interest of the other state or of the international community as a whole [25 (1) (b)] secondly, 
the international obligation in question does not exclude the possibility of invoking necessity [25 (2) (a)]; and 
thirdly, the invoking state should not have contributed to the situation of necessity [25 (2) (b)]. 
839 This restrictive interpretation of the customary law defence was confirmed by the ICJ in Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/ Slovakia) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, p 7 -  Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (1 October 2009) available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.  Also see UNCTAD (2009).   
840 Burke-White and von Staden (2008); Kurtz (2010), 325; Aaken and Kurtz (2010), 859. Also see Qureshi 
(2009), 631; Newcombe (2011).  
841 Bjorklund (2009), 494; Bjorklund (2009), 479; Alvarez and Khamsi (2009); UNCTAD (2009), 80-81; Dolzer 
(2011), 705; Schill (2007), 265; Newcombe and Paradell (2009); Gazzini (2008), 450; Vicuna (2011), 741; 
Gazzini (2009); Reinisch (2007), 191; Desierto (2010); Parish (2010), 169; Salacuse (2010), 342-349; 




show the existence of arbitral discretion in adopting different interpretations because the law 
is not clear and precise enough.  
 
Some disputes against Argentina, which involved IIAs other than the US-Argentina IIA such 
as the Argentina-Italy IIA which didn’t had a NPM provision, the tribunal recognised that 
though the situation prevailing in Argentina was serious enough, the tribunal could not accept 
Argentina’s argument that it could suspend its treaty obligations since the IIA didn’t 
recognise any such exception.842 In other words, since the treaty didn’t provide for any 
exception, the tribunal had to judge Argentina’s necessity defence under the extremely strict 
customary law necessity defence.    
 
In light of this debate on investment protection and host country’s regulatory power, this 
chapter will assess whether India can rely on NPM provisions in its IIAs to safeguard its 
regulatory power or not if it is found to have violated one of the substantive provisions of the 
IIA. In order to achieve this purpose, the chapter will interpret the NPM provisions to find out 
plausible interpretations and then assess the effect of these interpretations on India’s 
regulatory power.    
 
It is important to mention that just like one cannot have a per se rule for interpretation of the 
FET and expropriation provisions without taking into account the text of the treaty, one 
cannot have a per se rule for interpreting NPM provisions in different IIAs.843 The actual 
interpretation of a NPM provision, in a specific IIA, will depend on the application of treaty 
interpretation rules given in Articles 31-32 of the VCLT. The analytical template used in this 
chapter to analyse the NPM provisions in Indian IIAs is same as the one used by Burke-
White and Von Staden.844  
 
The rest of the chapter is divided in six sections. Section 6.1 discusses the anatomy of NPM 
provisions in Indian IIAs. Section 6.2 discusses the permissible objectives (non investment 
                                                
842 Impregilo v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, 21 June 2011, paras 336-346.  
843  For a debate on this issue see Burke-White and Staden (2008); and Alvarez and Khamsi (2009). Also see the 
discussion in Kurtz (2010), 351-352. In this regard also see Burke-White and Von Staden (2010), 283, which 
discusses different standard of reviews that investment treaty arbitration panels can adopt to interpret NPM 
provisions in view of the public law character of investor-state arbitration disputes. In this regard also see the 
arguments of Dolzer that a treaty exception like the NPM provision should be treated in a restricted manner – 
Dolzer (2011), 709.    




objectives given in the NPM provision for which India can deviate from IIA obligations) 
found in all the NPM provisions in Indian IIAs. Permissible objectives provide the ‘heads’ 
under which India can adopt different policy needs. Thus, the chapter will first discuss the 
strength of the existing ‘heads’ under the NPM provision for different policy-needs of India. 
Once this determination has been made, the chapter will then turn to study the nexus 
requirement in Section IV. Nexus requirement is the link between the regulatory measure 
adopted and the non-investment objective sought to be achieved through that measure. The 
discussion on nexus requirement will examine the regulatory latitude that India has under the 
existing NPM provisions to adopt measures for different policy-needs. Section 6.3 discusses 
the conditions that have to be satisfied while invoking NPM provisions in Indian IIAs.      
 
6.1 ANATOMY OF NPM PROVISIONS IN INDIAN IIAs  
 
All the 73 IIAs, studied for this paper, contain a NPM provision. However, the NPM 
provisions are differently formulated. On the basis of varying textual formulation, the NPM 
provisions can be divided in three groups - ‘model-NPM’ type; ‘modified-model NPM’ type; 
and ‘Article-XX’ type.  
 
Table 6.1 – Different formulation of NPM provisions in Indian IIAs  
 
Type  Number of IIAs  
Model NPM  36 
Modified-Model NPM  33 
Article-XX 4 
 
Source: Author’s study of 73 Indian IIAs.   
 
6.1.1 ‘Model-NPM’ type  
 
36 Indian IIAs have exactly the same formulation as contained in the Indian model IIA and 
hence this group is called ‘model-NPM’ type. The Indian model IIA states in Article 12 (2) – 




Contracting Party from taking action for the protection of its essential security interests or in 
circumstances of extreme emergency in accordance with its laws normally and reasonably 
applied on a non discriminatory basis’. Article 12 (2) starts with a non obstante clause 
making it clear that in spite of whatever is stated in Article 12 (1)845, nothing in this 
agreement prevents the host contracting party from taking measures to fulfil the listed 
permissible objectives subject to specified conditions. The words ‘nothing in this Agreement 
precludes’ gives the non-precluded character to this provision.  
 
6.1.2 ‘Modified-model-NPM’ type 
 
33 IIAs have NPM provisions that can be described as ‘modified-model NPM’ type because 
these provisions, though different, do not vary much from the ‘model-NPM’ type provisions. 
The difference is mainly in the form of either having more number of permissible objectives 
or having ‘necessary’ as the nexus requirement (issues to be discussed later). For example, 
Article 11 (2) of the India-Qatar IIA states ...nothing in this Agreement precluded the host 
contracting party from taking action for the protection of its essential security interests or 
public order or morality affecting public order or in circumstances of extreme emergency in 
accordance with its laws normally and reasonably applied on a non discriminatory basis. 
 
6.1.3 ‘Article–XX’ type  
 
NPM provisions in four IIAs can be described as ‘Article XX’ type (India-Korea – Article 
10.18, India-Singapore – Article 6.11, India-Japan – Article  and India-Malaysia) because of 
it being very close to the general exceptions provision given in Article XX of GATT.846 This 
                                                
845  Article 12 (1) states – ‘Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, all investment shall be governed by 
the laws in force in the territory of the Contracting Party in which such investments are made’. This provision is 
nothing but an obvious statement that the day to day affairs of the foreign investments will be governed by the 
domestic laws of India.   
846 For example, Article 6.11 of the India-Singapore IIA gives the ‘General Exceptions’ provision as follows:  
1 Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against the other Party or its investors where like conditions prevail, or 
a disguised restriction on investments of investors of a Party in the territory of the other Party, nothing in this 
Chapter shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by a Party of measures:  
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order;  
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;  
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Chapter including those relating to:  




type of NPM provision is different from the ‘model-NPM’ type and ‘modified-model NPM’ 
type. In fact, it is interesting to note that these four IIAs also contain GATT Article XXI847 
type security exceptions (issue discussed later in the paper).  
 
6.1.4 Common Points in NPM Provisions in Indian IIAs  
 
There is no one trend or pattern that can be discerned about the NPM provisions in Indian 
IIAs. For example, one can find NPM provisions belonging to all three categories signed 
almost at the same time. For instance, the NPM provision in India-China IIA entered in 2006 
is of ‘model-NPM’ type; NPM provision in India-Saudi Arabia entered in 2006 is of 
‘modified-model NPM’ type and the NPM provision in India Singapore IIA entered in 2005 
is of ‘Article-XX’ type. Further, the same ‘model-NPM’ type provision exists in an IIA with 
a developed country like the UK and also with developing countries like Mongolia and 
Indonesia. The study of the NPM provisions in these 57 IIAs throws up the following 
important points about the structure and formulation of the NPM provisions.  
 
First, the NPM provision start with the words ‘nothing in this agreement precludes the host 
contracting party from taking action for...’. Thus, India can move away from any IIA 
obligation in order to achieve certain objectives. In majority of Indian IIAs, these objectives 
are protection of ‘essential security interest’ (ESI) or in ‘circumstances of extreme 
emergency’ (CEE)848 (some IIAs have other objectives also - discussed later). This means 
that India is prevented from taking action for any other objective that is not ESI or a CEE 
relying on the NPM provision.   
 
Second, majority of NPM provisions in Indian IIAs do not contain ‘necessary’ as nexus 
requirement. Absence of ‘necessary’ as the nexus requirement means that a thin level of 
                                                                                                                                                  
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data 
and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts;  
(iii) safety;  
(d) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value;  
(e) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.  
847 Article XXI of GATT allows member countries of the WTO to adopt measures to safeguard their essential 
security interests notwithstanding anything contained in the treaty.  




nexus is required between the measure taken and the objective sought to be achieved through 
that measure. The detailed meaning of ‘necessary’ is discussed later in the paper.   
 
Third, it is important to note the immediate context in which the NPM provisions in Indian 
IIAs occur such as the title of the provision containing the NPM provision.849 NPM 
provisions, in majority of Indian IIAs, do not occur under headings such as ‘Exceptions’ or 
‘Non Conforming Measures or Non Precluded Measures’, which one would expect, given 
their basic character of being an exception to the treaty. In India-Russia IIA, the NPM 
provision is part of a provision titled ‘Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investment’. In 
only 11 IIAs, NPM provisions are under titles such as ‘Exceptions’850 or ‘Prohibitions and 
Restrictions’.851   
 
Given the divergent nature of NPM provisions in Indian IIAs, the chapter will find out how 
broad or narrow these NPM provisions are? A broad NPM provision (such as one that has 
more non-investment objectives) will offer greater scope for India to exercise its regulatory 
power as compared to a narrow one.  
 
6.2 PERMISSIBLE OBJECTIVES   
  
Permissible objectives mean those non-investment objectives that are listed in NPM 
provisions and for which the host country can deviate from IIA obligations. For example, the 
NPM provision (Article XI) in the US-Argentina IIA has three permissible objectives – 1) 
maintenance of public order, 2) maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, 
and 3) protection of its own essential security interests (ESI). It is important to note the 
preliminary point that the host country can deviate from its substantive obligations in the IIA, 
relying on a NPM provision, only for those non investment objectives that are listed in the 
NPM provision.  
 
                                                
849 A good example of this is given in Plama v Bulgaria, ICISD Case No ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
8 February 2005, para 147.  
850 India-Singapore, India-Korea, India-Italy, India-Czech Republic, India-France, India Australia, India-Bosnia 
Herzegovinia, India-China IIAs. In India-Mexico IIA, the provision is titled as ‘Security Exceptions’, thus 
limiting the scope of the NPM only to security related matters.    




Permissible objectives in NPM provisions can be divided in two categories – ‘security’ and 
‘non security’ related permissible objectives. Security related permissible objectives include 
objectives such as protection from ‘armed conflicts’ or ‘war’. Non security related 
permissible objectives include adopting measures for public health, environment etc. The 
‘model-NPM’ provisions contain only ESI and CEE as the two permissible objectives. NPM 
provisions that are ‘modified-model NPM’ type contain more permissible objectives as 
compared to ‘model-NPM’ types. The most comprehensive list of permissible objectives is 
contained in the NPM provisions belonging to ‘Article XX’ type that contains both ‘security’ 
and ‘non security’ related permissible objectives. Overall, as can be seen from Table 2, NPM 
provisions in Indian IIAs contain fewer permissible objectives.   
 
The discussion below will focus on different permissible objectives found in NPM provisions 
in Indian IIAs starting with ESI because of two reasons – first, ESI is the most common 
permissible objective present in 48 out of the 57 IIAs studied; and second, since Indian IIAs 
contain fewer permissible objectives, ESI assumes further importance, as a permissible 
objective, that can potentially be used both for ‘security’ and ‘non security’ concerns.  
 
Table 6.2 Different Permissible Objectives occurring in NPM provisions in Indian IIAs  
 
Permissible Objectives   In how many NPM provisions (IIAs) are 
these objectives found 
Essential Security Interest  
Essential Security interest in exceptional 
circumstances  
64 (As an independent permissible objective) 
India-Swiss Confederation IIA.  
Circumstances of Extreme Emergency  41 (As an independent permissible objective)  
5 (as linked to other objectives) – posing a 
threat to life or health of human beings, 
animals or plants or for the prevention of 
diseases or pests.   
Public Order  
Sub category – Morality affecting Public 
Order 
7 (as an independent permissible objective) 
1 




War or other forms of armed conflict   
Prevention of spread of diseases and pests in 
plants and animals   
 
8 (as an independent permissible objective) 
Public Health  
As a sub category - Prevention of spread of 
diseases and pests (this arguably includes not 
just plants and animals but also human 
beings)   
3  
6 – Including India-Singapore, India Korea, 
India-Japan and India-Malaysia IIAs – which 
provides protection of human, animal or 
plant life or health as the permissible 
objective – this is broader than mere 
prevention of spread of diseases and pests, 
however is narrower as compared to Public 
Health. 
Public Morals 
Morality affecting Public Order  
4 
1 
Protect Environment  
Sub category – conserve exhaustible natural 
resources   
3 
2  
        
Source: Author’s survey of 73 Indian IIAs  
 
6.2.1 Essential Security Interest 
 
The discussion on ESI in Indian NPM provisions divided between two heads - those Indian 
IIAs that do not contain ‘self judging’ language and do not have a list of activities related to 
ESI; and those that have self judging language and contain a list of activities related to ESI.  
 
Interpretation of ESI in NPM provisions without self judging language  
 
Out of the 48 IIAs that contain ESI as a permissible objective, 46 of them do not contain a 
self judging NPM provision. In other words, there is nothing in these 46 IIAs to show that 




adopted to achieve ESI (discussed in part IV on nexus requirement).852 Thus, India’s 
determination of ESI in these 46 IIAs can be reviewed by an arbitral body.     
       
To use ESI as a ‘ground’ to deviate from IIA obligations, India will have to show that the 
‘security interests’ are ‘essential’. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘essential’ is ‘vitally 
important’. Thus, to invoke ESI as a ground to deviate from IIA obligations India will have to 
show that the ‘security interests’ are most important and not ordinary. In other words, all 
security interests will not fall under ESI but only those that reach the threshold of ‘most 
important’. Had the intention of the parties been that countries are allowed to deviate for all 
‘security interests’, they would not have prefixed it with the word ‘essential’.853 
 
However, ‘essential’ ‘security interests’ in these 46 Indian IIAs does not mean only those 
circumstances where the very existence and independence of India is compromised, as it was 
held by the Enron and Sempra tribunals while interpreting ESI in the NPM provision in US-
Argentina IIA.854 Such situations are undoubtedly ‘essential’ ‘security interests’ and thus 
shall fall under ESI. However, the ordinary meaning of the word ‘essential’ in ESI is not 
limited to such situations only. The fact that India can invoke ESI only when most important 
‘security interests’ are involved means that ESI also covers those situations which are 
‘severe’ even if this ‘severe’ situation has not become ‘severest’ and thus not reached the 
highest threshold of ‘compromising the existence and independence of state’.855 India need 
not wait for the situation to reach this highest threshold before taking measures to protect it 
because acting at such late stage will imply that nothing will be left to protect.856      
 
The next important issue is whether ESI in these 46 IIAs cover only pure ‘security’ related 
interests such as safeguarding the country from ‘war’ or ‘external aggression’ or do they also 
cover health, environmental and economic interests provided these interests fulfil the 
threshold of being an ‘essential’ interest. According to the Oxford English dictionary 
                                                
852 See CMS Tribunal para 370; LG&E Tribunal, para 212; El Paso v Argentina, paras 591-604.  
853 In this regard also see the arguments on Article XXI of GATT – Schloemann and Ohlhoff (1999), 445. Also 
see the arguments of one author, in context of NPM provision of US-Argentina IIA (Article XI) – that the gap 
created in Article XI of the US-Argentina IIA by not defining ESI can be filled by the notion of ‘grave and 
imminent peril’ given in Article 25 of the ILC Article - Gazzini (2009), 18. The Enron and Sempra tribunal did 
the same though they equated the treaty defence with the customary law defence of necessity given in Article 25 
- see Enron tribunal, para 333-4; Sempra tribunal, para 375-6.  Also see Desierto (2010).   
854 Enron tribunal, para 306; Sempra tribunal, para 347.  
855 Also see LG&E tribunal, para 251 and 252 and Continental tribunal, para 180.  




‘security’ means the ‘state of being or feeling secure’. The state of being or feeling secure in 
the context of a country can mean two things. First, feeling secure from any external threat 
such as war or external aggression or from any other threat such as terrorist act, espionage 
etc. Second, feeling secure from any economic or financial crisis or any other ecological or 
health disaster. Both situations will require regulatory interventions and such regulatory 
interventions may go against India’s IIA obligations. Which regulatory intervention will be 
excused under NPM provision will depend on the meaning of ‘security’.  
 
It has been argued that ESI unlike ‘war’ and ‘armed conflicts’ is a broad category and could 
be interpreted to include non military emergencies such as economic emergencies as well.857 
Similarly, according to Continental tribunal ESI must be interpreted broadly and thus a severe 
economic crisis will qualify as an ESI.858 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also 
interpreted provisions similar to ESI, occurring in the Friendship Commerce and Navigation 
(FCN) treaties between US-Nicaragua by stating that ‘the concept of essential security 
interests certainly extends beyond the concept of an armed attack, and has been subject to 
very broad interpretations in the past’.859  
 
On the other hand, it has been argued that from a plain meaning of ESI one cannot conclude 
that it includes economic emergencies because ESI primarily relates to military and strategic 
considerations.860 In context of Article XI of the US-Argentina IIA it has been argued that 
‘security’ normally refers to defence and military matters.861  
In light of these two different viewpoints on meaning of ESI and since Indian IIAs do not 
define ESI, the discussion below will show that ESI in Indian IIAs can be interpreted in two 





                                                
857 Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 497. Also see Gazzini, (2009), 15.  
858 Continental tribunal, para 178. Also see para 180-81; also see LG&E tribunal, para 238. Also see CMS 
tribunal, para 359; Enron tribunal, para 332; Sempra tribunal, para 374.   
859 US-Nicaragua Judgment (Merits) at 116. For a different understanding of these judgments see Alvarez and 
Khamsi (2009), 452-453.   
860 Reinisch (2007), 209.  






In order to find out which, ‘security interests’ will fall under the purview of ESI in Indian 
IIAs, one can have recourse to an important tool given in Article 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT, 
which states that any international rule applicable in the relations between the countries shall 
also be taken into account in interpreting the treaty. Thus, for more than 30 Indian IIAs, 
where India’s treaty partner is also a WTO member, one can have recourse to Article XXI (b) 
of GATT that gives activities related to ESI. Article XXI (b) of GATT refers to those 
situations of security concerns, which are essentially military type situations. It does not talk 
of feeling secure from any economic or financial or health crisis. Further, Article XXI (b) can 
be invoked only for grounds given under it862 and not for any other ground.863 Thus, one can 
argue that in the absence of a definition of ESI in these 30 Indian IIAs, the meaning of ESI 
can be gathered from the list of activities related to ESI given in Article XXI (b) of GATT. In 
other words, ESI in these IIAs will be limited to narrow ‘security’ interests limited to military 
type threats. A narrow interpretation of ESI, on these lines, can also be supported in light of 
the object and purpose of majority of Indian IIAs being investment protection and thus 
exception from investment protection should be narrowly construed.864    
 
This narrow interpretation is also supported by the manner in which this term is understood in 
the Indian domestic legal system.865 The discussion on domestic law is not to suggest, in any 
way, that this meaning should be imported in the treaty. The purpose is to shed light on the 
meaning of the treaty term while fully recognising that the source of law is the treaty and not 
Indian domestic law.866  
 
                                                
862 Akande and Williams (2003), 384-385.  
863 In this context it has been argued that a wide range of legitimate ESIs are conceivable and in principle any 
policy interest of certain intensity may be legitimately protected under Article XXI - Schloemann & Ohlhoff 
(1999), 444. This is a broad interpretation not supported by the text of Article XXI.  
864 A similar argument was made by the Enron tribunal, supra n for NPM provision in US-Argentina IIA – see 
para 331. Also see Canfor Corporation v USA and Terminal Forest Products Ltd v USA, Decision on 
Preliminary Question, 6 June 2006, para 187 online 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CanforTerminalDecision6June2006.pdf which held that exceptions in 
international instruments should be construed narrowly.   
865 For instance, while discarding the narrow interpretation of ‘essential security interest’, the Continental 
tribunal referred to the treaty practice of the US and the intention of US to have a NPM provision, which is 
broad enough to deviate from substantive obligations to preserve national interest – Continental tribunal para 
181, Vandevelde (1992), 222-223 
866 The CMS (paras 200-246); Sempra (paras 247-256); and Enron (paras 218-225) tribunals looked at 
Argentina’s domestic law including the interpretation of emergency developed by the courts of Argentina to 




The Indian Constitution does not contain the phrase ESI but ‘security of the state’ in Article 
19 (2)867 and in Article 311 (2) (c).868 The Indian Supreme Court, in Union of India v 
Tulsiram Patel stated that the phrase ‘security of the state’ cannot be confined to an armed 
rebellion or revolt but included other instances as well such as leaking secrets or information 
about defence services to outsiders, terrorist related activities, dissatisfaction in armed forces 
or other utterances intended or calculated to have the above effects.869 The court, thus, said 
that there are various ways in which the ‘security of the state’ can be affected and that it is 
not possible to enumerate these ways.870 Thus, the court’s understanding of ‘security of state’ 
stretches beyond armed rebellion and revolt to other security related issues such as leaking 
sensitive information, terrorist activities etc; however remains related to strict security related 
issues only and does not include other issues related to economy, health or environment 
within the ambit of ‘security of state’.   
 
The court also drew a distinction between ‘security of the state’, ‘public order’ and ‘law and 
order’. The court held that situations that affect ‘public order’ are graver than ‘law and order’ 
and situations that affect ‘security of the state’ are graver than situations that affect ‘public 
order’.871 This distinction was also emphasised in Union of India v Ram Manohar Lohia872.  
This court stated that ‘security of the state’, ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ represented 
three concentric circles.873 ‘Law and order’ is the biggest circle followed by ‘public order’ 
and ‘security of the state’ represented the smallest circle.874 This interpretation certainly helps 
in distinguishing between situations that would threaten ‘security of the state’ from those that 
would threaten ‘public order’ and also from ‘law and order’.875 However, this interpretation 
                                                
867 Article 19 (2) provides the reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and 
expression and provides ‘security of the state’ as one of the reasonable restriction on the exercise of the 
fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. 
868 Article 311 deals with dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under 
the Union of the state. Article 311 (2) (c) states that an inquiry for the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank 
for a civil servant may not be conducted in cases where in the interest of the ‘security of the state’ it is not 
expedient to hold such an inquiry. 
869 Union of India v Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416, para 143. Also see Singh (2008), 134.  
870 Id.  
871 Id.  
872 Union of India v Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1966 SC 740 
873 Id, para 68. 
874 Id 
875 Also see Romesh Thapar v State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 – where the Supreme Court said that ‘security 
of the state’ does not refer to ordinary breaches of ‘public order’ which do not cause any threat to the state itself. 
Also see State of Bihar v Shailabala Devi AIR 1952 SC 329 where incitement to commit violent crimes like 




does not shed much light on what kinds of emergencies or situations will constitute threats to 
ESI for India to deviate from its IIA obligations.  
 
An example in the Indian Constitution that links ‘security of the state’ to security related 
emergencies is given in Article 352. It provides that if the President of India is satisfied that a 
grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened whether by war or 
external aggression or armed rebellion he may by proclamation make a declaration to that 
effect.876 In this Article the phrase used is ‘security of India’ and not ‘security of the state’. 
However, both the phrases mean the same thing. This Article gives three instances where 
‘security of India’ could be threatened – war, external aggression and armed rebellion.877 It 
does not refer to any other situation that could threaten the ‘security of India’ such as 
economic, health or environmental emergency. However, Article 360 of the Indian 
constitution refers to financial emergency.878 Notwithstanding this, arguably, ‘security of the 
state’ within Indian domestic law is confined to only military and police related threats or 
conditions and does not include other non security related factors.       
 
Broad Interpretation  
 
A broad interpretation of ESI implies an interpretation where ‘state of being or feeling 
secure’ includes both - security from external threat or war – and - security from non military 
threats. It can be argued that ESI in these 46 Indian IIAs cannot be limited to the list of 
activities given in Article XXI of GATT because in all these IIAs, ESI is open ended. ESI has 
been kept open ended because unlike in India-Singapore and India-Korea IIA, in no other 
Indian IIA a distinction has been made between ‘security’ and ‘non security’ permissible 
objectives. Thus, ESI is intended to cover both ‘security’ and ‘non security’ policy objectives. 
Had the parties intended to limit the meaning of ESI only to ‘security’ objectives, they would 
have expressly done that. Furthermore, there is a key distinction between Article XXI of 
GATT and the NPM provisions in these 46 Indian IIAs – the former is self judging whereas 
                                                
876 Proclamation under Article 352 (national emergency) has been done on three occasions. ‘War’ was the 
reason on two occasions and ‘internal disturbance’ was the reason on the third occasion.   
877 Singh (2008), 953. The phrase ‘armed rebellion’ was added by the 44th amendment to the Constitution 
replacing the phrase ‘internal disturbance’ – which had a broader connotation as compared to ‘armed rebellion’ 
which is narrower and more specific. For more on this see – Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. 
Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 431. Also see – Subramaniam (2000), 134.  




the latter are not.879 In other words, the context (an integral part of treaty interpretation under 
Article 31 (1) and (2) of VCLT) of the NPM provisions in Indian IIAs is different from the 
context of Article XXI of GATT. Thus, ESI in NPM provisions in Indian IIAs has a different 
meaning from ESI in GATT Article XXI.   
  
Limitations of ESI as a permissible objective 
 
The critical outcome of the above discussion is that a narrow interpretation of ESI will 
certainly restrict India’s regulatory power. Even if a broader interpretation is adopted, which 
goes beyond a pure military threat approach, due to the presence of the word ‘essential’, it 
will include only those situations that are of a high threshold or situations of gravity which 
can be described as a serious threat to India’s security interest. Burke-White and Von Staden 
in their 2010 paper have argued that giving adequate margin of appreciation to countries in 
public law matters like dealing with an ‘essential’ ‘security interest’ will allow regulatory 
latitude to countries to use NPM provisions for their national needs.880 A deferential standard 
of review within the treaty interpretative framework will certainly help India in situations like 
a grave economic crisis engulfing the entire country to decide when does an economic crisis 
reach the threshold of an ‘essential’ ‘security interest’ and hence serve India’s regulatory 
power. However, it cannot be used to cover those policy needs that require adoption of 
measures that might affect the rights of foreign investors such as adopting measures to boost 
domestic industry in situations of economic downturn or adopting measures to boost 
industrial development in certain regions of the country. Such policy objectives, though 
important, will fail to satisfy the requirement of an ‘essential’ ‘security interest’ when ESI is 
interpreted using the VCLT rules of treaty interpretation as discussed above. In other words, 
in such situations, ESI will be inadequate as a permissible objective notwithstanding the 
deferential standard of review followed by an ITA tribunal.      
  
 
                                                
879 Kurtz has argued against using ESI in Article XXI of GATT to interpret ESI in Article XI of the US-
Argentina IIA (personal communication with Dr J. Kurtz - on file with author). Also see Kurtz (2010), 363-364 
for using human rights law to interpret ESI in US-Argentina IIA.  




Interpretation of ESI in NPM provisions containing self judging language  
 
There are four Indian IIAs – India-Korea, India-Singapore, India-Japan and India-Malaysia 
which contain ‘self judging’ language in the NPM provision. Article 10.18(2)(b) of India-
Korea881 and Article 6.12 (1) (b) of India-Singapore IIA882, which are almost mirror images 
of GATT Article XXI (b), provide that nothing in the investment chapter shall be construed 
to prevent a party from taking any actions ‘which it considers’ necessary for the protection of 
its ESI. This chapeau is then followed by a list of activities related to ESI.883 The words, 
‘which it considers’, in the respective provisions of these two IIAs imply that the host state 
will unilaterally determine the legality of measures taken to meet ESI. Thus, these words 
confer greater deference to the host state in determining which measure to adopt to achieve 
the desired permissible objective884 (this issue will also be discussed later in the section on 
necessity requirement).   
 
The interesting question is whether the self judging language also applies to indentifying 




Article 10.18 (2) (a) of India-Korea IIA states that a country is not required to furnish any 
information, the disclosure of ‘which it considers’ contrary to its ESI. In other words, this 
provision allows India to consider whether the disclosure of information is contrary to its 
                                                
881 Article 10. 18 (2) provides - Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed: 
(a) to require a Party to furnish any information, the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential 
security interests; 
(b) to prevent a Party from taking any actions which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests; 
(i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials or relating to the supply of services as carried on, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of supplying 
or provisioning a military establishment; 
(ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; 
(iii) relating to fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; or 
(iv) to protect critical public infrastructures for communications, power and water supply from deliberate 
attempts intended to disable or degrade such infrastructures 
882 Article 6.12 (1) (a) and 6.12 (1) (b) [chapeau] of India-Singapore IIA is same as Article 10.18 (2) (a) and 
10.18 (2) (b) [chapeau] of India-Korea IIA respectively, given above.   
883 See Articles 10.18 (2) (b) (i)-(iv) of India-Korea IIA, given above and Articles 6.12 (1) (b) (i)-(iv) of the 
India-Singapore IIA.  




ESI. India can decide on whether disclosing particular information will adversely affect its 
ESI only if it is allowed to decide, free of review, what this ESI is. Hence, if India can 
determine ESI under sub clause (a), free of review, then India should be allowed to self 
decide what constitutes an ESI under sub clause (b) also. It will be unusual if India is allowed 
to determine its ESI under paragraph (a) but not under paragraph (b). Same argument applies 




 Notwithstanding the above argument, there is a fundamental difference in sub clause (a) and 
sub clause (b). Sub clause (a) does not provide a list of activities related to ESI; whereas in 
sub clause (b), ESI is related to a list of activities and situations.886 This list contains all 
military type threats or where the security of the state is endangered due to a war. Thus, 
arguably, in sub clause (a), ESI has a broader scope as compared to sub clause (b).  
 
Further, in all four IIAs such as Articles - 10.18 (2) (b) of India-Korea and 6.12 (1) (b) of 
India-Singapore IIA, ‘which it considers’ (the self judging phrase) is placed between ‘taking 
any actions’ and ‘necessary’.887 Thus, India can only decide the necessary measures to be 
adopted for the protection of ESI. There is nothing in the provision to show that the host state 
also has to decide, on its own, what constitutes an ESI for the purpose of sub clause (b).   
On the basis of these arguments, one can argue that ESI can be self determined in sub clause 
(a); but not in sub clause (b).   
 
Thus, different arguments can be made on whether the determination of ESI by the host state 
under sub clause (b) is reviewable or not by the arbitral tribunal; what is certain is that 
determination of ESI under sub clause (b) can only be for the activities or situations given 
under the clause and not for any activity that falls outside this clause.888 In other words, even 
if India were to self determine ESI under sub clause (b), that self determination can only be 
for the list of activities given under sub clause (b).     
 
                                                
885 In this regard also see the arguments on Article XXI of GATT - Akande and Williams (2003), 397. 
886 See supra note 863.  
887 See supra notes 863 and 864.     




This is supported by the context (Article 31 (1) of VCLT) in India-Singapore, India-Korea, 
India-Japan and India-Malaysia IIAs. For example, in India-Singapore IIA, ESI, as a 
permissible objective, occurs under the heading ‘security exceptions’ distinct from ‘general 
exceptions’ provision. The ‘general exceptions’ provision covers other permissible objectives 
such as public health, public order, public morals, conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources. Similarly in India-Korea IIA, although ESI falls under the generic heading 
‘Exceptions’, Article 10.18 (3) states that Article 10.18 (2) (which gives ESI provision) shall 
be interpreted in accordance with the ‘understanding’ of the parties on ‘Security 
Exceptions’.889 Thus, Article 10.18 (3) provides that ESI, in India-Korea IIA, has been 
conceived and adopted as ‘security exceptions’. Further, India-Korea IIA, like India-
Singapore IIA, has provisions where NPMs can be adopted under categories like ‘public 
health’ and public order’.   
 
It can be argued that countries intended to limit interpretation of ESI, in these IIAs, because 
of the presence of other permissible objectives in the ‘non security’ part of the NPM 
provision. Thus, in case of a public health emergency, India does not need ESI and can rely 
on the ‘public health’ permissible objective occurring in the ‘non security’ part of the NPM 




Three IIAs (India-Singapore, India-Korea and India-Malaysia) provide that the ‘security 
exceptions’ are non-justiciable. For instance, Annex 10 C of the India-Korea IIA provides 
that  
‘...any decision of the disputing Party taken on such security considerations shall be non-
justiciable in that it shall not be open to any arbitral tribunal to review the merits of any such 
decision...’, 
 
This provision makes it amply clear that the arbitral tribunal cannot review the action of the 
host states related to the security considerations and this will include the determination of 
                                                
889 Article 10. 18 (3) provides – “Paragraph 2 shall be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the 
Parties regarding Security Exceptions for Investment and Non-justiciability of Security Exceptions set out in 




ESI. It has been argued that the purpose behind making security exceptions non justiciable is 
to avoid uncertainties as to the application of the security related measures.890  
 
Since these provisions are non-justicibale, India can self determine both the ESI and the 
measure to be adopted to achieve this ESI. Thus the debate on whether ESI can be self 
determined under both the sub clauses (a) and (b) in these two IIAs is immaterial. However, 
even then, India can determine ESI in sub clause (b) of both the IIAs only with regard to the 
list of activities provided and not with regard to those activities not given in sub clause (b). 
Doing otherwise will be against the intent of the countries as reflected in the text. 
It has been argued that this type of express non-justiciable language will push the invocation 
of the security exception completely outside the purview of arbitral review even with regard 
to whether it was made in good faith.891 Complete preclusion might result in India abusing its 
regulatory power.    
 
6.2.2 Circumstances of Extreme Emergency 
 
Before discussing CEE, it is important to mention that strictly speaking CEE is not a 
permissible objective. CEE actually means circumstances that are of extreme emergency 
where India can deviate from IIA obligations provided other conditions are satisfied. So, it 
essentially refers to certain circumstances and not to an objective that India seeks to achieve 
like ESI. However, in the chapter, CEE is discussed as a permissible objective because it is 
capable of including different regulatory objectives within its ambit.    
 
The Indian Constitution provides for three types of emergencies – national emergency 
(Article 352), emergency in states due to failure of constitutional machinery (Article 356) and 
financial emergency (Article 360). Article 352 talks of ‘grave emergency’, which can exist 
only in three cases – war, external aggression and armed revolt. As mentioned above, Article 
360 talks of ‘financial emergency’. The term, ‘grave emergency’ has not been defined in 
Indian Constitution and also not interpreted by the Indian courts since a proclamation of 
emergency under Article 352 has been made only on three occasions and thus there has not 
been much judicial adjudication on this. However, the Supreme Court ruling in Naga 
                                                
890 Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 494-495.  
891 Id, 495. This point has been made specifically about the India-Singapore IIA but will hold for India-Korea as 




People’s Movement v India892, threw some light on when can a situation be called ‘grave 
emergency’. The Apex Court while discussing the 44th Amendment to the Indian constitution 
that replaced the condition ‘internal disturbance’ by ‘armed rebellion’ in Article 352, 
observed that the intention behind this substitution is to limit the invocation of the emergency 
powers under Article 352 only to more serious situation where there is threat to the security 
of the country and thus to exclude situations of internal disturbance which are of lesser 
gravity. More clarity on ‘emergency provisions’ in Indian constitution comes from Article 
356, which gives the second type of emergency that can be imposed in India. This type of 
emergency is imposed when government of a state cannot be carried out in accordance with 
the provisions of the Indian constitution. In Rameshwar v India893, a case related to Article 
356, the Supreme Court said that resort to emergency provision has to be in exceptional 
circumstances when there is real and grave situation calling for drastic action.894 
 
In context of IIAs, CEE exists in 41 NPM provisions in Indian IIAs as an independent 
permissible objective as shown in Table 2. In 5 IIAs, this permissible objective is linked to 
other permissible objectives. For example, in India-Denmark IIA, the provision is - ‘In 
circumstances of extreme emergency for the prevention of diseases or pests’. The plain 
meaning of a provision like this is that it refers to only those circumstances of extreme 
emergency which are related to prevention of diseases or pests and not to all circumstances of 
extreme emergency. Similarly, India-Spain IIA provides ‘in circumstances of extreme 
emergency posing a threat to life and health of human beings, animals and plants’.  
 
In CEE the word ‘emergency’ is preceded by the word ‘extreme’. The word ‘emergency’, 
according to the English Oxford dictionary connotes a serious, unexpected, and potentially 
dangerous situation requiring immediate action. This word is preceded by ‘extreme’. By 
giving ordinary meaning to the terms used, as per Article 31 (1) of VCLT, the presence of the 
word ‘extreme’ before ‘emergency’ implies an even higher threshold for invocation and thus 
the situation has to be ‘very serious’ and ‘very potentially dangerous’, not just ‘serious’ or 
‘potentially dangerous’ to qualify as CEE.895 Therefore, CEE represents the existence of an 
exceptional circumstance whereby there is a real and grave situation calling for drastic action. 
In such circumstances, India can invoke CEE not just on grounds related to security concerns 
                                                
892 Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v Union of India AIR 1998 SC 431.  
893 Rameshwar Prasad and Others v Union of India AIR 2006 SC 980. 
894 Id, Also see Burke-White and von Staden (2008), 368.  




but also on grounds related to health896 (such as a spread of an epidemic) or environment or a 
major political crises or natural disasters897 provided the high threshold as warranted by CEE 
is reached. This is because the text of the IIA does not limit invoking CEE only for pure 
security related threats. In the absence of any explicit or implicit restriction on purposes for 
which CEE can be invoked in Indian IIAs, the correct interpretation is that CEE can be 
invoked for all policy needs provided the ‘extreme emergency’ threshold is reached. 
However, CEE also has its limitations as a permissible objective. Even if India is granted a 
deferential standard of review as argued by Burke-White and Von Staden898 to judge whether 
the ‘extreme emergency’ threshold has been reached in a particular circumstance; it will be 
extremely difficult for India to justify measure adopted for a policy need such as adopting 
measures to boost industrial development in a backward region as a ‘circumstance’ of 
‘extreme emergency’. In other words, deferential standard of review is useful in providing 
regulatory latitude to India; however such deference will operate within the treaty 
interpretative framework and hence cannot be used if a policy need cannot be brought under 
the ambit of CEE as understood pursuant to the application of the VCLT treaty interpretation 
tools.   
 
The formulation in India-Italy and India-Uzbekistan IIAs is noteworthy because it imposes a 
lower degree of threshold by the use of the terms ‘emergency’ and ‘national emergency’ 
respectively, not prefixed with the word ‘extreme’.   
 
6.2.3 Public Order 
 
Public Order as a permissible objective occurs in eight Indian IIAs as an independent 
permissible objective as shown in Table 2. Out of these, four IIAs (India-Qatar – Article 11.2, 
India-Argentina – Article 6.2, India-Portugal – 12.2, and India-Saudi Arabia – 14.2) are 
                                                
896 In case of a health emergency, it is important to make an additional point related to the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health especially for those Indian IIAs that have been entered into with WTO member 
countries. The declaration states that each country has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or circumstances of extreme urgency in matters related to health Thus, it provides the flexibility to 
countries to define a public health emergency in a manner supportive of its health needs. For those Indian IIAs 
with countries who are also WTO members, and using Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, this provision can be relied 
upon to establish the existence of a public health emergency under CEE where public health is not given as a 
separate permissible objective – see the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health WT/MIN (01)/DEC/2, 
20 November 2001 
897 UNCTAD (2009), 77 




‘modified-model NPM’ type IIAs and four of them (India-Korea – Article 10.18, India-
Singapore – Article 6.11, India-Japan – Article 11 and India-Malaysia – Article 12.1) are 
‘Article-XX’ type. India-Qatar IIA provides not just for ‘public order’ as a permissible 
objective but also for ‘morality affecting public order’. One can find out the meaning of the 
term ‘public order’ by giving ordinary meaning to the terms used. ‘Public’ in the shorter 
Oxford English dictionary means ‘of or pertaining to people as a whole’.899 ‘Order’ in the 
shorter Oxford English dictionary means ‘a condition in which the laws regulating the public 
conduct of members of a community are maintained and observed; the rule of law or 
constituted authority; absence of violence or violent crimes.900 Reading the two together 
means that ‘public order’ implies a situation where affairs related to people as a whole, which 
are reflected in the society’s public policy and laws are maintained and observed. Every 
society’s public policy and laws regulating the affairs of its people are different and hence 
India should be given some regulatory latitude in applying concepts like ‘public order’ based 
on what India considers is its fundamental interest or affair pertaining to its people as a whole 
within the treaty interpretative framework.901       
 
The Continental tribunal interpreted ‘public order’ in a broad manner and held that an 
economic crisis could also result in putting ‘maintenance of public order’ at stake.902 The 
Continental tribunal said that ‘public order’ is intended as a broad synonym for ‘public 
peace’ which can be threatened by actual or potential insurrections, riots and violent 
disturbances of the peace.903  
 
One can also have recourse to Article 31 (3) (c) of the VCLT to substantiate and further shed 
light on ‘public order’ in these six Indian IIAs. Since all the six countries (Qatar, Argentina, 
Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Korea) are WTO member countries along with India, 
one can look at the WTO agreement. Article XIV of the WTO General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) mentions public order as a permissible objective for which a country can 
deviate from GATS obligations. However Article XIV does not define ‘public order’ though 
                                                
899 United States Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Report of the 
Panel (US-Gambling, Panel Report), WT/DS285/R, para 6.463.  
900 Id, para 6.466 
901 In this regard also see the arguments of Burke-White and Von Staden that deference should be accorded to 
states in interpreting public order because such concepts are deeply rooted in domestic legal and political 
practices of different states - Burke-White and Staden (2008), 360 
902 Continental Tribunal, para 180-181.  
903 Id, para 174, para 180. On the other hand, it has also been argued that ‘maintenance of public order’ is 




footnote 5 to Article XIV (a) states that public order exception may be invoked only where a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society.  
 The WTO Panel while interpreting ‘public order’ in Article XIV of GATS in US-Antigua 
gambling904 recognized that the content of a concept like ‘public order’ for countries can vary 
in time and space, contingent upon a series of factors such as existing social, cultural, ethical 
and religious values905 and hence countries should be given some scope in defining and 
applying concepts such as ‘public order’ based on their own values and systems,906 which 
was later upheld by the AB.907 After recognizing that countries enjoy some deference in 
defining ‘public order’, the tribunal said that as a matter of effective treaty interpretation it 
should give meaning to the term ‘public order’.908 Thus, after considering the dictionary 
meanings and footnote 5 to Article XIV (a) of GATS, the tribunal held that “public order 
refers to the preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public 
policy and law. These fundamental interests can relate, inter alia, to standards of law, 
security and morality”.909  
 
Article 27.2 of the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) contains the term ‘ordre public’, which is a French term and is deemed to be 
narrower than public order.910 Although ordre public is not defined in the TRIPS agreement; 
Article 27.2 mentions that ordre public includes the protection of “human, animal or plant 
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment”, thus indicating towards its 
broad interpretation.911 In European law ordre public encompasses protection of public 
security and physical integration of individuals as part of the society.912   
 
The Indian Supreme court in Supdt v Lohia913, said that the expression ‘public order’ is 
synonymous with public peace, safety, and tranquillity.914  Courts have held that public order 
implies absence of violence and an orderly state of affairs, in which citizens can peacefully 
                                                
904 United States- Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Report of the 
Appellate Body, Adopted 20 April 2005, (US-Gambling, AB Report) WT/DS285/AB/R.     
905 US- Gambling, Panel Report, para 6.461.  
906 Id. Also see Burke-White and Staden (2008), supra note 31, 360; ICTSD-UNCTAD, 379.  
907 US-Gambling, AB Report, para 296-299.  
908 US-Gambling, Panel Report para 6.462.  
909 Id, para 6.467. Also see Kurtz (2010), 360-361; also see Trebilcock and Howse (2005), 518.     
910 Id.  
911 ICTSD-UNCTAD (2004).   
912 Id, 379.  
913 Supdt., Central Prison v Ram Manohar Lohia AIR 1960 SC 633.  




pursue their normal avocation of life915 and that it signifies absence of disorder which 
involves breaches of local significance.916 
 
Thus, what follows from the discussion above is that India should be able to make use of 
‘public order’ as a permissible objective in order to adopt measures in cases of health, 
economic and environment exigencies provided India is able to show that Indian society’s 
fundamental interest or affair related to people as a whole has been disturbed or is at risk. 
Within the treaty interpretative framework of the VCLT, India will also have due deference 
in this regard. However, the major limitation is that India will be able to do so only in case of 
eight IIAs, as the rest 65 do not contain ‘public order’ as a permissible objective. 
 
6.2.4 Public Health 
 
Another important permissible objective is ‘public health’. However, only three Indian IIAs 
contain ‘public health’ as a permissible objective – India-Mauritius (Article 11.3), India-
Japan (Article 11) and India-Malaysia (Article 12.1). Article 11 (3) of the India-Mauritius IIA 
allows the host country to impose prohibitions or restrictions of any kind to protect ‘public 
health’. A somewhat related formulation is given in India-Korea and India-Singapore IIA. 
The NPM provision in these IIAs states ‘protection of human, animal or plant life or health’ 
as the permissible objective.  
 
India-Spain IIA provides ‘circumstances of extreme emergency posing a threat to the life or 
health of human beings, animals or plants’ as the permissible objective. This goes beyond 
mere public health and also includes life and health of animals and plants. Thus, in this sense, 
is broader than ‘public health’. However, ‘threat to life or health of human beings, animals or 
plants’ is prefixed by the phrase ‘circumstances of extreme emergency’. Thus, measures to 
protect human, animal, plant life or health are to be taken only when circumstances of 
extreme emergency pose a threat to their life and health and not otherwise. This formulation 
is narrower than ‘protection of public health’ given in India-Mauritius IIA.       
 
                                                
915 Basu (1996), 1230.  




A further narrowing of the permissible objective is evident in India-Germany, India-Italy, 
India–Czech Republic, India-France, India–Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, India-
Australia, India-Kuwait and India-Malaysia  IIAs where the permissible objective is stated as 
‘circumstances of extreme emergency for the prevention of diseases’. Thus, this health related 
objective can be used only for adopting NPMs for the prevention of diseases and that too only 
in circumstances of extreme emergency and not for other reasons related to life or health of 




Barring four Indian IIAs (with Singapore, Korea, Japan and Malaysia), none of the Indian 
IIAs have ‘environment’ as a permissible objective. In the India-Korea IIA, Article 10.18 (1) 
(b) allows the host country to take measures necessary to protect environment. Apart from 
this, the same IIA also contains a permissible objective related to environment which allows 
the host country to take measures necessary to conserve exhaustible natural resources [Article 
10.18 (1) (e)]. India-Singapore IIA, unlike the India-Korea IIA, does not contain ‘protection 
of environment’ as a specific permissible objective. Rather, it allows the host country to 
deviate from its IIA obligations by taking measures related to ‘conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources’. This formulation, though related to environmental protection, is narrower 
in scope in comparison to ‘protection of environment’.   
 
Furthermore, both India-Singapore and India-Korea have environment as one of the 
objectives in the provision titled ‘measures in the public interest’. Thus, under both the IIAs, 
India can adopt an environmental measure if adopting such a measure is in public interest. 
Similar focus for protection of environment exists in India-Japan and India-Malaysia IIAs. 
This particular provision coupled with the NPM provision gives enough regulatory power to 
India to fulfill its environmental needs in these four IIAs. In rest of the Indian IIAs, reliance 
on NPM provision for environmental purposes will be difficult.   
 
6.2.6 Other permissible objectives 
 
Some other permissible objectives present in Indian IIAs are Public morals (India-Korea and 




of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value (India-Korea and India-
Singapore IIA); and taking action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security (India-Korea and India-
Singapore).  
 
6.3 NEXUS REQUIREMENT  
 
Nexus requirement in a NPM provision is the link between adopted measures and the 
permissible objective sought to be achieved through that measure. For instance, in the Indian 
Model IIA the word that links ‘nothing precludes the host country from taking action’ and 
‘protection of its essential security interests’ is ‘for’. Thus ‘for’ is the nexus requirement in 
this NPM provision. Other words that often occur in NPM provisions as nexus requirement 
are ‘necessary’ ‘related to’ ‘directed to’ etc.  
 
 
Table 6.3 Nexus Requirement in Indian NPMs 
 
Nexus Requirement  In how many NPM provisions in Indian 
IIAs  
Necessary for/to 22. In some of the IIAs, ‘necessary’ as the 
nexus requirement is present in different 
versions. For example in India Morocco – 
‘strictly necessary’; in India-Kuwait – 
‘necessary reasonable measures’; and in 
India-Singapore, India-Japan and India-
Korea – ‘necessary’ is the nexus requirement 
for some permissible objectives and not for 
all.   
For  47.    
Applying Measure ‘To’ 1 (India-Uzbekistan IIA – Article 13.2).  
‘Relating to’.  1 (India-Singapore IIA for the permissible 




resources’).   
‘Directed to’ 1 (India-Mauritius IIA – Article 11.3).  
Apply prohibitions or restrictions ‘in’   1 (India-Italy IIA – Article 12).    
 
Source: Author’s survey of 73 Indian IIAs  
 
As one can see from Table 3, out of 57 IIAs studied, 34 of them have ‘for’ as the nexus 
requirement and only 19 have ‘necessary’ as the nexus requirement. Other nexus 
requirements are - ‘to’, ‘relating to’, and ‘directed to’. The significance of the nexus 
requirement is in establishing the degree of connection between the adopted measure and the 
permissible objective sought to be achieved. The stricter the nexus requirement, the stricter 
will be the degree of connection between the measure adopted and the permissible objective 
sought to be achieved. Thus, a nexus requirement like ‘necessary’ is stricter as against 
‘related to’.917  
The discussion below will examine the meaning of the word ‘necessary’ and then 
subsequently will look at the meaning of the other ‘nexus requirements’ in Indian IIAs.  
 
6.3.1 Necessity Requirement  
 
The discussion on ‘necessary’ as the nexus requirement in Indian IIAs is under two heads – 
‘necessary’ in NPM provisions that are non self judging and those that are self judging – 
India-Korea and India-Singapore. In these two IIAs, the ‘non-security’ exception contains 
‘necessary’ as the nexus requirement, but is not self judging. Only the ‘security’ exceptions 
are self judging.    
 
‘Necessary’ in Non self judging NPM provision   
 
As it has been mentioned above, ‘necessary’ as a nexus requirement in the NPM provision 
occurs only in 22 Indian IIAs. In India-Kuwait IIA, the nexus requirement is ‘strictly 
necessary’. Thus, in this IIA, India will have to show that the measure is ‘strictly necessary’ 
and not just ‘necessary’ requiring an even stricter nexus. Another interesting variation to be 
                                                
917  In this regard, see the WTO ruling in United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 




noted is in India-Austria and India-Finland IIAs, which state ‘taking necessary action in 
abnormal circumstances’... Thus, India will have to show that the measure is ‘necessary’ and 
that ‘abnormal circumstances’ exist.    
 
However, in other NPM provisions where the word ‘necessary’ has not been qualified, the 
question is - should ‘necessary’ be interpreted using the customary defence of necessity as it 
was done by the CMS, Enron and Sempra tribunals while interpreting ‘necessary’ in the NPM 
provision in the US-Argentina IIA. These three tribunals read the customary law necessity 
defence given in Article 25 into the treaty defence and came to the conclusion that since 
Argentina’s measures didn’t satisfy Article 25, the measures were illegal.918 However, the 
LG&E tribunal first used Article XI (the NPM provision) and subsequently used Article 25 to 
support its conclusion that the measures were consistent under Article XI.919 The CMS 
annulment committee, the Continental tribunal and the Sempra annulment committee 
emphasized on the difference between the two provisions and held that Article XI of the US-
Argentina IIA differed in material respects from Article 25.920 The scholarly opinion on these 
cases is divided.921 Recently, an arbitral tribunal in El Paso v Argentina, used the customary 
law ‘necessary’ doctrine to interpret ‘necessary’ in Article XI of the US-Argentina IIA. The 
tribunal used Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT to borrow Article 25(2) (b) of the ILC Draft 
Articles (state cannot use the ground of necessity if it has contributed to the situation) into 
Article XI of the US-Argentina IIA.922 As it has been discussed elsewhere, Article 31(3) (c) 
of the VCLT provides ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’. Thus, the tribunal concluded that Article 25(2) (b) is a general rule of 
international law and hence a ‘relevant rule’ under Article 31(3) (c).923  
                                                
918 CMS Tribunal, para 304 onwards; para 353-78; Enron tribunal, para 333-334, para 339; also see the 
discussion in Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 494-495; Sempra Tribunal, paras 375 & 378.   
919 Reinisch (2007), 208; Binder (2009), 614-615. Also see Kurtz (2010), 355-356 for criticism of the 
methodology adopted by the LG&E tribunal.   
920 Sempra Annulment, para 198; Continental tribunal, para 167; CMS Annulment, para 129. On this also see 
Dolzer (2011), 714-715.  
921 See Bjorklund (2009), 493; Alvarez and Khamsi 2009, for supporting the analysis of the CMS, Enron and 
Sempra tribunals. For different views see - Kurtz (2010); Burke-White and von Staden (2008); Dolzer and 
Schreuer (2008); Gazzini (2009); Bottini (2008). Also see the discussion in Newcombe and Paradell (2009), 
494-495; Subedi (2008), 189-191; Salacuse (2010), 342-348; Sornarajah (2010), 455-465. For a critique of the 
Continental tribunal see Dolzer (2011).      
922 El Paso v Argentina, paras 613-626.  
923 Id, paras 613-621. the tribunal also went on show, very summarily, that Article 25(2) (b) of the ILC Articles 
is also a ‘general principle of law recognised by civilized nations’ by stating the UNIDROIT principles on 
international commercial contracts in support of its conclusion – para 623. The Continental tribunal had said that 
this particular provision of the customary defence of necessity ‘cannot be the yardstick as to the application of 
Art. XI of the BIT’ – see para 234. Also see A Martinez (2010) Invoking State Defences in Investment Treaty 





El Paso tribunal’s reasoning leaves one wondering why only Article 25(2) (b) of the ILC 
Articles was discussed as a ‘relevant rule’ under Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT to interpret 
‘necessary’ in the NPM provision. Article 25 of the ILC Articles, as mentioned above; 
provides four factors, related to the invocation of ‘necessity’, including the factor that a 
country cannot invoke necessity if it has contributed to the situation of necessity. Thus, why 
were other factors like the one given in Article 25(1) (a) which requires that the invoked 
measure must be ‘the only way’ for the state to safeguard its essential interest. This provision 
is also a rule of customary law and hence one fails to understand the conspicuous failure of 
the tribunal to explain why Article 25(1) (a) is or is not a ‘relevant rule’ under Article 31(3) 
(c) of VCLT to interpret ‘necessary’ in Article XI.924 Further, while the tribunal used all the 
treaty interpretation rules given in Article 31 of the VCLT in deciding whether Article XI of 
the US-Argentina IIA is self-judging;925 it didn’t discuss any of these rules in interpreting 
‘necessary’ in Article XI. It simply relied on Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT and brought in 
Article 25(2) (b) into the treaty defence without fully appreciating the differences in the 
‘context’ of the treaty exception from the customary law necessity doctrine.    
 
On the basis of this theoretical analysis, the majority in the tribunal, in a severe indictment of 
sovereign ability of a country to adopt economic policies that it prefers, concluded that since 
Argentina had contributed to the economic crisis by adopting faulty economic policies, it 
cannot invoke the ‘necessary’ defence, given in the IIA, notwithstanding the existence of an 
extremely severe political, economic and social situation.926 In other words, notwithstanding 
the severest economic, social and political crisis that Argentina faced, it could not rely on the 
treaty exception that was agreed by the countries to remedy such situations because two 
arbitrators were of the view that Argentina had contributed to the crisis and hence it cannot 
invoke the treaty exception. Arbitrator Stern, on the panel, disagreed with the majority that 
Argentina had contributed to the economic crisis. This also shows the degree of subjectivity 
involved in deciding these complex issues.        
  
‘Necessary’ in the NPM provisions in Indian IIAs is different from Article 25 for two 
reasons. First and most important, in Indian IIAs adoption of necessary measures is subject to 
                                                
924 See Gazzini (2008) on this.  
925 El Paso v Argentina, paras 588-610.  




the following condition - measures should be applied on normal, reasonable and non 
discriminatory basis (see section V). These conditions are completely different from the 
conditions that have to be fulfilled in invoking Article 25. Thus, the intent clearly is to have a 
different meaning of ‘necessary’ from Article 25.   
 
Second, interpreting ‘necessity’ requirement in NPM provisions in accordance with the 
stringent requirements of necessity in Article 25 and in a manner where the latter supplants 
the former shall make the treaty defence (NPM) inseparable from the customary law defence 
of necessity and thus will render NPM provisions in Indian IIAs futile. If Indian treaty 
makers intended to use the Article 25 defence to achieve the permissible objectives given in 
NPM provisions, there was no need to have a NPM provision because the customary defence 
is anyway available. Article 25 deals with wrongfulness in international law whereas the 
NPM provision in Indian IIAs deal with those alleged violations of the IIA that can be 
excused under the treaty.927 Another reason advanced by Burke-White and Von Staden for 
‘necessary’ in NPM provisions to be interpreted differently from the strict standard of review 
of Article 25 of the ILC Articles is based on the context of the term – ‘necessary’ occurs in 
the NPM provision which is a general exception and hence indicates that the term ‘necessary’ 
is intended to provide countries with some flexibility in achieving the permissible 
objectives.928    
 
This brings us to the next issue in interpreting ‘necessary’ in these 22 Indian IIAs. Although 
the NPM text and context in Indian IIAs makes it clear that it is different from Article 25 and 
thus the meaning of ‘necessary’ is not just indispensability and that India should have some 
flexibility in deciding which measures are ‘necessary’ to achieve its permissible objectives; 
the ‘ordinary’ meaning of the word ‘necessary’ (under Article 31 of the VCLT) gives room 
for the application of two tests929 - the least-treaty-inconsistent-alternatives-reasonably-
available test (LTIARA)930; and a proportionality or a weighing and balancing test, where the 
LTIARA test could be one part.931  
                                                
927 Sempra Annulment, para 200-203. Also see Desierto (2010).  
928 Burke-White and Von Staden (2010), 296. Also see Binder (2009), 617-620 for the argument that the 
potential of Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT to reconcile treaty and customary law standards, in case of necessity, 
is limited.   
929 Burke-White and von Staden (2008), 343. 
930 Bown and Trachtman (2009), 87.   
931 In this regard also see the arguments of Burke-White and Von Staden (2010) who argue for a margin of 




The WTO jurisprudence on ‘necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV has 
developed a two tier test involving both proportionality and LTIARA932 - first, the 
proportionality or the weighing and balancing test will weigh and balance different factors 
like the importance of the regulatory value pursued, the contribution made by the challenged 
measure to the regulatory value and the restrictive effect of the measure on international 
trade; second, if the first step yields a preliminary conclusion of the measure being 
‘necessary’, then the second step should compare this measure with other least trade 
restrictive measures, which are reasonably available to the importing country933 - the 
LTIARA test. The proportionality test in WTO has been critiqued for encroaching onto the 
host country’s sovereignty because it allows the WTO adjudicator to compare trade and non-
trade values and based on this assessment, the adjudicator can replace the importing country’s 
assessment with his/her own assessment.934 
 
The Continental tribunal used the WTO Article XX jurisprudence935 to determine whether 
Argentina’s measures satisfied the test of ‘necessity’.  The Continental tribunal asked the 
following questions - whether the measures contributed materially to the realization of ESI 
(the legitimate aim under Article XI)936; and whether a reasonable alternative measure, 
consistent to the IIA, which yielded the same result might have been available to 
Argentina.937 The tribunal answered the first question in the affirmative938 and the second 
                                                
932 See the WTO Jurisprudence on ‘necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV - Korea-Measures 
Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS 161 and 169/AB/R, 11 December 2000; 
Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican-Republic 
- Cigarettes), WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted 25 April 2005;  US-Gambling supra note 81 and 110; Brazil-Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, 17 December 2007.    
933 Diu (2010), 1093.  
934 Bown and Trachtman (2009), 85; Regan (2007), 348; Ortino (2005), 35-36; Kurtz (2010), 366-368. In 
context of GATT Article XX, also see Eeckhout (2010), 18-20 who has argued that that if intrusion in importing 
country’s sovereignty is the ground to oppose ‘weighing and balancing’ test, then even the ‘least restrictive test’ 
is also intrusive because it involves complex questions such as whether a reasonably alternative measure is 
available that achieves the same level of benefit - which is difficult to quantify.  
935 For more on the GATT Article XX test see - Trebilcock & Howse (2005), 525-538; Eeckhout (2010), 3. 
Mavroidis (2005), 190-194; Ortino (2005). For more on weighing and balancing test see - Kurtz (2010), 365-
366. Also see Newcombe (2011), 363 who has supported the use of GATT Article XX jurisprudence to interpret 
general exception clauses in IIAs. Also see Muchlinski (2009) and the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights such as Handyside v. United Kingdom, (5493/72) [1976] ECHR 5.  
936 Continental tribunal, Id, para 196 
937 Id, para 198.  




question negatively939 and thus came to the conclusion that measures adopted by Argentina 
were ‘necessary’ to protect its ESI.940  
 
In context of ITA, the arbitral tribunal should not engage in finding out how the benefit of the 
goal will balance against the restrictive effect on investment.941 Given the debate on IIAs and 
ITAs intruding too much on host country’s regulatory power and the institutional position of 
arbitrators; once it is established that the host country’s regulatory measure falls under one of 
the permissible objectives, the arbitral tribunal should only engage in finding out whether a 
less investment restrictive measure is reasonably available942 to the host country that would 
achieve the same benefit. If indeed such a measure is available, then the measure adopted by 
the host country should be held not ‘necessary’. Thus, the LTIARA test will serve India’s 
regulatory power better by dissuading the arbitral tribunal from judging the relative 
importance of India’s regulatory objective with the restriction on foreign investment. 
Furthermore, by requiring that only least investment restrictive measure, which is reasonably 
available to the host country be adopted, this test will also ensure that foreign investment is 
not unduly restricted.    
 
However, in the absence of meaning of ‘necessary’ in the NPM provision in 19 Indian IIAs, 
both the tests are applicable and it will depend on arbitral discretion as to which standard of 
review is followed in interpreting ‘necessary’.943 Furthermore, another demonstration of 
arbitral discretion is the analysis undertaken by the El Paso tribunal. Thus, an arbitral tribunal 
can even interpret ‘necessary’ in these Indian IIAs using elements of the customary law of 
necessity and thus have the same result that the methodology of confluence will have.944 
While one concedes that Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT can be used to bring in customary 
rules of international law for the interpretation of the treaty, it is also important to note that 
                                                
939 Id, paras 200-219.  
940 The only measure of Argentina that the Continental tribunal found not satisfying the requirement of 
‘necessity’ was related to restructuring of the Treasury bills – para 221. The use of WTO jurisprudence by the 
Continental tribunal has attracted some criticism because the structure of Article XI of the US-Argentina IIA is 
different from Article XX of GATT – Bjorklund and Nappert (2010); Desierto (2010); Alvarez and Brink 
(2010).  
941 Kurtz (2010), 369. 
942 A measure should be held to be reasonably available only if it is practically possible for the host country to 
adopt such a measure – See US Gambling, AB report, para 308.  
943 Also see the argument made by Burke-White and Von Staden (2010), for adopting ‘margin of appreciation’ 
as the standard of review.  
944 On using Article 25 of the ILC Articles to interpret ‘necessary’ in the NPM provision occurring in the IIA 




this does not mean a blind importation of the customary law into the treaty.945 Such 
importation has to be consistent with the overall ‘context’ of the treaty defence; else it will 
not be consistent with the scheme of the IIA. As it has been mentioned above, the NPM 
provision in Indian IIAs are drafted very differently from the stringent elements given in 
Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles and hence have a different context from the context in 
which Article 25 contains its key elements. Reading rules of necessary under the customary 
law defence into the treaty exception by relying on Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT, without 
fully appreciating the context of the treaty exception, means bringing the methodology of 
confluence through the back door to effectively negate the regulatory power of the host 
nation.           
 
‘Necessary’ in NPM provisions containing self judging language  
 
In India-Singapore, India-Korea IIA, India-Japan and India-Malaysia the chapeau of the 
‘security’ exception clause allows countries to adopt measures, which the countries consider 
are necessary for the protection of ESI, as it has been mentioned before.  
 
The presence of the phrase, ‘which it considers’, before ‘necessary’ in these four IIAs means 
that the determination of whether the measures are necessary or not will be made by India for 
achieving the ESI. In this regard, a question arises whether a ‘good faith’ review of the 
‘necessary’ measures adopted is nevertheless possible?  
 
In context of Article XXI of GATT it has been argued that although a WTO panel cannot 
determine whether the measure adopted by a state under Article XXI is necessary to protect 
its security interests; nevertheless, a ‘good faith’ review of the measure is possible.946 This 
‘good faith’ review should examine whether the country considered (genuinely believed) the 
measure to be taken necessary to tackle the essential security threat.947 Complete preclusion 
from judicial review may result in countries abusing the self judging NPM provision and 
                                                
945 On this point see Qureshi (2006), 23 for the point that Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT ‘is about interpretation 
and not about amendment or modification’. Also see Sands (1999).   
946 See Akanade and Williams (2003), 389, 393-399; Schloemann & Ohlhoff (1999), 443; 444-445.  




adopting protectionist measures and thus not balancing investment protection with host 
state’s regulatory power.948  
 
However, as mentioned above, the security exception in all these four IIAs are non-justiciable 
and thus even a ‘good faith’ review of the ‘necessary’ measure may not be possible.    
 
6.3.2 Non ‘necessary’ nexus requirements 
 
More than 35 Indian IIAs do not contain ‘necessary’ as the nexus requirement but other 
requirements like ‘for’, ‘relating to’, ‘to’ and ‘directed to’. In fact, majority of Indian IIAs (32 
out of 57 studied) have ‘for’ as the nexus requirement. It has been argued that ‘for’ as the 
nexus requirement suggests a relatively thin nexus whereby measures will be allowed as long 
as they merely further a permissible objective.949 A weak nexus requirement, like ‘for’ 
implies that India will be able to adopt a large number of measures to achieve permissible 
objectives (provided it is able to show that there exists a permissible objective as per the 
NPM provision) even if such measures are not ‘necessary’. However, the presence of ‘for’ as 
the nexus requirement creates a genuine apprehension that the NPM provision could be 
abused by India. With ‘for’ as the nexus requirement India can adopt a large range of 
measures to achieve a permissible objective even if other least restrictive alternative measures 
are reasonably available. 
 
Similarly, the nexus requirement, ‘relating to’, suggests a weaker nexus requirement as 
compared to ‘necessary’950 though stronger than nexus requirement like ‘for’. In US-Shrimp, 
in the WTO, ‘relating to’ was interpreted to mean that there should be a rational connection 
between the measure taken and the objective sought to be achieved.951 India-Singapore IIA 
has ‘relating to’ as the nexus requirement for the objective of conservation of ‘exhaustible 
natural resources’. A nexus requirement like ‘relating to’ will imply that the arbitral tribunal 
only has to see whether there is a rational connection between the measure adopted the 
objective sought to be achieved. This gives more regulatory power to India.   
                                                
948 See Burke-White and von Staden (2008), 378 who argue for a residual ‘good faith’ review; also see 
Vandevelde (1993), 176. 
949 Id, 342.  
950 Trebilcock and Howse (2005).  
951 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 




6.4 ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS IN IIAs TO WHICH NPMs ARE SUBJECTED TO 
 
Indian NPM provisions subject adoption of NPMs to certain conditions as mentioned above. 
For example, the NPM provision in India Model IIA states that measures adopted to meet the 
permissible objectives must be ‘in accordance with its laws normally and reasonably applied 
on a non discriminatory basis’. A condition such as this is intended to ensure that measures, 
adopted to achieve permissible objectives, should be applied in a manner that is just and 
rationale. These conditions are applicable for all permissible objectives whether ESI, CEE or 
other objectives like protecting the spread of diseases and pests. In other words, even when 
India has to act for its security interests, which are serious in nature (meeting the high 
threshold of ESI), it has to adopt NPMs on a normal, reasonable and non discriminatory 
basis.     
 
Amongst Indian IIAs, as many as 48 IIAs have the same condition as given in the Indian 
Model IIA. These 48 IIAs include both ‘model-NPM’ type IIAs and ‘modified-model NPM’ 
type IIAs. There are another 12 IIAs that contain conditions, which are in slight variation 
from the one contained in these 32 IIAs. For example, India-Netherlands (Article 12), India-
France (Article 12) and India-Bosnia Herzegovina (Article 12) IIAs states that measures 
adopted should be imposed in a non discriminatory manner and in good faith. Similarly, 
India-Croatia (Article 12.2) IIA, apart from the requirement that measures adopted should be 
applied normally, reasonably and on a non discriminatory basis, also includes the requirement 
of imposing measures on a non arbitrary basis. The NPM provision in India-Bosnia 
Herzegovina IIA, apart from the non-discriminatory requirement, also states that measures 
adopted should give same treatment to all investors in like situations.  
 
India-Singapore, India-Korea, India-Japan and India-Malaysia IIAs contain many elaborate 
conditions in the form of a chapeau like the chapeau of Article XX of GATT or Article XIV 
of GATS. These conditions are same as those given in the chapeau of GATT Article XX and 
GATS Article XIV. On other hand, a few Indian IIAs such as India-Germany, India-Russia 
and India-Argentina do not contain any such conditions for the application of the measures 








The NPM provision plays a key role in providing host countries with regulatory flexibility to 
deviate from investment protection to pursue non-investment related policy objectives. This 
chapter has shown that the NPM provision in majority of Indian IIAs is formulated in a 
narrow manner that will not be enough to safeguard India’s regulatory power by balancing it 
with investment protection. Barring the Indian IIAs with Korea, Singapore, Japan and 
Malaysia none of the IIAs contain a well formulated NPM provision. The nexus requirement 
































The concluding chapter notes the two key conclusions of the thesis (Section 7.1 and 7.2) and 
suggests a way forward to balance investment protection with India’s regulatory power 
(Section 7.3)  
 
7.1 VAGUE TREATY PROVISIONS  
 
The first key conclusion of the thesis is that provisions on expropriation, FET, MTP and 
NPM provisions in majority of Indian IIAs are vague, broad and indeterminate.952 The 
discussion on the expropriation provision in 73 Indian IIAs shows that ‘limited-content’ 
expropriation provisions occurring in 57 Indian IIAs neither defines expropriation nor 
provides the factors that need to be taken into account to determine indirect expropriation. 
The only indicator present in these 57 IIAs is to focus solely on effect of the measure to 
determine indirect expropriation, which should be same as effect that would result had the 
investment been directly expropriated. Thus, the implied reference is to the ‘substantial 
deprivation’ test. Only 16 Indian IIAs, provide factors that should to be taken into account in 
determining indirect expropriation. These factors focus both on the effect of the measure on 
foreign investment and the character of the measure i.e. whether the measure was adopted to 
pursue a genuine policy objective. Some IIAs, out of these 16, focus on proving intention to 
expropriate and provide an absolute safe haven to pursuing policy objectives.  
 
The chapter on the FET provision shows that in as many as 66 Indian IIAs, there is no 
indication regarding the meaning of the FET provision. Only 5 IIAs provide some indication 
regarding the content of the FET standard by linking it with MST of aliens under CIL.  The 
provisions on monetary transfer in 58 Indian IIAs provide unqualified right to foreign 
investors to transfer funds and do not recognise any exceptions to this right. Only in 15 
Indian IIAs, the provisions on monetary transfer provision recognise certain exceptions to the 
right of the foreign investors to transfer funds.   
                                                





The chapter on NPM provision shows that in majority of Indian IIAs, the NPM provision 
contains limited permissible objectives such as ‘essential security interest’ and 
‘circumstances of extreme emergency’. NPM provisions in only 4 Indian IIAs allow India to 
deviate from its treaty obligations to pursue a wide range of policy objectives like 
environment and public health apart from essential security interest.  
 
7.2 EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATIONS   
 
The second key conclusion of the thesis is that these vague, broad and indeterminate 
provisions can be given interpretations giving precedence to investment protection over 
India’s regulatory power. These vague and broad provisions give lot of discretion to ITA 
tribunals, which have interpreted similar provisions in other IIAs in ways that limit host 
state’s regulatory powers. For example, 57 Indian IIAs that indirectly refer to the ‘substantial 
deprivation’ test do not provide any further indication regarding ‘substantial deprivation’ of 
which investment. This opens up the possibility of different plausible interpretations such as 
examining whether investment as a whole has been substantially deprived to find indirect 
expropriation or severing investor’s investment into different property rights and then 
applying the ‘substantial deprivation’ test to each of these property rights to determine 
indirect expropriation. Higher degree of severance could result in more regulatory measures 
being held expropriatory. Further, due to the vagueness of treaty provisions, ITA tribunals 
have come up with three different tests to determine indirect expropriation leading to 
confusion over which test should be used if an Indian regulatory measure is challenged as 
expropriation under any of the Indian IIAs.   
  
Likewise, the FET chapter has demonstrated that FET has emerged as the most important 
treaty provision for foreign investors to challenge host country’s regulatory power. Rules of 
treaty interpretation are of limited value in case of FET provisions in 66 Indian IIAs that do 
not provide any indication regarding the content of the FET standard. The scope of arbitral 
discretion here is much larger. As the FET chapter has shown that some ITA tribunals give a 
lower threshold for the violation of the FET provision whereas some tribunals provide a 
higher threshold. All tribunals have said that honouring investor’s legitimate expectations is 




have given an expansive interpretation to legitimate expectations stating that bringing 
changes in the regulatory framework could violate investor’s legitimate expectations. On 
other hand some tribunals like Saluka call for a more balanced interpretation to determine 
whether investor’s legitimate expectations have been breached or not. These divergent rulings 
have created confusion regarding the actual content of the FET standard in these 66 Indian 
IIAs. Further, even in those Indian IIAs that link the FET provision with MST of aliens under 
CIL, one is unsure of the actual content of the FET provision due to the problems in 
determining the content of the international minimum standard.   
 
Due to the broad provision on monetary transfer in majority of Indian IIAs, India’s capital 
control measures aimed at achieving different policy objectives may be challenged as 
violation of India’s obligations contained in MTP. India will be able to defend its capital 
control measures only in 15 Indian IIAs where the MTPs recognise restrictions on the rights 
of the investor to transfer funds.  
 
Barring 4 Indian IIAs, the NPM provisions in Indian IIAs do not allow India to deviate from 
its IIA obligations for many important policy objectives because the NPM provision 
recognises a narrow set of permissible objectives. Thus, if India wishes to deviate from an 
IIA temporarily because it wishes to promote indigenous industries in a backward region of 
India which otherwise cannot compete with foreign corporations, it will not be able to do so 
without running the risk of its regulatory measure being challenged under the IIA. Further, 
the nexus requirement of ‘necessary’ can be interpreted differently as the ITA tribunal rulings 
show. Some ITA tribunals like CMS, Enron and Sempra interpreted ‘necessary’ in the NPM 
provision by relying on the stringent defence of necessity found in customary international 
law. On the other hand, some ITA tribunals like Continental interpreted ‘necessary’ by 
relying on the Article XX WTO jurisprudence. Moreover, as the NPM chapter has shown, 
‘necessary’ in the NPM provision in Indian IIAs can be interpreted either using the ‘least 
restrictive test’ or the proportionality test, which further adds to the confusion regarding the 







7.3 WAY FORWARD – BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION WITH INDIA’S 
REGULATORY POWER   
 
One approach that can be adopted to balance investment protection with India’s regulatory 
power is to interpret IIAs in a manner that balances investment protection and host state’s 
regulatory power.953 This can also be described as using the ‘interpretative-route’ to address 
the legitimacy concerns of the ITA system using different standards of review954 such as 
doctrine of proportionality955 or using the doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’.956 Schill has 
argued that to increase the legitimacy of the ITA system, the need is to focus on ‘system-
internal’ approaches.957 Such an approach means conceptualising the ITA system as a public 
law discipline and interpreting IIAs using a public law method, namely comparative public 
law.958 This puts the burden on arbitrators to strike a balance between investment protection 
and host country’s regulatory power.  
 
The ‘interpretative-route’ has many challenges in balancing investment protection with host 
country’s regulatory power. The biggest challenge is that the ‘interpretative-route’ cannot 
completely overcome the weaknesses in the substantive law i.e. the IIAs. There is only so 
much that arbitrators can do if the IIAs does not include provisions that balance investment 
protection and regulatory power of the host state.959 For example, if countries have not 
included sustainable development in the IIA, it will be difficult for arbitrators to bring 
sustainable development into the case.960 An IIA cannot be interpreted with certain objective 
in mind without taking into account the language of the treaty. Interpreting an IIA in order to 
achieve a certain objective without being mindful of the language of the treaty goes against 
the basic canons of treaty interpretation required under international law. For example, the 
expropriation chapter has shown that while the ‘police power’ test, advocated by some 
arbitral tribunals, is an attempt to show that IIAs do not come in way of countries exercising 
                                                
953 Cheng (2006), 1016; Franck (2005), 1588.       
954 See Burke-White and Von Staden (2010), 283.   
955 Krommendijk and Morijn (2009), 422; Newcombe and Paradell (2008), 363-65; Kingsbury and Schill 
(2009).  
956 Choudhary (2008), 823-27. Also see Bjorklund (2011) who argues that ‘margin of appreciation’ in 
interpreting FET may result in arbitrary treatment of those in developing countries.    
957 Schill (2011), 61.  
958 Id. Also see Montt (2009). Also see Vadi (2010), 67 – who argues that one needs to be careful while 
adopting the comparative method to the ITA system.   
959 Stern (2010).  
960 Id. Also see Brower II (2009), 354-355 – who though supporting a bottom up approach to improving the ITA 
system by emphasizing on the role that arbitrators, scholars and practitioners can play, also cautions on the cost 




their regulatory power, it goes against the plain language of the IIA. When applied in context 
of Indian IIAs, it poses many conceptual problems because the language of many Indian IIAs 
does not support such a test.      
 
Another serious challenge for the ‘interpretative-route’ to balance investment protection with 
host country’s regulatory power is the lack of consistency and coherence in arbitral 
jurisprudence that has emerged so far. One arbitral award being different from another or lack 
of coherence, in itself, should not come as a surprise in a regime that has multitude of IIAs 
existing at the bilateral level. Each IIA is different from another and hence there are bound to 
be differences in the interpretation of the provisions. Further, there is no appellate system that 
could play a role in bringing the required coherence.961  
 
 However, the deeper problem is that same IIA provision has been interpreted differently by 
different ITA tribunals. On the one hand, some ITA tribunals like Total962 have held that the 
FET provision should be interpreted in a manner that balances investment protection with 
host state’s regulatory power; many other tribunals like CMS and Enron have given FET an 
investor-friendly meaning.963 Similarly, as the NPM chapter has shown, different 
interpretative approaches were adopted by arbitral tribunals to interpret the same treaty 
defence of necessity.            
 
The thesis has discussed these different interpretative techniques that can be adopted to 
balance investment protection with host country’s regulatory power. For example, the NPM 
chapter has shown ‘margin of appreciation’ is useful in according deference to India to decide 
when the threshold is reached to invoke the permissible objective of ‘essential security 
interest’. Thus, India will be able to use ‘margin of appreciation’ in a situation of serious 
economic crisis or a serious national security to decide whether the threshold for the 
invocation of the NPM provision has reached. However, such deferential standard of review 
                                                
961 Alvarez (2005), 97. Also see Brower II (2009), 354-355 – who though supporting a bottom up approach to 
improving the ITA system by emphasizing on the role that arbitrators, scholars and practitioners can play, also 
cautions on the cost of such reliance. Disparity in the results of ITA rulings will further widen because 
differences in different treaty texts are becoming more profound with more and more countries introducing more 
detailed and substantive IIA provisions - Alvarez (2011), 636. Thus, one IIA may simply refer to the 
requirement to provide FET without providing what it contains. Whereas another IIA may provide the content of 
such FET by stating that providing FET requires each member state not to deny justice in any legal or 
administrative proceedings in accordance with the principles of due process - See Article 11(2) of the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement.  
962 Total SA v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, 27 December 2010.  




will be of limited value for those policy needs, which cannot be brought under the ambit of 
‘essential security interest’ pursuant to formal treaty interpretation rules such as an industrial 
policy favouring domestic industries for the backward region of India. The solution to justify 
such policy needs under the NPM provision is not to provide India a deferential standard of 
review, but to have a NPM provision that recognises and allows India to deviate from its IIA 
obligations for such policy needs.     
 
Likewise, the chapter on expropriation has discussed that use of ‘doctrine of proportionality’, 
as one of the interpretative techniques to balance investment protection with host country’s 
regulatory power, gives much discretion to ad-hoc arbitrators who are not embedded in the 
judicial system of the host country and do not understand the social values and ethos of that 
country and hence are not qualified to decide on extremely complex value laden judgments.  
It is contentious whether placing such high onus on international arbitrators to judge value 
laden policy objectives is appropriate.    
 
Professor Subedi has argued that ‘the business of developing law of foreign investment is too 
important an area to be left to some ad hoc tribunals established under ICSID or 
UNCITRAL’.964 Hence, the onus should primarily be on countries. This brings us to the 
‘reformulation-route’, which focuses on reformulating the IIA to balance investment 
protection with host country’s regulatory power. The recent treaty practice suggests that 
countries are keen to take control in their hands to balance investment protection with 
regulatory power and not leave it to the arbitrators. There is more and more evidence of 
countries wanting to make sure that their IIAs are more precise and clear so as to avoid 
unexpected restrictions on regulatory power. Many countries are re-negotiating their IIAs as a 
direct response to arbitral tribunal decisions that have brought to the fore new insights 
regarding the inherent risks in IIAs containing broadly defined provisions.965 Examples of 
such treaty practice have been given in the introductory chapter. Countries are making 
changes in their IIAs to negate expansive arbitral jurisprudence. For example, in the final 
draft of the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), the 
MFN provision is limited to establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, operation 
and the like and does not include matters related to dispute settlement – a clear indicator of 
                                                
964 Subedi (2006), 139 




rejecting the ruling given in Mafezzini v Kingdom of Spain and thus prohibiting an expansive 
interpretation of MFN.966  
 
Often the possibility of re-negotiating IIAs is dismissed as an extremely difficult exercise.967 
This argument ignores the evidence on countries successfully re-negotiating their IIAs. A 
good example is of the Czech Republic, which has renegotiated 22 IIAs over the last two to 
three years. India has made amendments to three IIAs with Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech 
Republic as discussed in the chapter on MTPs and NPM provisions, thus clearly showing that 
renegotiation or making amendments in IIAs is certainly possible. Further, the global 
evidence tells us that from 1998 to 2008, 132 IIAs have been renegotiated.968 
 
Another argument could be that re-negotiating IIAs involves transaction cost, and hence India 
may be deterred from doing so. While re-negotiating an IIA certainly involves transaction 
cost, as is for re-negotiating all international treaties, it is not as difficult a job as is often 
made out because most IIA obligations are undertaken at the bilateral level and in many 
cases, like that of India, are entered for 10 years with the option of reviewing the IIA after 
this period. Thus, an opportunity to review an IIA presents itself every 10 years. Further, re-
negotiating a bilateral treaty is easier in comparison to renegotiating a multilateral treaty like 
the WTO, for example. India has a pretty successful track record in renegotiating Double 
Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAAs), signed bilaterally, in order to address concerns 
related to tax evasion and black money. In the period from 2009 to 2011, India has 
renegotiated 21 of its existing DTAAs.969 Thus, if bilateral DTAAs can be renegotiated, 
bilateral IIAs can also be renegotiated.    
 
Furthermore, renegotiating an IIA does not mean that all IIAs have to be renegotiated 
overnight. It can be done over a period of time. Further, if India thinks that renegotiating the 
entire IIA with all countries is not practicable, it can at least issue joint clarifications or 
interpretations of different terms or provisions like FET that have been heavily litigated and 
whose meaning has been a cause of concern. Such joint clarifications or interpretations can 
                                                
966 For more on this see – Chalamish (2009), 331.  
967 Susan Franck (2010) as quoted in A Bjorklund (2010); Franck (2005), 1588-89.  
968 UNCTAD IIA Monitor 2008-2009).   
969 Black Money: Government ‘Seriously Considering’ Amnesty Scheme, The Hindu, September 14, 2011 




play a major role in clarifying the meaning of the vague IIA terms and hence become an 
important treaty tool for interpretation using Articles 31(3) (a) and 31(3) (b) of the VCLT.  
 
Moreover, even if one concedes that India will be deterred from re-negotiating its existing 
IIAs so as to reformulate them due the high transaction cost involved or find it difficult for 
other reasons, the outcome of such review can still be applied to the new IIAs that India is 
negotiating or wishes to negotiate in future. Furthermore, nothing stops India from amending 
its model IIA, which arguably can be used as a treaty interpretation tool under Article 32 of 
the VCLT.970  
 
At any rate, it is important to note that the process of reviewing and then clarifying the 
substantive law (which is to be done by India and its IIA partner country) and the process of 
developing well accepted and reasoned jurisprudential principles through adjudication that 
balance the interests of investors and host states (which is to be done by arbitrators) are not 
mutually exclusive.  
 
It is important to point out that by emphasising on renegotiation of IIAs, one is not stressing 
on overly specific definitions aiming to cover all potential dispute situations.971 Hence there 
will always be room for interpretation of IIAs and hence the role of arbitrators is 
indispensable. However, the quest is to have clarity in the law to be interpreted so that key 
treaty provisions do not remain as vague and as indeterminate as they currently are; and that 
interpretations of these vague and indeterminate provisions do not surprise host countries. 
Renegotiated and re-drafted IIAs or adoption of authoritative interpretations of vague 
provisions will provide a better sense and indication of the intent of the countries. Even 
arbitrators will welcome clear and non-vague treaty provisions or indicators in the IIA that 
will help them enormously to rightly ascertain the meaning of key provisions.    
 
The thesis gives below the elements that could be made part of the four key provisions 
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In order to balance investment protection with India’s regulatory power, expropriation 
provision in all Indian IIAs be reformulated by specifying that expropriation is to be 
determined relying on the substantial deprivation test. In order to make it clearer that indirect 
expropriation occurs when there is effect equivalent to direct expropriation, India could 
consider putting a phrase like ‘effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal 
transfer of title or outright seizure’ in its IIAs. Such a phrase exists in four Indian IIAs (India-
Singapore, India-Korea, India-Japan and India-Malaysia). Further, the reformulated IIA 
should also make it clearer that this deprivation should be for the investment activity as a 
whole and not for ‘taking’ individual property rights so as to make sure that tribunals do not 
indulge in conceptual severance and India is not penalised for those acts that do not 
substantially deprive foreign investment as a whole. The expropriation provision in the 
‘content-indicative’ IIAs also needs to be reformulated to get rid of the proportionality and 
purpose-only test and contain the substantial deprivation test for the investment activity as a 
whole. Further, bonafide and non discriminatory regulatory measures that the current 
formulation of the ‘content-indicative’ IIAs wants to protect from being labeled as 
expropriatory can be better protected under a suitably drafted NPM provision to help balance 
investor protection with India’s regulatory power. The reformulated expropriation provision 
focusing on substantial deprivation test along with a reformulated NPM provision will 
achieve the same objective that the ‘content-indicative’ formulation of expropriation 
provision in the IIAs seeks to achieve; however with a more clearer and effective treaty 
interpretation methodology that integrates different parts of a treaty rather than the 
methodology that conflates different standards. The formulation clearly pointing to a 
substantial deprivation test will mean that India’s regulatory measures that merely have 
economic disadvantage on foreign investment are not held expropriatory and at the same time 
will protect investment better by allowing investors remedy in cases where regulation crosses 
the threshold of substantial deprivation. After all, this is the very purpose why countries agree 
to an expropriation provision in IIAs. For those situations where a non discriminatory 
regulatory measure implemented by following due process for an important bonafide public 
purpose crosses the threshold line, India can always invoke the NPM provision to excuse the 
violation. This will also have the advantage of deterring an arbitral tribunal form second 









Indian IIAs should provide the meaning of the FET provision in order to make sure that 
arbitral tribunals do not give interpretations that might result in unexpected restrictions on 
India’s regulatory power. As the chapter on FET provision shows that linking the FET 
provision with the minimum standard in customary international law does not help much 
because of the indeterminate nature of the MST of aliens under CIL. In this regard, guidance 
can be drawn from the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, where Article 11 (2) 
states that fair and equitable treatment requires each Member State not to deny justice in any 
legal or administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process’.972 
Thus, a provision like this limits FET to denial of justice. India could consider having a FET 
provision which clearly links fair and equitable treatment to denial of justice and gross 
arbitrariness. This will help India to adequately protect its regulatory power by desisting an 
arbitral tribunal from adopting an expansive interpretation of the FET provision and at the 
same time allow foreign investors protection from grossly arbitrary actions of the Indian 




To draw guidance for the reformulation of MTPs in Indian IIAs, one can look at the MTPs in 
other IIAs.973 For example, Article 12 of the Korea-Japan IIA, like majority of Indian IIAs 
also allows for a wide range of transfers in freely convertible currencies at the market 
exchange rate and without delay. However, Article 12 also contains an exception which 
allows the host country to delay or prevent a transfer in cases of bankruptcy, insolvency or 
the protection of the rights of creditors; criminal or penal offences etc.974 Apart from this 
exception, and more importantly, this treaty has another exception contained in Article 17. 
Article 17 allows the host country to adopt measures restricting capital transactions in the 
event of serious BoP difficulties and also in cases where capital movement causes or 
threatens to cause serious difficulties for macroeconomic arrangement – like monetary and 
                                                
972 Ewing-Chow (2011).     
973 In this regard also see the argument that ‘Reforming treaties in order to grant individual nations and the 
global community the policy space to deploy capital account regulations to prevent and mitigate financial crises 
is fairly simple at the technical level but quite difficult at the political level’ – Gallagher (2012), 129.  




exchange rate polices.975 Protection of such non-monetary objectives in MTPs is evident in 
other IIAs – like – Article 7 of the US-Uruguay IIA which allows the contracting party to 
prevent a transfer through equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of its laws 
for purposes like protection of rights of creditors, or for criminal or penal offences.976   
 
India-Mexico, India-Korea and India-Singapore IIAs also provide a good model for the 
reformulation of MTPs. As discussed, these IIAs not only allow the host country to 
temporarily deviate from free transfer right for monetary objectives like a BoP crisis but also 
for other non-monetary objectives like protection of rights of creditors. These IIAs also 
establish consistency between different international obligations by referring to the IMF 
Articles. This sort of formulation is better than the model followed in those Indian IIAs that 
make transfers subject to national laws because there is a possibility of abuse by the host state 
by simply changing its domestic laws and thus it will tilt the scale too much in favour of 
India’s regulatory power against investment protection. A MTP provision, which clearly lists 
the grounds for deviation, not only allows the host country to exercise regulatory power but 
also protects foreign investment and investor’s rights.  
 
Thus, the reformulated MTP, in order to balance investment protection with India’s 
regulatory power should contain the following elements - it should allow the investor to 
transfer all funds related to investment in a convertible currency at the market rate of 
exchange; it should recognize clear exceptions to this right by allowing India to impose 
capital controls on such transfers provided such restrictions are imposed on an equitable and 
non discriminatory manner; the grounds for imposing such restrictions should cover – both 
monetary and non monetary objectives; monetary objectives should include not just severe 
BoP crisis or external financial difficulty but also other monetary objectives like maintaining 
a healthy exchange rate (as given in the Korea-Japan IIA) or preventing too much volatility in 
the stock market; such restrictions should be consistent with the IMF Articles to make sure 
that there is consistency in India’s international obligations pertaining to capital transfer; the 
MTP could create a distinction between portfolio investment and FDI in terms of imposing 
                                                
975 See Article 17 (1) (a) & (b) of the Japan-Korea IIA.  




restrictions because portfolio investments are volatile whereas FDI is more stable though, at 
times, it might not be easy to distinguish between portfolio investment and FDI.977  
       
One may question whether instead of providing exceptions within the MTP why not use the 
NPM provision to move away from the right of the foreign investor to transfer capital. While 
the NPM provision is certainly useful from the host country’s point of view to ensure that it 
enjoys regulatory power, such a provision is for the entire treaty and not just a particular 
provision. As it has been discussed above, in the present Indian IIAs, the NPM provision is 
quite narrow and allows deviation from investment protection only in exceptional 
circumstances and thus is not suitable for all kinds of monetary or non-monetary objectives. 
Even if this NPM provision is amended to include more permissible objectives (grounds on 
which a country can deviate from its investment obligations), it will be difficult to invoke the 
NPM provision for all purposes in case of restrictions imposed on monetary transfer. So, 
while the NPM provision might be invoked in cases of severe BoP crisis depending on the 
formulation, it cannot be invoked for other macroeconomic objectives like maintaining 
healthy exchange rate or for other non-monetary objectives like protecting the rights of the 
creditors. Thus the need is to have an exception within the MTP so as to let the host country 
exercise regulatory power for different policy objectives. This is also warranted by India’s 
own policy of not having full CAC and adopting a cautious approach towards capital 
accounts liberalization and Indian domestic law that recognizes the requirement to impose 




Recent treaty practice suggests that countries are adopting comprehensive NPM provisions in 
their IIAs978 in order to ensure that specific policy objectives are achieved without violating 
the IIA.979 This practice indicates that countries are starting to realise the limitations of the 
‘police power’ argument, which is often advanced as a response to a critique of textual 
indeterminacy in IIAs affecting host country’s regulatory power.  
 
                                                
977 For more examples of IIAs recognizing exceptions to the provisions on monetary transfer see – Gallagher 
(2012), 128-130.   
978 Subedi (2008), 185-187; Salacuse (2010), 341-342; Spears (2010), 1059-1062. Also see Muchlinski (2009), 
37-45; Footer (2009), 42.     




The textual indeterminacy of the NPM provision in Indian IIAs can be overcome if India 
reformulates its NPM provisions by adding ‘non security’ related permissible objectives such 
as ‘economic and social development’ ‘public health’, ‘environment’, ‘public order and 
public interest’, ‘economic crises’. Thus, with ‘economic and social development’ as a 
permissible objective in the IIA, India will not be worried to show that its NPM for such 
economic and social development need falls under ESI (which will require a high threshold). 
These ‘non security’ related permissible objectives should not be self judging; though the 
‘security’ related permissible objectives may be made self judging, but not non-justiciable 
and thus open for a good faith review. Making ‘security’ related permissible objectives non-
justiciable might be misused to the detriment of investment protection.   
 
Besides this, since the NPM provision will have permissible objectives divided into ‘security’ 
and ‘non-security’ related objectives, CEE as a permissible objective will not be needed 
because any circumstance of extreme emergency related to ‘non-security’ situations will be 
dealt under the ‘non-security’ related permissible objectives and any circumstance related to 
security situation under ‘security’ related permissible objectives.        
 
The counter argument to reformulating NPM provisions aimed at including more permissible 
objectives is that a large number of permissible objectives may result in excessive regulatory 
power for India jeopardising investment protection. Such fears can be quelled by having 
‘necessary’ or ‘related to’ as the nexus requirement for different permissible objectives and 
not ‘for’. In case of having ‘necessary’ as the nexus requirement, the NPM provision should 
provide that ‘necessary’ will be interpreted using the LTIARA test so as to bar the tribunal 
from undertaking a proportionality test to find out whether a measure is ‘necessary’. Such 
clarification assumes importance in light of the type of interpretation adopted by the El Paso 
tribunal. It is imperative that India makes it very clear that invocation of ‘necessary’ in the 
treaty is not to be confused with any element of customary international law doctrine of 
necessity.     
 
Likewise, in order to make sure that NPM provisions balance investment protection with 
regulatory power and are not abused, imposition of NPMs should be subjected to conditions 
such as measures shall be applied normally, reasonably and on a non discriminatory basis as 




conditions should exist for ‘non-security’ related permissible objectives and not for security 
related permissible objectives.  
 
A suitably formulated NPM provision will preserve India’s regulatory power along with 
investment protection.980 Further, a comprehensive NPM provision in the IIA and the rights 
and defences under CIL can co-exist unless the IIA states anything to the contrary. In other 
words, the NPM provision is activated only once the country has violated one of the 
substantive IIA provisions. For example, there can be cases where India successfully uses the 
‘police power’ argument to convince the tribunal that it has not expropriated the investment; 
nevertheless fails in doing the same with FET or any other provision. In such a situation, 
India can still rely on the NPM provision to argue that the FET violation is excused by 
showing that the measure falls under the NPM provision even if the adopted NPM violates 
any of the treaty provisions. Thus, the NPM provision operates at a different level and does 
not necessarily compete with the ‘police power’ argument981and can help India justify those 
regulatory measures that the ‘police power’ argument will fail to justify.  
 
Another factor that will act as a check on India not abusing the broadly formulated 
permissible objectives in NPM provision or for that matter any other provision that 
safeguards its regulatory power is the fact that India needs a ‘quantum leap’ in FDI in the 
coming years if it wishes to grow in double digits.982 FDI flows to India remained sluggish in 
2010 despite FDI flows to other emerging market economies like China and Brazil showing 
an upward trend.983 This is a major concern in India in the backdrop of expanding current 
account deficit.984 Thus, India needs FDI to finance its current account deficit.985 For these 
economic reasons, India will be conscious of the fact that any abuse of the NPM provision 
will hurt the sentiment of foreign investors and affect India’s reputation as an attractive FDI 
destination. India has surely moved away from the days when it espoused the creation of a 
                                                
980 Also see Burke-White and von Staden (2008); and Muchlinski (2011), 352. 
981 In this regard also see Newcombe (2011); Spears (2010), 1063.   
982 “India needs Quantum Step in Investment” ‘The Financial Times’ (17 November 2010), online 
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983 RBI (2012). 
984 Id.  
985 “India Attractive FDI Destination Despite Some Slowdown: Montek”, Deccan Herald (9 February 2011) 
online Deccan Herald  http://www.deccanherald.com/content/133008/india-attractive-fdi-destination-
despite.html - where the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of India (the top most body in policy 
formulation) emphasized on India being an important FDI destination – showing the sensitivity attached to the 




new international economic order in the sixties and seventies to embracing foreign 
investment as an integral and not peripheral in its quest for economic development. 
 
At this stage, it is also important to point out that India also needs to review the MFN 
provision in its IIAs. The White Industries case in context of India and other cases and 
academic literature on international investment law demonstrate that a broadly worded MFN 
provision can be used by foreign investors to borrow beneficial provisions from other IIAs. 
Thus, it is imperative for India to review the MFN provision so that it cannot be used to 
sidestep the renegotiated provisions of an IIA.    
 
India’s IIA programme is one of the biggest IIA programmes amongst developing countries. 
Despite this, no major study has been done to understand the Indian IIA programme in light 
of the growing global debate on IIAs and how they affect India’s regulatory power. This 
thesis has aimed to fill this gap. It has endeavoured to put the Indian IIAs at centre-stage by 
critically analyzing them in light of the growing pros and cons of investment treaty 
arbitration. It has provided significant inputs towards drafting of new IIAs and re-drafting of 
existing IIAs aimed at balancing investment protection with India’s regulatory power so that, 
as Lauge Poulsen says, India’s sovereign right to regulate is not compromised by chance.986 It 
is expected that this thesis will spur further research and discussion on Indian IIAs amongst 












                                                




















                                                
987 This list only includes IIAs that India has signed and enforced and which have been studied in the thesis. It 
does not include those IIAs that India has signed but not enforced.  
S.  
No. 
Country Date of Agreement Date of 
Enforcement 
1 The United Kingdom 14 March 1994 6 January 1995 
2 Russian Federation 23 December 1994 5 August 1996 
3 Germany 10  July 1995 13 July 1998 
4 Denmark 6 September 1995 28 August 1996 
5  Turkmenistan 20 September 1995 27 February 2006 
6 The Netherlands 6 November 1995 1 December 1996 
7 Italy 23 November 1995 26 March 1998 
8 Tajikistan 13 December 1995 23 November 2003 
9 Israel 29 January 1996 18 February 1997 
10 Poland 7 October 1996 31 December 1997 
11 Czech Republic 
Czech Republic(Protocol) 
11 October 1996 6 February 1998 
12 Kazakhstan 9 December 1996 26 July 2001 
13 Sri Lanka 22 January 1997 13 February 1998 
14 Vietnam 8 March 1997 1 December 1999 
15 Oman 2 April 1997 13 October 2000 
16 Switzerland 4 April 1997 16 February 2000 
17 Egypt 9 April 1997 22 November 2000 
18 Kyrgyz Republic 16 may 1997 12 May 2000 
19 France 2 September 1997 17 May 2000 








17 November 1997 
 
16 February 2009 
9 December 1999 
 
21 October 2009 
23 Mauritius 4 September 1998 20 June 2000 




26 October 1998 
 
12 September 2007 
23 September 1999 
 
12 May 2008 
26 Morocco 13 February 1999 22 February 2001 
27 Indonesia 10 February 1999 22 January 2004 
28 Australia 26 February 1999 4 May 2000 
29 Qatar 7 April 1999 15 December 1999 
30 Uzbekistan 18 May 1999 28 July 2000 
31 Argentina 20 August 1999 12 August 2002 
32 Austria 8 November 1999 1 March 2001 
33 Philippines 28 January 2000 29 January 2001 
34 Portugal 28 June 2000 19 July 2002 
35 Sweden 4 July 2000 1 April 2001 
36 Thailand 10 July 2000 13 July 2001 
37 Lao PDR 9 November 2000 5 January 2003 
38 Mongolia 3 January 2001 29 April 2002 
39 Croatia 4 may 2001 19 January 2002 
40 Kuwait 27 November 2001 28 June 2003 
41 Ukraine 1 December 2001 12 August 2003 
42 Cyprus 9 April 2002 12 January 2004 
43 Yemen 30 October 2002 10 February 2004 
44 Finland 7 November 2002 9 April 2003 
45 Belarus 27 November 2002 23 November 2003 
46 Serbia 31 January 2003 24 February 2009 
47 Armenia  23 May 2003 30 May 2006 
48 Sudan 22 October 2003 18 October 2010 
49 Hungary 3 November 2003 2 January 2006 
50 Bahrain 13 January 2004 5 December 2007 
51 Saudi Arabia 25 January 2006 20 May 2008 
52 Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 September 2006 14 February 2008 
53 Slovak Republic 25 September 2006 16 June 2007 
54 China 21 November 2006 1 August 2007 
55 Jordan 1 December 2006 22 January 2009 
56 Trinidad and Tobago 12 March 2007 7 September 2007 
57 Greece 26 April 2007 12 April 2008 
58 Mexico 21 May 2007 23 February 2008 
59 Libya 26 May 2007 25 March 2009 
60 Iceland 29 June 2007 16 December 2008 
61 Macedonia 17 March 2008 17 October 2008 
62 Brunei 22 May 2008 15 February 2009 
63 Syria 18 June 2008 22 January 2009 
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